India’s Space Launch Failures and Global Risk

The Indian Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) was launched from Satish Dhawan Space Centre, Sriharikota, on 12 January 2026, carrying the EOS-N1 (Anvesha) hyperspectral Earth-observation satellite for military and strategic use. Fifteen other small satellites were also part of this mission. The mission failed because the rocket did not reach the planned orbit, and all 16 satellites are presumed lost after an in-flight anomaly. The rocket tumbled and lost all payloads. This failure followed a similar third stage “anomaly” that happened in May 2025’s attempted launch of a similar PSLV.

The PSLV‑C61, which was carrying India’s EOS-09 radar satellite for military use, failed during the third stage in May 2025. Media reports say a sudden drop in third-stage chamber pressure caused a loss of control, and thus the launch failed. ISRO, the Indian space agency, convened a failure review board, but its findings have not been published yet. This shows a trend of failed space launches by the ISRO.

India is trying to establish itself as a middle power in space technologies. To achieve this goal, India has sought international collaborations with the US, European, Russian, and East Asian space agencies to procure and gain expertise on critical aerospace technologies like propulsion systems, guidance kits, and other key technologies. The technologies used in space are inherently dual-use, and India has used all these collaborations to use the key technologies for military use. Launch failures on this scale also clearly spill into India’s strategic deterrent, not just its civilian space programme.

India’s space and missile programmes share expertise. Under the 1983 Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), Agni, Prithvi, and Trishul nuclear missiles were built around space-launch technology. For example, the Agni missile’s first stage is based on ISRO’s old SLV-3 booster. Some reports suggest PSLV solid stages would be used to form a 10,000-km Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which is likely India’s Agni-VI or Surya Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capable ICBM. Conversely, ISRO routinely launches satellites built by DRDO for defence, for example, EOS-N1 was developed for military reconnaissance, launched on the same launcher, blurring the lines between civil and strategic systems.

There is also a history of failure in the Indian Missile program. Multiple live tests of Indian nuclear-capable ballistic missiles failed due to issues with propulsion stages and guidance kits, which were borrowed from its civil space programmes. Missiles like Agni series, Prithvi, Nirbhay, and Akash have failed multiple times during testing.

In 2022, an Indian BrahMos cruise missile was fired into Pakistan without any warning or explanation. Pakistan handled the situation responsibly by not retaliating immediately, but India’s response was irresponsible and negligent. This shows that India has a history of uncontrolled firings of nuclear-capable missiles. In a similar yet hypothetical scenario, the Agni missile, equipped with a warhead, was produced with a propulsion system borrowed from the faulty Indian PSLV technology, and it deviates from its original pathway due to a similar kind of anomaly. Early warning (EW) sensors of Pakistan, as well as those of China, will identify the vectors; however, under the severe time constraints imposed by EW systems, Pakistan’s established emphasis on restraint and verification may be increasingly tested, even as it continues to prioritise calibrated and proportionate responses. In a real conflict, any unexplained launch or malfunction is treated as aggressive intent, not a technical glitch.

The BrahMos incident of the year 2022 has shown that such launches can happen, but not every time the results will be non-escalatory. This should be a wake-up call for the international community. Europe and the US have intensified cooperation with India’s civil space sector. The world must recognise that the dual-use technologies, which include any rocket expertise or components provided for satellites, will ultimately aid the Indian missile programme. Indeed, experts observe that slowing another country’s space-launch progress directly slows its missile development. In practice, this could mean stricter vetting of technology transfers under civil‑space agreements. Indian partners should even demand independent technical audits of dual use launch projects. Space agencies and satellite firms working with India should factor in these risks when sharing technology or ride-share agreements.

The recent failure in the launch of India’s PSLV is a worrying trend of technical inefficiency in the systems closely integrated with its strategic missile systems. When civilian and military programmes share propulsion, guidance and production chains, repeated failures cease to be minor setbacks and become sources of serious strategic risk. In the nuclear setting, there can be no room for mistakes or explanations. India’s record of launch mishaps and accidental firings reflects weak control and inadequate accountability. Unless New Delhi undertakes meaningful structural separation, transparency and restraint, its space ambitions will continue to undermine regional stability rather than enhance security.