Strafasia | Strategy, analysis, News and insight of Emerging Asia

In the civilizational tapestry of South Asia, customs and traditions have long held a place of quiet authority, shaping not merely social conduct but also the emotional grammar of life itself. No joy was deemed complete without the rituals that sanctified it, and no sorrow was fully expressed without the conventions that gave it form. Among these traditions, marriage stood as the most elaborate of all social occasions—an arena not only of celebration but also of reconciliation. Old grievances were set aside, estranged relatives were drawn back into the fold, and hearts, however reluctantly, were persuaded to soften in the face of collective happiness.

Yet beneath the surface of such harmony, there often lingered subtle tensions, the unspoken rivalries of kinship that found expression in curious ways. It was not uncommon, for instance, that even the arrangement of a wedding feast could become a matter of delicate contention. If the paternal uncle assumed the role of hosting, the maternal uncle might feel slighted; if the maternal aunt took charge, the paternal aunt might quietly resent her exclusion. Such grievances, though seemingly trivial, were deeply rooted in a sense of belonging and recognition. The lament, “Had I any standing in this house, I would have been asked,” was not merely a complaint but a reflection of an emotional economy in which honour and participation were intimately intertwined.

With the passage of time, many of these customs have faded into the background, softened by the forces of modernity and the changing rhythms of life. Urbanization, education, and a more pragmatic outlook have gradually eroded the rigidities of tradition. Yet, in certain quarters of the region, echoes of these old patterns persist, sometimes in altered forms but often with the same underlying impulses.

It is in this cultural context that one may find an illuminating metaphor for the conduct of nations. For just as families once vied for recognition in moments of celebration, so too do states seek acknowledgment and influence in the theatre of international affairs. The recent tensions in the Gulf have provided a telling example of this dynamic, revealing not only the anxieties of a troubled region but also the contrasting approaches of its neighbouring powers.

At a time when the world watches the Gulf with deep concern, fearing the escalation of conflict and its far-reaching consequences, Pakistan has once again articulated its long-standing commitment to peace and reconciliation. Rather than aligning itself with any camp of confrontation, it has urged all parties to seek dialogue and restraint. This posture is not born of expediency alone but is rooted in a consistent diplomatic philosophy that views stability as a shared responsibility and peace as a collective good.

What is particularly noteworthy is the response that this approach has elicited. The parties involved in the tension, recognising Pakistan’s balanced stance and its history of engagement, have shown a willingness to reach out and explore avenues of mediation. With the notable exception of Israel, Pakistan enjoys relations of varying degrees of warmth and trust with the principal actors in the region. This trust, painstakingly built over decades, has now translated into a moment of diplomatic relevance, placing Pakistan at the centre of international attention.

This is not without precedent. Pakistan’s role in facilitating the process that eventually led to the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan stands as a recent example of its capacity to act as a bridge in complex geopolitical situations. Such contributions, though often understated, have reinforced its image as a state that prefers conciliation over confrontation, and dialogue over discord.

Yet, as in the familial settings of old, where one relative’s prominence could stir unease in another, Pakistan’s emerging role has not been received with equanimity by all. In India, a country of considerable size and ambition, this development has provoked a visible discomfort. Sections of its political class and media have reacted with unusual candour, directing criticism towards their own leadership. According to them, the Indian Prime Minister Modi did nothing but forcefully hug world leaders.

Such reactions, though couched in the language of domestic critique, betray a deeper sentiment—a sense of having been left out of an important moment. The analogy to the wedding feast is difficult to ignore. There is, in the tone of some of these commentaries, an echo of that familiar grievance; that one was neither consulted nor accorded the recognition one believed oneself to deserve. Yet, in the realm of international relations, as in life, participation cannot be demanded merely by virtue of size or aspiration; it must be earned through consistent conduct and credible engagement.

India’s recent posture, marked at times by conflicting signals and selective alignments, has complicated its ability to present itself as a neutral or trusted interlocutor. Expressions of concern that appear disproportionate or insincere risk being perceived as performative rather than principled. In contrast, Pakistan’s measured and interest-free approach has found resonance precisely because it is seen as aligned with the broader desire for de-escalation.

