Japan’s South Asia Pivot: Strategic Opportunities and Challenges for Pakistan

Over the period of time, the Indo-Pacific region has witnessed a tremendous shift in its geopolitical landscape. Rise of China as an economic power, re-hyphenation of the DragonBear threat by the Trump administration, and the strategic rebalancing by India are re-defining the socio-political and security architecture of the region. Among these developments, the emergence of Japan as an active player in South Asia is of significant importance. Under its landmark Free and Open Indo Pacific vision (FOIP), and “India Plus” outlook, Japan simultaneously offers opportunities and exerts challenges for Pakistan.

Presented by the late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, FOIP stands out at a midway between the norm-based partnership and the China led authoritative initiatives. In contrast to BRI, FOIP offers economic cooperation and infrastructure investment with the predominant focus on the dignity of the host states and local empowerment. Moreover, PM Kishida further uplifted its status to Free and Open International Order (FOIO) to make it appealing for the Global South.

Based on its strategic location, South Asia holds a critical importance in Japan’s vision, with Tokyo gradually yet carefully deviating from its earlier pacifist stance to becoming an active resident player in the power politics of the said region. The pattern Japan follows is unique: a thematic, and domain specific cooperation instead of seeking complete strategic alignment with any state. For instance, it partners with Bangladesh on building corridors and joins hand with Sri Lanka in tackling the maritime security threats. While it may seem promising at glimpse, there are some intervening variables hindering the due course: i.e. China.

While Japan (though its vison) presents itself as a bridge between the Global South and North, and a counter-weight to the western-led projects demanding prior alignment with democratic norms and other ethos, Tokyo has its own indigenized checklist that requires a strict adherence on the well-defined principles (i.e. rule based order) from the host states before the operationalization of the infrastructure projects under FOIP. This model is quite successful in ASEAN owing to the similar historical, cultural, and civilizational linkage of these states with Japan. But, in South Asia, a region well-known for the hybrid governance structure and the shadow authoritarian practices, the feasibility stands at the crossroad.

This context creates a conducive environment for China. Time and again, Dragon has successfully projected itself as an equal partner of the host states through its least concerned attitude towards their domestic environment, something which appeals most of the region. Also, the comparatively strict transparency demands from Japan contributes negatively in two different ways: hinders timely progress and the rhetoric itself fails to match the financial scale of Beijing. So, the lack of pragmatic appeal creates a notion of Japan as a supplement partner instead of being perceived as a full-scale alternative option.

However, there exist grey areas in the given discourse: India’s non-participation in BRI and Pakistan’s push for diversification of its regional partners. What complicates the geostrategic equation in this realm is the long-lasting rivalry between both the South Asian neighbors that often turns into an active kinetic conflict under the nuclear threshold. Although, Tokyo always supports peace initiatives, risk-reduction measures, and values strategic neutrality in its dealing with the both states, the growing Indo-Japanese bilateral and multilateral partnership coupled with the expanding Dragon’s footprints has compelled Japan to recalibrate its posture from neutrality to strategic ambiguity which favors New Delhi.

From a realist perspective, the bilateral deals (i.e. RSSA), multi-lateral naval exercises, technological cooperation, critical infrastructural development in India, and above all, the strategic-cum-assertive posturing in anti-China forums such as AUKUS and QUAD reflects the status of the Indo-Japanese partnership beyond simple collaboration under FOIP. Additionally, both states share similar world view: reforms in the UNSC, revival of multi-polarity, and the institutionalized cooperation framework to tackle the Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats. The China factor further strengthen their ties.

On the other hand, the partnership between Japan and Pakistan has remained limited in the recent years. Tokyo reduced its developmental assistance to Islamabad. As advocated by Masahiro Kurita, an expert in a Japanese think-tank NIDS, CPEC is the main reason behind the cautious attitude of Japan. As more than 80% of Japan’s sea-born energy trade commence from the Strait of Hurmuz, the development of duel-used infrastructure in Gwadar by China pose a serious challenge to the energy security of Tokyo.

Also, the Japanese government suspects that infrastructural investment in Pakistan would proceed with no promising returns owing to the excessive involvement of China which the former perceives negatively. In short, the perception of Islamabad as a strategic all-weather ally of China in the region has resulted in creating a downwards trajectory in the Pak-Japan relations, something which needs a timely response or else India would capitalize upon the trust gap.

Some pertinent steps need to be taken in this regard. Although, differences exist between both states, as constructivists argue, one cannot ignore the sociological and historical similarities between Japan and Pakistan. Moreover, both states had closely worked together under the trilateral umbrella of the U.S. in the past. The recent shift in Japan’s China policy under Ishiba administration provides a hope for both states to reconsider their bilateral relations.

It is a right time for Islamabad to re-shift its Japan’s policy beyond the aid and development paradox and expand the strategically narrow space for the future cooperation. For instance, given the normalization of Beijing-Tokyo relations amid Trump’s tariffs threats, Pakistan must pitch for the wide-scale investment in its SEZs to Japan. It would help in multifold way: break the ice as well as provide a chance for both states to diversity their regional partners. Secondly, the cooperation in the Non-Traditional Security (NTS) areas should be institutionalized. In this way, there is a possibility of the potential spillover effect of the cooperation in the traditional security domains, with win-win rhetoric for both actors.

In conclusion, one can say that the changing geopolitical environment offers strategic opportunities to Islamabad and Tokyo to rethink of their bilateral relations. Pakistan must carefully use it diplomatic, economic, security (traditional and non-traditional), P2P, and academic means to create a space for Tokyo to perceive Islamabad as a friend not a geopolitical pawn. On the other hand, Japan must reorient the so called India Plus approach as it directly helps India following its victim card. Only the stable and balanced relations with both states can increase the “win-shots” for Tokyo, something which needs immediate attention.