A Silent Nuclear Threat

The appearance of nuclear weapons became one of revolutionary changes in world history, becoming a potent umbrella and at the same time safeguard against major wars of power between the nuclear states. But in today’s digital age, a new force threatens this fragile balance: the substitution of information and computer technology into nuclear systems. Nuclear weapons have strategies that have been embedded in most nations to address issues of security and as these nations integrate cyber capabilities into these strategies, then the emergence of cyber vulnerabilities marks a crucial global safety concern. This growing cyber-nuclear convergence brings novel threats, thus, requiring policy responses.

In particular, one can state that nuclear deterrence was always tightly connected with highly protected and effective C&C systems. The former ensures that nuclear decision ‘making never drifts beyond the legally designated authority while the latter ensures that even the orientation of an attack, through missile placement, remains within the purview of the authorized controller. However, as such advanced cyber technologies are sunk deeper into such processes ranging from encrypted messaging to defensible machine intelligence threat recognition it offers new potential loop holes for the adversaries. It’s classic of the cyber tools, fast and efficient, but what has enhanced the rate of efficiency and speed is what could equally cause large-scale vices, should certain computers are misused or infected by notorious hackers.

Potential terrorists targeting nuclear systems may cause very undesirable consequences, such as false alarms, uncontrollable missile launches, and interference with communication in the critical periods. Even a break-in into the system, or even the slightest interference, can replicate a nuclear launch warning that would set states on alert and create the conditions for the escalation of a conflict even when no attempts are being made to unleash a nuclear attack. This destabilizing potential means that the world safety depends on defending the systems which were created to get rid of war.

In order to see how dangerous this threat is, it is possible to turn to the example of the Stuxnet virus, which marks one of the first attempts at hacking at the infrastructure of a state and disclosing weaknesses in it. The worm, Stuxnet, was reportedly created by operatives of a state and was aimed at Iran’s centrifuges to knock these off balance and delay Iran’s nuclear program without going to a conventional war. Although this attack was aimed at the infrastructure rather than the weapons themselves it aimed to achieve strategic military goals to show how cyber operations could serve a purpose. If such tools were used against nuclear command systems, they would be disastrous in their consequences.

Other major cyber incidents explain the following risks: The WannaCry ransomware attack of 2017 continued to hit the world’s computer networks across healthcare facilities, railways, and many more. While the Solar Winds attack targeted U.S’ government organizations, such breaches show how they are easy for cybercriminals to launch advanced cyberattacks on even well-protected networks. Since the aforementioned nuclear states like the United States, Russia, and China understand these vulnerabilities, tremendous value relies on guaranteeing no such vulnerability affects nuclear command and control systems.

New possibilities for accidental launches, general destabilization, and in particular the exacerbation of conflicts now exist due to the incorporation of cyber technology into nuclear systems. In the worst case, an intruder may get in the system and produce false missile firing signals, leading a nation to retaliate on the basis of such a signal. In addition, even if no actual nuclear launch takes place, undermining and disrupting command and control relationships may slow decision making at a critical time and the subsequent decisions may be catastrophically misperceived.

These vulnerabilities also threaten to undermine the very principle of the concept of deterrence which is based on each state’s confidence in the security of its preferred arsenal. If a nation perceives that its nuclear systems are threatened by the cyber realm, it will act either preemptively or undertake measures that are likely to spirits, leading to proliferation. The possibility of cyber – mocking causing an unplanned sense of escalation might fuel development of a new generation of cyber weapon systems, nations hacking and defending other’s nukes, adding to the global insecurity.

While the UN and other international organizations have advanced in managing nuclear threats, current systems fail to effectively solve problems connected with the cyber-nuclear connection. The UN and some bilateral treaties recognize the function of cybersecurity, although no global treaty addresses cyber threats directed at nuclear systems. This lack of regulation indicates that the industry requires broad guidelines covering structural worries and modern cybersecurity threats at the same time.

International organizations continue to require the efforts of multilateral organizations like NATO or the UN or regional affiliations to develop special norms for the cyber domain of nuclear power. That is why the collaborative governance is justified by the threats that the existence of cyber capabilities represents to the international security, even if the states believe that they are strategic components of their security systems. As chemical and biological warfare are beyond what should be acceptable in war, similar strict action should be taken when one nation attacks another’s nuclear system.

Based on the examples, the following policy directions become imperative as prerequisites towards the reduction of the risks associated with the cyber-nuclear nexus: First, states require enhancing the protection of nuclear C&C from cyber threats, which means that the corresponding systems should be shielded from hackers. This should consist of annual cycles of cyber-security stock-takes, susceptibility reviews and the implementation of state-of-art cyber-defense solutions.

Second, they should encourage formulation of treaty which is concerning the relationship between cyber and nuclear. These agreements may cover such measures as reciprocal commitments to noninterference with nuclear management and control arrangements or even the absence of efforts to create new pieces of cyberware targeted at disrupting the latter. In that regard, prioritizing cyber-nuclear arms control means starting the gradual processes of framing the existing gaps in the evolution of global governance.

Third, training and nudging cyber norms that are direct to the nuclear world would assert that cyberattacks on nuclear systems are not acceptable conduct. They would complement early efforts that still guide international relations not to use WMDs to solve conflicts since interference with nuclear-command structures through cyberspace is detrimental to all human beings.

Finally, confidence-building measures referring to accidental escalation of situation such as setting up of cyber ‘hotline’ between two countries possessing nuclear weapons system. They would let states provide explanations for any suspicious cyber operation, thus decreasing the probability of cases where misunderstanding occurred and war might have broken out.

While cyber domain keeps on transforming the national security architecture, the threats eliminating in the cyber-nuclear domain require attention. Merely recognizing that cyber threats create new points of weakness for nuclear systems is one thing, however policies aiming at curbing it should be the norm. The world and especially the other responsible nuclear states need to formulate full-spectrum security strategies for these vital systems. World leaders and governments bear an obligation to defend the world against a foreseeable cyber-nuclear catastrophe and to guarantee that the security mechanisms designed to save us from harm do not push the world over the edge.