It would, however, be a mistake to interpret this moment in purely competitive terms. The pursuit of peace is not a zero-sum game, nor is diplomatic relevance a finite resource to be hoarded. The challenges facing the Gulf—and indeed the wider world—are too grave to be reduced to questions of prestige or rivalry. What is required is a collective commitment to dialogue, a willingness to rise above narrow considerations, and an understanding that stability in one region contributes to stability in all.

In the final analysis, the lesson is both simple and profound. Whether in the intimate sphere of family or the vast arena of global politics, recognition flows not from assertion alone but from conduct that inspires trust. Just as the most respected member of a household is often the one who unites rather than divides, so too is the most valued state the one that brings others together in moments of uncertainty. In choosing the path of reconciliation, Pakistan has reaffirmed a principle that is as old as the traditions from which it draws its metaphor; that true honour lies not in being seen, but in being relied upon.

Two governments, one American and one Iranian, have made the same fundamental choice. Their citizens are paying the price. The slogan which has echoed through Iranian protest rallies during more than a year, was shouted in Ahvaz by retirees before shut offices of pension funds, in Tehran by teachers before shut ministries, and in the industrial south by workers: “Enough warmongering, our tables are empty”. It is the sentence that breaks through the haze of geopolitics with the harshness of experience. It is also, incidentally, the most accurate political analysis of this conflict that has ever been provided.

The Iran-US war which officially started on 28 February 2026 did not come out of nothingness. It came as the culmination of a long, drawn-out haemorrhage, one to which neither Tehran nor Washington was prepared to admit that it had dealt itself a self-inflicted wound. On either side of this encounter, the decision to arm the state or to feed the people had already been taken, without trumpeting or other warning, long before the first shot was fired.

In America, they enacted that decision into law. A few months after Congress muscled through the biggest-ever reductions to Medicaid and federal nutrition aid, Congress approved military expenditures of $901 billion in the next fiscal year. At least 15 million citizens would lose healthcare coverage as a direct consequence, according to the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office. The reasoning was in its defence: everything that has nothing to do with military or border security is on the chopping block. The aerospace and defence industry, in its turn, has recorded an increase of more than 21 per cent since early last year – a market message that speaks louder than any budget speech as to the direction American priorities were already taking before the bombs hit.

The welfare-warfare transition in Iran has had another, no less destructive form. The latest budget submitted by President Pezeshkian poured almost 150 percent more money into security and proposed wage increases of only a little over two-fifths of the inflation rate. This, in a country whose food prices had increased 72 percent annually by December 2025, and whose Iranian rial had depreciated by about 40 percent, following the 12-day clash with Israel the previous June. The priorities of the Iranian state were not a secret; they had been spelled out in each and every line of its budget and the former Iranian Welfare Official Warns had declared that 57 percent of Iranians were already malnourished to some degree.

The conflict is not historically important, as the United States and Iran are rivals, but the candour with which population in both countries are now identifying the trade-off their governments have chosen. Some Iranian participants in the December 2025 protests sang the song, stating that the government is preoccupied with other proxies instead of its internal requirements, “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, My Life for Iran”. These are not the mottos of a foreign-backed destabilisation program. They belong to those languages of a people who have seen their hospitals fall and their savings melt away as their government financed militia operations in four countries.

These decisions will now be compounded with the costs of this conflict. Since the attacks of 28 February, millions have been forced to flee, and thousands of people have been killed already. The energy infrastructure of the region is under acute strain, endangering food security and economic stability of South Asia and the developing world including Pakistan, which imports almost 60 percent of its petroleum in the Gulf and depends on the region remittances to keep its balance of payments afloat.

The lesson, and the tragedy, is that this was not necessary. It was adopted incrementally, by bureaucracy, and with conscious awareness of the repercussions. Governments do not often declare trading health of their citizens with military posture. They just tend to spend that amount of money every year and wait till the reckoning arrive.

It has arrived.

Power in the modern age seldom speaks in whispers; it announces itself with assertions, repetitions, and claims designed to shape perception as much as reality. In recent months, one such assertion has echoed persistently from Washington, where President Donald Trump has, on numerous occasions, declared that he prevented a full-scale war between Pakistan and India following the tense military exchange of May 2025. Repeated with striking frequency, this claim seeks not merely to inform but to construct a narrative in which the United States appears as the indispensable arbiter of peace in a volatile region.

