Israel’s Doha Strike and International Law Questions

The credibility of rules lies in restraining friends as much as foes, but the Doha strike exposed how far that standard slipped. On 9 September, explosions in Doha’s Leqtaifiya district signalled an Israeli attempt to decapitate Hamas’ political leadership on Qatari soil. Qatar called it a gross breach of sovereignty. The attack exposed the United States’ (US) commitments to its Gulf allies. Analysts note that the political aftershocks of this “unlawful act” shaped the impetus for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to sign the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), which was a long time in the making. Even then, despite US prodding, it took almost a fortnight for Prime Minister Netanyahu to express “regret” to Doha, an implicit admission that a red line had been crossed.

Legally, the ground is clear. Under jus ad bellum, Article 2(4)of the UN Charter bars threats or the use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated this in the Nicaragua v. United States in 1986, treating the rule as binding on all states. Only three narrow grounds can justify force across borders, including consent from the host state, a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, or self-defence against an actual or truly imminent attack. A strike in the neutral capital that was hosting ceasefire talks fails to meet any of these tests, and no public evidence of imminence had been presented. By the law’s own standard, this is a breach of sovereignty and of the rule on the non-use of force.

The institutional record is no better. On 11 September, the UNSC met at Pakistan’s request, where Pakistan’s ambassador called Israel “an aggressor, an occupier and a serial violator” of the UN Charter, arguing that the Doha strike undercuts rules that shield small states and the mediators they host. He then read the Council’s press statement, which condemned the strikes in Doha, voiced solidarity with Qatar, and reaffirmed sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nonetheless, the Council avoided naming Israel. A proof, Pakistan believes, of a selective enforcement that lets a violator posture as a victim and erode the UN Charter’s core restraints.

Yet days later, the Council again failed to adopt a Gaza ceasefire resolution when the US cast a veto, its sixth since the war began, despite 14 of 15 members supporting the text. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has since debated that veto, underscoring the widening gap between global sentiment and Council performance. Veto politics do not legalise battlefield conduct; they merely weaken the only forum charged with upholding the Charter’s core bargain.

Outside the UNSC, where it always favours Israel over international norms, Washington’s posture has been one of damage control rather than discipline. Following Netanyahu’s “regret,” the US rushed out an executive order pledging to treat any armed attack on Qatar as a threat to US peace and security. History shows that “exceptionalism” has existed and has been called out for violating the norms. Even if not binding, the ICJ’s judgment against the US mining of the Nicaraguan harbors clarified the principle: great power sponsorship does not convert illegality into policy. The norms still mark the line, yet Israeli exceptionalism keeps crossing it.

Giving the devil its due, even if one accepts Israel’s claim of self-defence, the conduct of hostilities is still constrained by international humanitarian law (IHL). Under the IHL, parties must distinguish between combatants and civilians, strike only military objectives, and keep civilian harm from becoming excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. They must also facilitate rapid, unimpeded humanitarian relief, reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2720 on Gaza. These duties are triggered by enemy tactics that exploit civilian areas and cannot be suspended. Striking a dense, neutral capital where a mediator was hosting talks hardly meets the precautions standard, but it predictably risks civilian life for a speculative gain.

Against this background, a safer international relations approach could be adopting hedging as policy, not posture. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capitals will expand air defense cooperation, diversify arms sources and seek security assurances. The logic is simple: if international norms and the guarantor, the US, cannot restrain a partner, the Gulf states will ensure their own security through contracts, capabilities, and options with other middle powers. That is rational balancing, but it is also a verdict on eroding norms.

Favouritism bends rules and breaks trust. As Hedley Bull warned, a society of states survives “only if like-minded states conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules.” Once enforcement becomes selective, others learn the wrong lesson. All in all, the impacts of this unlawful, norm-eroding strike will unfold over time; however, for now, the horizon reads that the region may shift from a rule-anchored order to incident-management and pay-to-play security.