From Ladder to Elevator: India, Pakistan, and the End of Predictable Escalation

The recent conflict between India and Pakistan has upended the widely held notion that conflict escalation in South Asia will follow a sequential pattern. This stepwise escalation pattern has traditionally been conceptualized, using Herman Kahn’s “Ladder of Escalation” model. This model was basically established during the Cold War era and was used to describe conflicts as progressing in discrete, incremental steps starting from diplomatic dissent to full-fledged wars. In the context of South Asia, this model has held significant gravity for a long period of time such as during the Kargil War of 1999, the 2001–2002 military standoff following the attack on the Indian Parliament, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the purported Uri surgical strike of 2016, and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, where each side escalated in measured, incremental steps. But quite shockingly in May 2025, we saw a dramatic shift from the traditional notion of escalation to a rapid escalation model, losing the rungs of ladder and moving to a non- linear mode of escalation, unlike the traditional “ladder of escalation” model. This has exacerbated the predictability of unpredictability in the South Asian region.

On 22 April 2025, militants struck a tourist group at Pahalgam, in the South Eastern part of Anantnag District of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K). This attack caused 26 deaths, and several injured. The Indian government and media accused Pakistan harbouring the militant groups who launched this attack. Pakistan strictly condemned the attack and offered a joint investigation to find the true culprits of the attack. This diplomatic gesture of Pakistan is reminiscent of its previous efforts for peace building in the region, such as after the Pathankot airbase attack of 2016. India, instead of considering peaceful means of dispute resolution, opted for an aggressive posture, and launched several air-to-surface missile strikes targeting Pakistan.

For Pakistan, this was a serious security concern which made Pakistan think of recalibrating its deterrence framework, considering the risk of accidental escalation and miscalculations in the region. The Indian attack has also eroded all the traditional norms of limited reprisals confined to Kashmir only. India in its Operation Sindoor launched missile and drone strikes into Pakistani territory of Punjab and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, depicting a clear message that India can go far beyond in aggression, even blurring the lines between a conventional and a strategic conflict. It is very interesting to know that the Indian defence sources stated in The Hindu that Operation Sindoor was “aimed at neutralizing militant infrastructure and deter future attacks,” but no joint or independent investigation was offered for identification of the perpetrators. These actions highlight the Indian doctrinal shift from traditional retaliatory strategies, such as those seen during the 2016 and 2019 episodes to an abrupt shift towards rapid escalation, with compressed decision-making time and greater chances of miscalculation.

Another drastic incident was the Indian precision strikes on the Nur Khan airbase, challenging the foundations of strategic calculus in the region. Nur Khan airbase is one of the important PAF installations in Pakistan situated in Rawalpindi, and precision strikes during the Operation Sindoor, which were confirmed via satellite imagery as told by the New Delhi TV Ltd (NDTV), depict a clear counterforce signal. This move showcases India’s strategic signalling of a rapid doctrinal shift from punitive retaliation to counterforce posturing, jumping up the rungs of the escalation ladder. This shift towards sudden pre-emptive strikes was visible from the 2019 Balakot strikes, reflecting a major disruption in the linear pattern of conflict escalation in the region. The unpredictability of the conflict has heightened drastically in the region. The conflict of May 2025 has further marked a rare instance of an aerial dog fight between two nuclear powered states i.e., Pakistan and India. Such air-to-air combat has been extremely rare in nuclearized South Asia. A similar example can be seen in history, after the Sino Soviet border clash of 1969 involving MiG-19s and Su-15s. Pakistan deployed JF‑17s and J‑10Cs, engaging almost 80 Indian aircraft, including Rafales and Su‑30MKIs. More interestingly, Chief of Indian Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan told in an interview at the Shangri‑La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, 2025, that maybe four to five Indian fighter jets were shot down by Pakistan during the four‑day conflict. He emphasized that the number is not important rather it is important to look at the mistakes made during the conflict to avoid them in the future skirmishes/clashes.

This crisis has shown conflict escalation at multiple fronts such as kinetic, cyber, conventional, and at informational level as well. Due to the spread of numerous fake news on social media sites particularly on X, formerly Twitter, public panic increased manifold. Cybersecurity forces of both states reported distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on governmental and non-governmental websites. CERT-IN of India and warning alerts regarding critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. However, this Pakistan’s NR3C reported showcase a significant departure from previous escalation patterns as previously the escalation started from provocation but went far beyond the traditional notion of conflict escalation, towards deep-strike engagement in no time. The ladder of escalation, as defined in the paradigm, follows a stepwise increase in its intensity with escalation occurring in layers such as, starting from preliminary warnings to muscle flexing by troop posturing, and limited strikes on border areas, etc., each of these steps was used to calibrate restraint and manage conflict escalation. This stepwise approach of conflict escalation used to provide space for back-channel diplomacy/international involvement. But this concept of controlled escalation vanished after the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan. Indian strikes deep in Pakistan’s strategic heartland, entirely bypassed the rungs of the escalation ladder. A new non-linear, rapid and abrupt conflict escalation type emerged which is perceived to establish a new, even more dangerous baseline for conflict escalation in the region.

Another problem that makes this issue a serious concern is the shrinking of decision-making timelines which can potentially lead to accidental escalations in the region. India is equipped with supersonic missiles, drone swarms, and highly advanced tech-driven weapon systems such as the Indian BrahMos, which is a super-sonic cruise missile, such capabilities can reduce the decision making time to less than 5-7 minutes in some cases. This further eliminates the space for deliberation or verification and thus, increases the chances of escalation to dangerous levels. This turbulence in the normalcy of conflict has seriously exacerbated the risk threshold in the region. Pakistan with its full spectrum deterrence policy, has expressed concern that any strategic action taken against its political independence will be responded to from all fronts. Whereas India’s No First Use policy comes in contrast with their practice of starting conflicts in the region as evident in the recent history as well. This ambiguity in policies and actions is creating a volatile environment where accidental escalations could possibly grow quite easily and rapidly.

To sum it up, it is believed that the conflict of May 2025 has exposed the obsolescence of the “ladder” model of escalation in the South Asian region, particularly between India and Pakistan. Escalation has now replaced the ladder with an “elevator” going towards a rapid, non-linear, and difficult to control conflict escalation. In this situation, Pakistan should recalibrate its deterrence framework, reinforce its conventional and asymmetric capabilities, re-establish military hotline communication systems at the Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO) level along with reviving the 1988 Agreement of Non-attack on Nuclear Facilities, and engage in effective diplomacy with regional and extra-regional powers.

Lastly, Track-II diplomacy should be re-established like the ones previously supported by the Stimson Centre and the Pugwash Conferences. Strategic stability can only be preserved by adapting to the realities of multi-layered warfare to significantly reduce the risk of accidental escalations in this nuclearized rivalry.