Yet history, when examined with sobriety rather than spectacle, often reveals a more intricate truth. The brief but intense confrontation between Pakistan and India did not unfold in a vacuum, nor did its de-escalation hinge upon a single external intervention. Credible reports and observable developments indicated that the realities on the ground, particularly the balance of military response and the swift demonstration of technological capability, played a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of events. It became evident to impartial observers which side had sought external mediation, and which had asserted control through measured but firm action.

Pakistan’s conduct during and after the confrontation offers a study in calibrated restraint. A nation often compelled by circumstance to defend its sovereignty, it has consistently articulated its preference for peace, not as a rhetorical device but as a strategic doctrine. However, peace, when mistaken for passivity, invites miscalculation. The response delivered by Pakistan’s armed forces was not only swift but precise, reaffirming a long-standing principle that restraint does not equate to weakness. The memory of aerial engagements, including the capture of Abhinandan Varthaman in an earlier episode, still lingers as a reminder of how quickly the dynamics of conflict can shift when resolve is tested.

What distinguishes Pakistan’s posture, however, is not merely its capacity to respond, but its refusal to succumb to triumphalism. Military success was not followed by chest-thumping rhetoric or theatrical displays of dominance. Instead, there emerged a quieter, more dignified expression of gratitude and humility, rooted in a consciousness that power, if left unchecked by moral restraint, can become self-defeating. This balance between strength and sobriety remains rare in a world where victories are often amplified beyond proportion for domestic or international consumption.

Beyond its immediate neighbourhood, Pakistan’s diplomatic engagements further underscore its commitment to stability. Its participation in international efforts concerning the crisis in Gaza Strip, despite the evident limitations of such initiatives, reflects a willingness to contribute to collective peace even when outcomes remain uncertain. The tragic reality, however, is that while forums are convened and declarations issued, the suffering in Palestine continues unabated, exposing the inadequacy of global mechanisms when confronted with entrenched power asymmetries and selective enforcement of international norms.

The unfolding tensions involving Iran, United States, and Israel have added yet another layer of complexity to an already fragile international order. Pakistan, adhering to its consistent approach, advocated dialogue at a time when diplomacy still held the promise of averting escalation. However, the subsequent military strikes altered the equation, transforming a negotiable dispute into a confrontation marked by unpredictability. Iran’s response, both strategic and resolute, challenged prevailing assumptions and demonstrated that even under pressure, nations retain the capacity to redefine the terms of engagement.

As the conflict edged towards a precarious equilibrium, the familiar question resurfaced: who can be trusted to mediate, to guarantee, to ensure that commitments are honoured? The credibility of traditional power brokers has been eroded by precedents that cast doubt on their impartiality. In this context, attention has once again turned towards Pakistan, not as a claimant of influence but as a practitioner of balanced diplomacy. Reports suggesting its quiet but active role in facilitating de-escalation point to a recognition that effective mediation requires not only strategic relevance but also a reputation for sincerity.

This evolving role, however, is not without its challenges. Mediation in contemporary geopolitics demands more than access; it requires trust, and trust is forged over time through consistency of conduct. Pakistan’s past and present efforts suggest an awareness of this responsibility, yet the ultimate test lies in whether conflicting parties perceive it as a credible guarantor in an environment where assurances are often viewed with scepticism.

The broader lesson emerging from these developments is both sobering and instructive. Peace in the twenty-first century cannot be sustained through unilateral claims or self-congratulatory narratives. It is shaped instead by a convergence of restraint, resilience, and responsible diplomacy. Nations that possess the capacity to wage war must also cultivate the wisdom to prevent it, and those who seek to mediate must demonstrate integrity beyond rhetoric.

In this delicate balance, Pakistan appears to be carving out a role that aligns with its professed ideals. It has shown that strength need not be loud, that victory need not be vaunted, and that the pursuit of peace, though often fraught with contradiction, remains the only viable path in a world perpetually on the brink. Whether this approach will yield enduring stability is a question that time alone can answer, but for the present, it offers a counter-narrative to the prevailing discourse of power—a reminder that true leadership lies not in claiming to stop wars, but in striving, quietly and consistently, to prevent them.

