ATACMS and Its Transformative Impact on the Russia-Ukraine War

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has raged on for more than 1000 day, and is marked by transforming battle lines, evolving military strategies, introduction of new military technologies, and deepening geopolitical ramifications. One of the recent developments that could impart significant impact on the battlefield is the introduction of the long-awaited Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) into Ukraine’s arsenal.

In the past, the United States has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s request for delivery of ATACMS citing concern over inadvertent escalation. But in an attempt to undermine Russian efforts to retake territories in Kursk Oblast currently occupied by Ukrainian forces, Washington has lifted the restriction from provision of ATACMS to Ukrainian forces. Additionally, the move can be regarded as a direct response to deployment of North Korean troops by Russia to combat Ukrainian forces. On political scale, it appears that Biden administration is seeking to consolidate Kyiv’s position in battleground before Trump’s administration arrives to the White House with aims to quickly end the conflict. For some analysts, however, ATACMS supply at this stage of war is too little and too late in Washington’s support to Ukraine.

The ATACMS is a short-range ballistic missile system designed for stand-off precision strike capabilities. It has a maximum range up to 300 kilometers (about 186 miles), allowing it to hit targets deep behind enemy lines. ATACMS is launched from two different mobile platforms: wheeled HIMARS which can carry one missile, and tracked M-270 which can carry two missiles simultaneously. The high mobility of launch platform grants rapid mobility capability which profoundly enhances survivability against counter-battery fire.  With Circular Error Probability (CEP) of approximately nine meters, the precision of ATACMS makes it a more lethal weapon when compared with rocket artillery systems currently operated by Russia.

One of the primary ways ATACMS will influence the war is through Ukraine’s enhanced strike capabilities. With its longer range, Ukraine can potentially target Russian command posts, supply depots, and critical infrastructure well beyond the frontline. This capability provides a strategic advantage, allowing Ukraine to degrade Russian logistical support, disrupt command and control, and diminish Russia’s ability to sustain its offensive operations. For instance, Russian troops rely heavily on a network of supply routes to transport ammunition, fuel, and other essential materials to the front lines. By striking at these logistical hubs, Ukraine can create significant gaps in Russian operational capabilities. It can also force the Russians to relocate critical assets further from the front line, complicating their operations and leading to possible overextension. Historically, Russian military doctrine has relied on employment of brute force based on overwhelming force and concentrated firepower. However, with the introduction of precision-strike capabilities like ATACMS in Ukrainian hands, the Russians will likely need to reconsider their troop deployments and command structures.

On November 19, Ukraine struck the city of Karachev located 75 miles deep into Russian territory using ATACMS for the first time. The attack also paved the way for the use of other Western long-range weapons, like air-launched Storm-Shadow/Scalp cruise missiles, against targets deeply situated in Russian mainland. According to data compiled by Institute for Study of War (ISW), hundreds of Russian military targets are now within the range of ATACMS. Russia has already moved 90 percent of military aircraft, particularly fighter-bombers equipped with glide bombs, away from strike envelop of ATACMS and Storm-Shadow missiles. However, at least 209 of 245 targets are land based and are not air-force bases. This suggests that besides pushing Russian Air Power further away from battlefronts, ATACMS now cover wide range of fixed military assets which are crucial for sustaining Russian war fighting efforts.  This could lead to a more conservative approach from Russia, slowing its offensive momentum and causing logistical and operational inefficiencies. Besides pulling deeper, Russia can also resort to multi-layer air-defense systems for intercepting ATACMS and protecting high-value military infrastructure. The efficiency of this approach is dubious as Russian defenses are already over-stretched and cannot reliably defend against proliferating threats of drones, decoys, electronic warfare, stand-off munitions, and saturation strikes.

Moscow has warned that use of ATACMS has initiated a new phase of war and has vowed to act accordingly. But this warning is more a political rhetoric than an actual threat as Moscow has very limited option in its disposal to escalate the conflict. In theory, this escalation can be undertaken either on vertical scale or horizontal scale. On vertical scale, Russia got both conventional as well as nuclear options in its disposal. From conational perspective, Russia has already used high-end weapons, like hypersonic cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and thermobaric ordinance, against Ukraine. Therefore, Russia cannot introduce any new conventional weapon as a retaliatory response to ATACMS. However, just to achieve psychological dominance through power demonstration, Russia can theoretically use its older generation inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with conventional payload. Yes, from military value perspective, this move will be counter-productive as ICBMs are very expensive and lack precision of a cruise missile. With conventional payload, ICBMs won’t be able to cause as much damage as is often perceived. But from psychological warfare perspective, Russia can demonstrate its will to introduce ‘new weapons’ in battle in response of any high-end Western weapon system used by Ukraine.

From nuclear perspective, the use of ATACMS can be linked up with risks of nuclear retaliation considering Russia’s recent lowering of nuclear threshold for responding with nuclear weapons against major conventional attack. However, ATACMS, despite being a potent conventional weapon, does not pose any existential threat to Russia thereby undermining the prospects of nuclear retaliation. The battlefield is vague, and Ukrainian forces are too dispersed to justify use of even Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs) by Moscow. Additionally, the severity of political, diplomatic, economic, and military consequences of using any type of nuclear weapon will continue to compel Russia to avoid adding any nuclear dimension in this conflict.

On horizontal scale, Russia is also unlikely to open any new front as it’s already running short on manpower, weapons, and supplies. Russia will continue its slow-track advance in Southern and Eastern battlefront. Any additional support will be directed towards Kursk for pushing Ukrainian forces out of Russian mainland. And this is where ATACMS are deployed and this is where Russia has been forced to pull its military resources out of ATACMS range. Therefore, it can be speculated that Russia will increase the strength of its own forces and North Korean troops, will avoid concentration of forces particularly heavy equipment, and will rely on swift and dispersed offensive tactics to retake the Kursk region by mid-January before Trump comes to power in Washington.

The introduction of ATACMS into Ukraine’s military arsenal stands to transform the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war significantly. Its long-range precision strike capabilities will enhance Ukraine’s operational effectiveness and degrade Russia’s military efficiency. As the war continues to evolve, the true impact of ATACMS will reveal itself over time. But its highly likely that it will be escalatory in nature.