Deterrence, Not Aggression: Debunking Tulsi Gabbard’s Claims on Pakistan’s Missile Ambitions

On March 18, 2026, during her testimony, DNI Tulsi Gabbard said that the development of long-range ballistic missiles in Pakistan could include ICBMs with a range sufficient to reach the homeland, and that Pakistan (as well as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea) was researching and developing various new types of novel missile delivery systems which could put the U.S. within range. This was paraphrased in news reports as Pakistan being one of the largest threats of nuclear attacks on America. Gabbard was repeating American sanctions announcements: in December 2024, Deputy NSA Jon Finer said that the new large-diameter rocket motors of Pakistan would one day enable strikes far further afield, and the U.S. sanctioned Pakistani design entities that create missiles, on the grounds that they may eventually develop an ICBM.

The military and government of Pakistan have always characterized their nuclear and missile countermeasures as a deterrent to the Indian action and not as an offensive to the U.S. As an example, the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan reacted to the 2024 sanctions by stating that they were unfortunate and have no rationality and that its strategic capabilities were only used to protect its sovereignty and ensure the stability of the region. The Ministry also continued that the weapons of Pakistan are aimed at safeguarding its sovereignty and maintaining peace in the region of South Asia, but are not directed to attack another nation. Likewise, in 2025 Pakistan declared a new Army Rocket Force; in its official announcement, it said that it would focus on conventional missiles; nuclear weapons would be controlled by the Strategic Plans Division. Simply put, the Pakistani authorities categorically deny the idea of attacking foreign countries and their weapons are self-defensive.

There is a general agreement among security experts that the nuclear-missile posture of Pakistan is region oriented. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan exists mostly to deter India and until now there is no sign that it has been developed to serve any other purpose other than India. Pakistan is also reported by SIPRI to have continued to develop new delivery systems and hoard fissile material in 2024, which Pakistan may expand its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, but not a threat to the U.S directly. This crisis of India and Pakistan of 2025 is also reported by the same SIPRI report where even minor strikes could easily escalate the situation into nuclear war, as both the countries are very careful over any form of usage.

In addition, analysts say that the present range of missiles that Pakistan has is nowhere close to the U.S. The Shaheen-III is its longest-range solid-fuel missile, with a range of approximately 2,750 km (sufficient to hit Indian territory and including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but barely the Pacific or the coast of the continental U.S.). No missile with a range beyond this has been publicly demonstrated by Pakistani forces. In comparison, very small number of countries (Russia, China, North Korea) have missiles with the capability of striking American homeland. According to SIPRI Yearbook, the modernization in Pakistan is intensive and the country can increase its armoury but even now, the country is still way behind the arsenals of the United States and the Russians.

The nuclear policy of Pakistan has been based on the India-Pakistan rivalry. Since the first test by India, in 1974, Pakistan sought to have nuclear weapons as a form of self-defence because they anticipated that deterrence was a means of deterring an interstate war at the major level. In a direct retaliation against India, Pakistan performed its nuclear tests in 1998. Since that time each of the two countries has stocked missile force against the other with a balance of assurance of mutual destruction being rather unstable. The official policy of Pakistan, which has been reaffirmed by traditional nuclear strategists such as Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, is that its arsenal is meant to prevent Indian aggression and not to start a conflict. It is noteworthy that Pakistan has had a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and even suggested official restraints.

These facts negate the implication that Gabbard puts across, that Pakistan is turning to threat the U.S. As a matter of fact, Pakistani leaders have made it publicly known that their missiles are a sacred trust to deter. Although U.S. intelligence is justified to observe any developments overtime, scholars note that it would be impossible to turn the other cheek because doing so would necessitate Pakistan to cast off its traditional India-oriented stance a move that has no public record