The spectacle of power, when divorced from prudence, often descends into isolation. In the contemporary theatre of international politics, the United States remains a formidable actor, yet its present leadership appears increasingly estranged from the very alliances that once amplified its influence. America may not be alone, but its president stands out in solitude. The distinction is neither rhetorical nor trivial; it reflects a growing divergence between the enduring strength of a nation and the faltering credibility of its leadership.

The erratic cadence of policymaking—decisions announced with flourish only to be revised or contradicted in after-hours pronouncements—has unsettled even the most steadfast allies. Diplomacy thrives on consistency, on the assurance that commitments made today will endure tomorrow. When policy becomes a moving target, trust erodes, and with it the delicate architecture of alliances. This erosion is not confined to transient political discomfort; it strikes at the very reputation of the United States as a reliable partner. Reputations in international affairs are not easily repaired. They are built over decades and can be diminished within moments of impulsive governance.

Historians and scholars of international relations will, in due course, examine this period with particular scrutiny. They will ask why a leader, presiding over one of the most powerful nations in history, found himself rebuffed and even disregarded by traditional allies. The answer lies not merely in policy disagreements, but in the manner in which those policies were conceived and pursued. The paradox is striking: a leader projecting strength abroad while simultaneously diminishing the confidence of those whose cooperation is indispensable.

The pursuit of accolades, notably the aspiration for the Nobel Peace Prize, further illustrates this contradiction. Peace is seldom the product of ambition for recognition; it is the outcome of restraint, patience, and a measured understanding of global complexities. When the quest for such honours appears intertwined with aggressive posturing, it invites scepticism rather than admiration. The dissonance between declared intentions and observable actions becomes too stark to ignore.

Equally disconcerting are the expansive ambitions that have surfaced in recent discourse. The notion of acquiring territories such as Greenland or orchestrating the apprehension of foreign leaders and bringing them to the United States to assert control over their national resources, reflects a worldview more attuned to coercion than cooperation. Such propositions, even when framed as strategic considerations, resonate poorly in a world increasingly conscious of sovereignty and international law. They evoke an era many believed had been consigned to history, thereby alienating partners who view such ambitions as destabilising.

Compounding this unease are the controversies that have cast long shadows over the credibility of leadership itself. The appearance of Trump’s name in the Epstein files, and the perception—rightly or wrongly—of vulnerability to external pressure or blackmail, particularly in relation to Israel, has further deepened mistrust among allies. In international politics, perception often carries as much weight as reality; even the suggestion of compromised autonomy is sufficient to erode confidence. Allies are less inclined to follow a leader whose decisions may be influenced by factors beyond transparent statecraft.

Simultaneously, a moral and political re-evaluation is unfolding within allied countries. The reported letter by British lawmakers to their Prime Minister, expressing regret over Britain’s historical role in the establishment of Israel, is indicative of a broader shift in perspective. It reflects an awakening conscience that questions long-held policies and their consequences. Within this evolving context, actions perceived as endorsing or facilitating aggression—particularly in relation to Iran—have intensified discomfort among Western partners. The convergence of these sentiments has further distanced them from American policy under its current leadership.

The ongoing tensions involving Iran have thus become a focal point of divergence. While the United States has sought to exert pressure and, at times, adopt a confrontational posture, key allies have exhibited marked reluctance to align themselves with such an approach. This reluctance is not merely tactical; it stems from a fundamental disagreement over both the necessity and the morality of the course being pursued. When alliances falter in moments of crisis, it is often because the underlying trust has already been compromised.

The internal dissent within the United States adds another layer of complexity. The resignation of a senior official, who publicly questioned the justification for military action and asserted that no imminent threat existed, is emblematic of a broader disquiet within the administration itself. Such acts of protest are not routine bureaucratic occurrences; they are signals of profound disagreement at the highest levels of governance. When those entrusted with national security express dissent, it inevitably reverberates beyond domestic borders, further eroding international confidence.

Moreover, the economic ramifications of these policies cannot be overlooked. The prospect of disrupted oil supplies and the consequent pressure on global markets have alarmed not only adversaries but allies as well. Energy security remains a shared concern, and actions that jeopardise it tend to isolate rather than unite. The burden of such policies, both financial and strategic, ultimately falls upon the very nation that seeks to assert its dominance.

