Indian Air Force’s role in Low Intensity Conflicts: A doctrinal evaluation

Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) are often identified as having short combat durations, limited geographical extensions and deployment of specialized forces; colloquially referred to as wars of insurgency or a limited conventional conflict as per US military jargons. Professor Sam Sarkesian highlights that LICs are often pursued by actors attempting to achieve escalation dominance over their adversary.. He further contends that pursuit of LICs have a political dimension embedded into it- imposition of political will.

Guilo Douhet, an Italian Air Force officer is considered the father of Air Power Theory. He was the first to highlight the strategic significance of air power over land and sea. Ensuring command of the air was considered the bedrock for executing strategic bombing over the adversary cities and shattering their will to fight. General Trenchard from the Royal Air Force (RAF) also reinforced Douhet ideas and advocated the offensive role of air power by executing aerial bombardment.

With the growing trend of great and regional powers engaging in LICs, the role of air power in contested air spaces needs a deliberation. The orthodox strategic bombing model of air power deployment can’t be pursued in the LICs, as it will not commensurate with the operational objectives, and raise the likelihood of escalation.

The 2022 IAF doctrine highlights the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) envisioned role in the entire conflict spectrum including the grey zone warfare. The doctrine further argues that with the lines between war and peace being increasingly blurred, the IAF is ready to perform a variety of operations, how unique the roles maybe. It can be inferred easily that the IAF is preparing itself to participate in LICs. As per the doctrine, application of the Indian aerospace power will be employed in nuclear as well as conventional operations. Within the conventional operations non-kinetic interdictions will also be pursued.

During times of peace, The IAF aims to maintain deterrence across the entire conflict spectrum. It is not a far-fetched possibility that the IAF will be participating in LICs to maintain deterrence. However, the operational implications of this strategy require further analysis. Deterrence can be pursued by punishment as well as denial model. Deterrence by denial at the lower level of conflict spectrum will entail the war-fighting posture opted by the IAF.

As envisioned by the IAF, there exists a No War No Peace (NWNP) environment, in such an environment the IAF will pursue following operations: information operations, shaping operations, Internal and external security operations. As NWNP is an ambiguous term, it becomes difficult to identify the conflict along the spectrum and predict the prospective levels of the force employment. Information operations pursued by the IAF in an LIC will aim to achieve information dominance via execution of electronic and cyber warfare. The IAF aspires to leverage its information superiority to attain psychological advantages in the LICs. Integrating various sensors will enhance information gathering to achieve superiority for tactical advantages.

In an NWNP environment, the IAF will pursue an offensive air defence strategy, entailing forward deployment of troops, sensor, and shooters to engage their adversary’s aerial assets including UAVs. However, forward air defense deployments may prompt limited offensive air operations in enemy’s territory. By placing air defence shooters and sensors on the forward lines, air control or relative superiority can be established vis-à-vis their adversary. Thus, paving the way for limited air incursions.

The IAF envisions the pursuit of punitive strikes against adversaries for political signaling at a strategic level. In a nuclear environment, the idea to control escalation while executing limited punitive strikes is fallacious and improbable. The IAF’s Balakot air strike in 2019, and Pakistan’s corresponding response reflects the embedded escalatory potential of punitive strikes. The IAF failed to engage targets in the Balakot operation due to Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) interdiction and graduated response. Furthermore, pursuing limited air incursion inside Pakistan’s territory against proscribed outfits without sharing credible intelligence with Pakistan appears to be an ineffective strategy, given the prospects of the escalation.

During the conflict, the IAF aims to pursue SEAD/DEAD (Suppressing and Depressing Enemy Air Defenses) operations. However, a capability once developed can be pursued in an NWNP situation as well. Additionally, the IAF aspires to pursue offensive air defence operations in LICs within NWNP environments. Collectively, these two provisions will encourage limited offensive operations by the IAF.

The Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces categorically discusses the role of the IAF in LICs alongside the Indian Army (IA). This doctrine discusses compellence as a form of strategic coercion. Furthermore, it has provisions of conflict termination. These two aspects of the doctrine need further discussion. Executing compellence aims to alter the status quo in an ongoing crisis. To pursue compellence, an adversary escalates the conflict and tactical advantage is ensured against said adversary. Conflict termination relies on a similar operational approach. The strategy of conflict termination is pursued to seize the moment of advantage in a conflict and leveraging it to materialize strategic coercion over an adversary. Strategies of conflict termination and compellence are deeply entwined with each other in terms of operational manifestation. As mandated by the Joint Doctrine, the IAF will participate in the Air-Land operations to degrade the adversary capabilities (escalation dominance) at each level of the conflict.

South Asian strategic stability will be compromised by the IAF’s pursuit of offensive operations in LICs. As validated by its doctrine and subsequent execution of limited operation in Balakot, the IAF aspires to pursue LICs to execute strategic coercion over Pakistan. Any limited air operation across the border by the IAF either focusing on maintaining air control, supporting land forces or escorting special forces, will have high escalation potential. In any such case the PAF will be compelled to deny escalation dominance to the IAF, and conflict will likely escalate to higher rungs. In a nuclear environment pursuit of LICs by the IAF will increase the prospects of the escalation. Had the IAF successfully engaged a strategic target in Balakot, the onus of response on Pakistan to ensure Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) might have complicated the situation. However, PAF’s response de-escalated the situation while denying the escalation advantage to the IAF. The IAF should reconsider its emphasis on LICs as a tool for strategic coercion over Pakistan, as the situation may get out of hands!