Beyond the Frenzy of Russian Space Based Nuclear Weapons

Since February 2024, the U.S security officials and policymakers have been accusing Moscow of developing a space-based nuclear weapon. In their assessment, Russia plans to develop a nuclear satellite that would lurk in the Outer Space and would eventually be, if and when it becomes absolutely necessary, detonated. Washington believes that it is in response to the Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture, a US project intending to deploy thousands of small satellites in the Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) tailored for military use. Detonating a nuclear weapon in space, albeit devastating as it would indiscriminately impact the satellites in the orbit, seems to be an effective counter measure when satellites in such number have to be dealt with. Purportedly fearing the same, the United States and Japan co-sponsored a resolution in Security Council last year, calling for prevention of nuclear weapons in space. China abstained while Russia vetoed the resolution on the grounds that it doesn’t address banning all space weapons.

Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture is a divergence from the conventional concept of having bulky military satellites with a limited-service span and an easy target for anti-satellite weapons. Since these satellites are numerically limited, it gives the adversary an option to target all, or strategically important few of them inhibiting the warfighting capacity of the owner country on ground. Hence these satellites have started to make lesser sense, both economically and strategically, as the space technology has evolved considerably since the Cold War era. The war in Ukraine has been a success story of the constellations of small, dispensable satellites cementing the assertion that it is the future of space frontier. Starlink did not even have complementing a military operation as an objective when the project was conceived, yet its role in Ukraine’s war efforts has been instrumental.  This has bolstered the view in favor of having a constellation of small expendable satellites that get the job done. These satellites, however, are vulnerable to nuclear explosion in the space to withstand the electromagnetic pulse and radiation.

James Acton, the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has illustrated an elaborate scenario of how the Russian space nuke could lead to a crisis instability between Russia and the United States. Considering nuclear weapons have once again taken over the imaginations of strategists and academics since the Ukraine War, he has crafted an ominous yet thoughtful argument regarding Russian nuclear satellites in orbit. It would have a profoundly devastating impact across domains indeed because of ubiquitous utility of space technology in everyday life. He points out that President Putin would not refrain from detonating a nuclear weapon in space, irrespective of the externalities, at a moment when he fears losing decisively to the United States. The fate of Saddam Hussain and Muamar Gaddafi would be on his mind, he argues. A pertinent point indeed, with a little caveat however. The fall of Saddam Hussain germinated from the baseless assertion of weapons of mass destruction unequivocally echoed by Bush Administration. The United States has a documented history of false saber-rattling regarding weapons of mass destruction leading an entire region to chaos to date, how and why should the world believe that the U.S officials are telling the truth this time?

Russia has been vehemently denying the allegation ever since it was made.  The US believes that these systems will be deployed into the space for indefinite period prior to the conflict. In the scenario James Acton built in his opinion piece, the decisive action would have to be taken by the US President once they are in orbit leading to crisis instability. However, an important link in the chain of events leading to ultimately eliminating the nuclear satellite in space is intelligence. Given that Russia has a mature and entirely indigenous space echo system, if it decides to build a satellite of the kind, it has the ability to keep the entire process entirely secret. How certain would the top intelligence echelon in the United States be regarding the payload carried by the Russian satellites? And more so, how confident would the US President at the time be with the intelligence shared with him/her about the Russian nuclear satellite in space? Ultimately the buck stops here. The disaster in Iraq and the imminent nuclear escalation that might follow would be looming large on the mind of anyone sitting in the Oval Office at the time. The strategic calculus in this situation is much more complicated than what Acton has argued.

The open source has a dearth of evidence to support the US claim and Russian denial. Responding to a question about Russian Space nukes at the Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference 2024, Russian expert, Dmitry Stefanovich said, “Even some of the US military officials are saying that this is not about the project to develop a weapon, but a project to look into the possibility of thinking if it would make any sense to deploy such weapon”. If that is believed to be the case, it is more of scenario planning rather than an actual project where a satellite capable of nuclear detonation is being built somewhere in Russia. The reality could be either way, or somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, even thinking on this line should be a matter of concern. And it would continue to be a matter of concern unless, to begin with, an unambiguous multilateral space treaty is agreed upon with a consensus that space is out of bound for nuclear weapons. The only definitive and multilateral regulatory framework in place at the moment is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Its effectiveness has been questioned for a while now as the geo and astropolitical dynamics have been in a constant state of flux since the cold war. Prevention of Arms Race in the Outer Space (PAROS) has been on the agenda of Conference on Disarmament (CD) since 1982. The lack of consensus surrounding the verifiability mechanism and realism centric distrust pertaining to space weapons has hindered progress. Consequently, four countries have already demonstrated their direct ascent ASAT capabilities, notwithstanding other space-based option to disrupt the operations of satellites.

The treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in the Outer Space and of the Threat or the Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, co-sponsored by Russia and China, is the only comprehensive draft proposed on the agenda of CD. The initial draft was presented in 2008 followed by an updated proposal of the treaty in 2014. United States has rejected both the proposals citing the fundamental flaw that the treaty does not address the terrestrial direct ascent ASAT weapons. The treaty also lacks the verifiability mechanism to prevent placement of weapons of in the outer space. Despite its flaws, in the absence of alternative proposals, it could serve as a good starting point of negotiations pertaining to placement of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, in space which is the most pressing concern of the United States at the moment pertaining Outer Space. In its criticism, the United States has called out Russia and China for its hypocrisy of tabling a resolution preventing the weaponization of space and doing exactly the same in practice. Ironic yes, but given the nature of geopolitical competition it is understandable too. In the absence of a binding space agreement, every country is bound to address its security needs and if an agreement isn’t reached sooner rather than later, more countries are likely to proceed in this direction.

James Acton in his article has advocated for a bilateral arms control mechanism to deal with the issue, which he himself believes is a far-fetched idea considering the existing state of arms control negotiations between US and Russia.  Even if somehow, both parties agree to reach an understanding, it would account for only a temporary fix. There is more than one global strategic dyad at present, US-China and Pakistan-India to name the others. And there might be a possibility that more of such dyads emerge in the future. Hence, for starters, the only durable solution is a consensus based comprehensive multilateral space treaty catering to contemporary realities which addresses the issue of nuclear weapons in space once and for all. Reaching this feat might enable the states to discuss eventual de-weaponization of Outer Space. Right now, both United States and Russia want to address all space weapons at once resulting in US rejecting PPWT and Russia vetoing US-Japan resolution at the security council. Considering how far countries have gone down this road, it is a non-starter and highly unlikely to yield anything substantial.