Perhaps most telling is the waning willingness of allied nations to commit their military resources. Armies are not instruments to be deployed at the behest of another’s ambitions without clear purpose or shared conviction. The hesitation of allied forces reflects a rational calculus: that participation in a conflict lacking coherent objectives or legitimacy carries risks disproportionate to any potential gains. This reluctance, in turn, affects the morale of the American military, which draws strength not only from its capabilities but also from the solidarity of its partners.

In the final analysis, the present moment serves as a cautionary tale about the limits of unilateralism. Power, when exercised without regard for partnership, becomes self-defeating. The United States retains immense capacity, but its effectiveness is intrinsically linked to the trust and cooperation of its allies. When that trust is undermined, even the greatest power finds itself diminished.

America endures, as it has through many trials, but the path to restoring its standing will be neither swift nor simple. It will require a recommitment to the principles that once underpinned its leadership: consistency, moral clarity, respect for international norms, and an appreciation of the value of alliances. Until then, the paradox will persist—of a nation that is not alone, yet a leader who stands increasingly so.

Since the British imperialism, the South Asian region had a unique interlink of its security architecture across the sides of the Indus Valley, stretching from the Kabul to the Delhi affecting each other’s policy decisions. This made the British Government to carve out a buffer in the form of Afghanistan, instead of incorporating it into the British empire. In the similar vein, the security architecture of the South Asian region of the 21^st century still depends on the similar horizon with the addition of Islamabad at the centre of this security dynamics. Each of the country’s policies generating ripple effects for the other two. On this note, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) provides an important analytical framework to perceive this interlocking security architecture from the lens of the security complexes.

The RSCT is primarily authored by Barry Buzan in his work, “Peoples, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (1983)” and later developed it further with Ole Waiver in their book “Regions and Power: The structure of the International Security (2003)”. As per the RSCT, despite the socio-political and economic integration of the global order, the security architecture of the states is divided in different regions which have been referred as the ‘regional clusters. The security of those states in these clusters is linked with each other, where the development in one country directly affects other, subsequently paving the way for the security interdependency. These regional clusters or “security complexes”, another term use for these interlocking security regions, are understood through the long and durable patterns of amity and enmity between them shaped by politico-economic and historical factors. Furthermore, under the anarchic international system and the quest to strengthen the self-help mechanisms, the actors in these security complexes start involving global actors for aiding them in this security competition or in other word global actor act as penetrators in these regions.

In this regards, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India forms a different security complex where their security has been interlinked. For instance, Pakistan has always sought for friendly and stable Afghanistan since its independence to connect itself with the Central Asia and putting end to the tensions in its Pashtun belt originating from Afghanistan. On the other hand, for Afghanistan, Pakistan is its gateway to the warm waters and the entry to the global markets. However, the historical patterns of enmity in the form of Durand line issue, the Pashtun stan case, refugee problem and the outpouring of terrorism has generated a long-lasting security dilemma for both sides, forcing each side to view each other through the securitization lens. This has made any engagement of either country with another regional or global player directly affecting them. It is evident in the unease of Islamabad with the increasing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan. On the similar level, Pakistan’s increasing cooperation with the United States of America on the issue of terrorism just was the case when Pakistan apprehended the Abbey Gate mastermind has made the regime in Kabul anxious.

Likewise, the continuance engagement in the hot wars and the cold war in the South Asia has generated a similar security dilemma between Pakistan and India, which has interlocked their security affairs with each other. This has, subsequently, paved the way for the Great Powers penetration in the South Asia. This was the factor that Pakistan sided with the United States through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) while India consistently sided with The Soviet Union. This similar security complex is again giving birth to the great power penetration in the South Asia in 21^st century in the form of China and the United States. The Sino-Pak strategic engagement and the Indo-US increasing defence partnership are the clear example of it. For instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Indo-US 10-years’ defence pact are the two of case studies of the increasing penetration of China and the United States in the south Asia to aide their partner in this security complex. furthermore, this security interconnectivity is visible in the form of regional engagement of both sides. The case in point here is the Indian investment in the Chahbahar port and the increasing engagement with Afghanistan is the product of its securitized relations with Pakistan. The similar scenario is visible with the growing ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh in the post-Sheikh Hasina scenario.

