A critique on Indian nuclear doctrine

Since the overt nuclearization of South Asia by India in 1998; Pakistan has taken corrective measures to restore strategic balance in region, being put at risk by India. As stated in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) of 1998, and Cabinet Security Committee’s (CCS) reviewed doctrine officially published in 2003, India has chosen Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The basic aim of this study is to investigate the truthfulness of this claim that India adheres to CMD in its nuclear doctrine.

Indian DND has not been considered as an official document, it still castes an overriding shadow on the minds of the Indian strategic community. The document published by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 2003 is considered as an official doctrine of India. The CCS document has taken its intellectual roots in the DND, but it differs from the former in certain aspects, that will be elaborated in detail. Now this study will examine the provisions of the CCS document and relate it to the concept of minimum deterrence.

The concept of minimum deterrence gained pre-eminence in 1950’s and 1960’s in the debates being generated in the proposals pertaining to general and complete disarmament. The basic assumption of the minimum deterrence is the existence of small yet survivable nuclear arsenal that is capable of absorbing enemy’s first strike and launching a second strike on the adversary for an unacceptable damage. The mere ability to inflict an unacceptable damage in the retaliatory mode ensures the functioning of deterrence, as predicted by the provisions of minimum deterrence. Within the concept of minimum deterrence, there seems no provision of nuclear first use or war fighting strategies.

Rajesh M. Basrur’s conception of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) is hinged on the minimalism and existentialism. However, citing the shaky ideational base of the umbrella concept: CMD; he contends that states may choose to keep nuclear weapons deployed within the rubric of CMD. At the prima facie, it looks incoherent with the dictums of the minimum deterrence to keep nuclear weapons in ready to use state, as CMD calls for the retaliatory function. Hair-trigger nuclear postures have provisions of launch on warning, although these kinds of nuclear strategies are conceived with in the notions of nuclear war-fighting, which contrast heavily with the notion of minimum deterrence.

Bharat Karnad related the concept of recessed and opaque deterrence with the minimum deterrence. He criticized CMD as a concept that contrasted with the ideological foundations of the minimum deterrence. He was of opinion that adding the qualifier “credible” has opened the window for expanding the nuclear arsenal at any time, thus elasticizing the notion of minimum deterrence.

For ensuring the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage, R. Rajaraman underscored the importance of the ensuring redundancy and stressed for the formation of strategic triad. As substantiated by the writings of Indian scholars, Indian conception of CMD has provisions of the deployed nuclear weapons and a hair-trigger posture, contrasting heavily with the classical definition of the minimum deterrence.

The DND talked about the provision of punitive retaliation in case of an adversary’s first strike; however, clause 2.3 of the CCS document entails the launch of massive retaliation, in case the deterrence fails. It is imperative here to probe into the reasons why India switched to massive retaliation in the official doctrine. Lieutenant General Balraj Nagal (Retd) has tried to explain this shift while criticizing the graduated deterrence strategy. Gen Nagal opines that the provision of punitive retaliation is a kind of graduated deterrence strategy, in case of deterrence failure, launching a proportional response may not inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary and shrink its warfighting potential, thus ceding initiative to him. In the nuclear war-fighting, if an adversary strikes one’s Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms in response to a punitive retaliation, the defender state will suffer and loose its ability to terminate the conflict at the lowest possible cost. While inspired from the US nuclear strategy of massive retaliation coined by John Foster Dulles, India chose the former.

India issues a threat of massive retaliation in case of a nuclear first strike on its territory, or its forces placed anywhere in the world in reference to clause 2.2 of the CCS document. A pertinent question strikes to one’s mind, what if the Indian forces are invading a state and violating its territorial integrity and sovereignty; In any such case issuing a threat of massive retaliation for executing compellence (a form of strategic coercion) would sound credible and work out? A simple answer to this paradoxical question is no. Compellence being a form of strategic coercion aims to alter the status-quo than to preserve it (deterrence). If India is aiming to alter the status quo by executing the threat of massive retaliation; in response a state will be pushed to use a low yield weapon to stop Indian forces attempting to penetrate deep into its territory, and the threat of massive retaliation will lose its credibility. Eventually, India will fall into the commitment trap.

The clause 2.2 of the CCS document also talks about the provision of the No First Use (NFU). However, academic treatment is required to test the veracity of the argument. Interpretation of DND by former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon in his book choices and at an address in National Defence College, has hinted at the provisions of nuclear first use.  He was of opinion that India will not be the first to initiate the process of launching nuclear first strike. In other words, he was implying that in case of any country preparing to launch a nuclear first strike on India, it reserves the right to launch a pre-emptive nuclear first strike. Former Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned the authoritative nature of the official doctrine and raised the doubts on the absoluteness of the NFU claim. In reference to clause 2.6 that India will use the nuclear weapons in case of any chemical or biological weapons attack on its territory or forces anywhere, further doubts will be raised on the NFU policy.

A question needs to be posed here: Why India wants to go nuclear first? As reflected in the DND and CCS document, there are no explicit provisions allowing for the nuclear first use. The provision of massive retaliation was aimed to deter a full-scale nuclear attack on India and prevention of an all-out war. Since 1998 Pokhran tests, two neighboring countries have never fought a full-scale war, so deterrence at the strategic level is working. The problem arises when India tries to pursue Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC’s) while threatening Pakistan of massive retaliation in case of former’s nuclear first use or hinting at launching nuclear first strike on Pakistan to execute escalation dominance. Is India aspiring to launch a comprehensive or splendid first strike on Pakistan to annihilate its nuclear arsenal? India can aspire to pursue this, however material capabilities i.e. possession of real time intelligence about all the Pakistan’s mobile launchers, submarines and hard silos seems impossible for India.

Although development of supersonic and sub-sonic cruise missiles, coupling Multiple Independent Targetable Vehicles (MIRVS) payloads with different short and medium range ballistic missiles and possession of Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD) reflects the transitioning to nuclear first use. Engaging Counter-Force (CF) targets have its own operational complexities. To engage variety of CF targets, military planners need varying yields of weapons with high precision. Additionally, most of the CF targets are placed in the vicinity of urban centers, in this fashion the prospects of massive collateral damage increase by manifolds.

The study finds out that the CCS document focused more on the credibility and survivability of the nuclear arsenal, rather than on minimalism. As reflected by various statements of Indian policy makers, India aspires to use nuclear weapons first for executing diplomatic coercion over Pakistan, but lacks the capability. This tendency to use the weapons first by India will give birth “to use it or lose it” dilemma in South Asia. Indian military planners should accept the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) proposed by Pakistan in 1998, and adjust their doctrine while paying heed to the tenets of the minimum deterrence, and avoiding the notion of maximum credibility.