This trifurcation of the security relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India has indeed formed a unique security complex in the South Asia, where each interaction directly or indirectly affects the other. The historical enmity of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan, has made any engagement between India and Afghanistan as what the scholar Christophe Jefferlot call a ‘pincer movement’ for Pakistan. Similarly, any ease of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will jeopardize India’s two front isolation strategy against Pakistan. This provides the significance of the Regional Security Complex Theory in comprehending the dynamics of these interlocking relations.

Another argument that RSCT put forward is that these regional clusters are not only relatively interdependent, but also indifferent to the outside security manoeuvring. In other words, the core elements of these security complexes are defined by their internal dynamics, not by external factors. In this case, the neighbouring wars although impact Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in different ways, but they cannot alter the fabric of this regional cluster. It is because the core of these security complexes is made through the internal dynamics. For instance, the trilateral relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are dictated by the geographical proximity, historical enmity, and the material grievances, not by any external entity.

To end the discussion, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India form interlocked securitized relations, where the security of one state cannot be understood by neglecting the security issues of the other two. This interdependent security apparatus among these countries is also visible in their external and internal policy choices in the form of alliance formulation and the penetration of the global powers in this security complex.  Therefore, the RSCT framework provides significant contributions not only in understanding this security complex in South Asian region but also dissecting its different contours.

The war in Iran has extended far beyond the Middle East and is now affecting other regions of Asia, particularly South Asia. South Asian countries are increasingly experiencing economic, strategic, and geopolitical repercussions from the conflict. This conflict, aggressively and illegally imposed by the United States and Israel, has not only disrupted diplomatic efforts but also challenged the foundations of international law. Iran’s retaliation to this aggression has surprised the world. But this conflict is no longer confined to the Middle East; it has spread to South Asia, sharply affecting energy markets, trade routes, and inflation dynamics. The aftereffects of war are now significant, as due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz it has been a sharp rise in global crude oil prices. Analysts warn that crude oil prices could exceed $100 per barrel. The consequences are particularly severe for South Asian countries such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.

Pakistan, a state already experiencing macroeconomic fragility, is now increasingly exposed to the economic consequences of a prolonged Iran war. Pakistan, the first South Asian country, has the highest oil prices at 321 per litre, which may increase to 500 if the conflict prolongs. This is because Pakistan imports approximately 39% of its oil from Gulf countries. Due to the conflict and the disruption of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan has been severely affected, as more than 70% of its oil imports pass through this critical route. Beyond the economic repercussions, the Iran war has generated serious security and diplomatic challenges for Pakistan. Pakistan shares a border with Iran while maintaining strategic relations with both Iran and the Gulf States. Pakistan faces a delicate geopolitical balancing act. A prolonged escalation of the conflict could heighten border tensions, exacerbate regional instability, and potentially lead to refugee inflows.

India, the most populous state in the world and South Asia’s largest economy, also faces a different and equally set of challenges. Right now, due to disruptions in the global gas trade caused by conflict, India is facing a significant LPG shortage. Despite its reliance on oil and gas imports, the war also presents a significant foreign policy challenge for New Delhi. India depends on the Gulf states not only for energy supplies but also for critical sectors ranging from aviation connectivity to fertilizer imports. Notably, nearly 10 million Indians are employed across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, collectively remitting over $51 billion annually. Consequently, any escalation of conflict in the region has the potential to adversely affect these remittance flows. Any escalation in regional conflict risks undermining these remittance flows and destabilizing India’s external economic position.

Bangladesh, though often less emphasized in strategic discourse, is equally vulnerable to the cascading effects of the Iran war.  As an energy-import-dependent economy, Bangladesh relies heavily on imported oil to sustain its industrial growth and power generation. Rising global energy prices have already placed significant pressure on its balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves. Higher fuel costs translate directly into increased production expenses in key export sectors such as textiles, thereby undermining Bangladesh’s competitiveness in global markets.  According to a new policy analysis by the South Asian Network on Economic Modelling (Sanem), a prolonged US-Israel war on Iran could reduce Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) by as much as 3 percent over the next two years.

Conclusively, the US-Israeli illegal imposition of the war on Iran represents not merely a localized conflict but a broader geopolitical crisis with far-reaching implications for South Asia. Countries such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are interconnected with the Middle East through energy dependencies, trade linkages, and labour migration. The disruption of critical maritime chokepoints, volatility in global energy markets, and uncertainty in remittance flows collectively exacerbate economic vulnerabilities across the region. The disruption of critical maritime chokepoints, volatility in global energy markets, and uncertainty in remittance flows collectively exacerbate economic vulnerabilities across the region. Furthermore, the conflict introduces complex diplomatic challenges, forcing South Asian states to navigate competing strategic interests while safeguarding their national priorities. If the conflict persists, its long-term consequences may include sustained inflationary pressures, weakened economic growth, and heightened regional instability. Therefore, a coordinated diplomatic effort and diversification of energy and trade dependencies remain essential for mitigating the adverse impacts of this evolving crisis.

On March 18, 2026, during her testimony, DNI Tulsi Gabbard said that the development of long-range ballistic missiles in Pakistan could include ICBMs with a range sufficient to reach the homeland, and that Pakistan (as well as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea) was researching and developing various new types of novel missile delivery systems which could put the U.S. within range. This was paraphrased in news reports as Pakistan being one of the largest threats of nuclear attacks on America. Gabbard was repeating American sanctions announcements: in December 2024, Deputy NSA Jon Finer said that the new large-diameter rocket motors of Pakistan would one day enable strikes far further afield, and the U.S. sanctioned Pakistani design entities that create missiles, on the grounds that they may eventually develop an ICBM.

The military and government of Pakistan have always characterized their nuclear and missile countermeasures as a deterrent to the Indian action and not as an offensive to the U.S. As an example, the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan reacted to the 2024 sanctions by stating that they were unfortunate and have no rationality and that its strategic capabilities were only used to protect its sovereignty and ensure the stability of the region. The Ministry also continued that the weapons of Pakistan are aimed at safeguarding its sovereignty and maintaining peace in the region of South Asia, but are not directed to attack another nation. Likewise, in 2025 Pakistan declared a new Army Rocket Force; in its official announcement, it said that it would focus on conventional missiles; nuclear weapons would be controlled by the Strategic Plans Division. Simply put, the Pakistani authorities categorically deny the idea of attacking foreign countries and their weapons are self-defensive.

There is a general agreement among security experts that the nuclear-missile posture of Pakistan is region oriented. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan exists mostly to deter India and until now there is no sign that it has been developed to serve any other purpose other than India. Pakistan is also reported by SIPRI to have continued to develop new delivery systems and hoard fissile material in 2024, which Pakistan may expand its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, but not a threat to the U.S directly. This crisis of India and Pakistan of 2025 is also reported by the same SIPRI report where even minor strikes could easily escalate the situation into nuclear war, as both the countries are very careful over any form of usage.

In addition, analysts say that the present range of missiles that Pakistan has is nowhere close to the U.S. The Shaheen-III is its longest-range solid-fuel missile, with a range of approximately 2,750 km (sufficient to hit Indian territory and including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but barely the Pacific or the coast of the continental U.S.). No missile with a range beyond this has been publicly demonstrated by Pakistani forces. In comparison, very small number of countries (Russia, China, North Korea) have missiles with the capability of striking American homeland. According to SIPRI Yearbook, the modernization in Pakistan is intensive and the country can increase its armoury but even now, the country is still way behind the arsenals of the United States and the Russians.

The nuclear policy of Pakistan has been based on the India-Pakistan rivalry. Since the first test by India, in 1974, Pakistan sought to have nuclear weapons as a form of self-defence because they anticipated that deterrence was a means of deterring an interstate war at the major level. In a direct retaliation against India, Pakistan performed its nuclear tests in 1998. Since that time each of the two countries has stocked missile force against the other with a balance of assurance of mutual destruction being rather unstable. The official policy of Pakistan, which has been reaffirmed by traditional nuclear strategists such as Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, is that its arsenal is meant to prevent Indian aggression and not to start a conflict. It is noteworthy that Pakistan has had a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and even suggested official restraints.

These facts negate the implication that Gabbard puts across, that Pakistan is turning to threat the U.S. As a matter of fact, Pakistani leaders have made it publicly known that their missiles are a sacred trust to deter. Although U.S. intelligence is justified to observe any developments overtime, scholars note that it would be impossible to turn the other cheek because doing so would necessitate Pakistan to cast off its traditional India-oriented stance a move that has no public record