MODI AND SHARIF IN POWER: MAPPING THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Owing to their confrontational nature, bilateral ties between India and Pakistan have remained a continued area of focus for domestic and international observers. Questions over the subject once again resurfaced this year, after Shahbaz Sharif swore-in as Pakistan’s prime minster for a second consecutive term, whereas, Narendra Modi’s swore-in as India’s prime minster for a third consecutive term. With both administrations starting afresh, any major breakthrough in India-Pakistan ties, which have otherwise been operating at charge d’affaires level since August 2019, is not much anticipated. While the Shahbaz administration, soon after assuming office, offered an olive branch to New Delhi, however, any encouraging response from New Delhi did not arrive. Any hopes of a thaw between the two South Asian rivals have further dashed following Prime Minster Modi’s recent comments in the Ladakh region, whereby he accused Islamabad of maintaining its relevance through “terrorism” and “proxy war”. While Islamabad is to convene the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of Government Summit in coming months, as well as the International Cricket Council Champions Trophy next year, experts in Islamabad opine that New Delhi may refrain from participating in both events.

India-Pakistan relations plummeted during PM Modi’s second tenure, following India’s unilateral revocation Article of 370 and 35-A. In 2021, reports of backdoor talks between the two countries surfaced, ultimately leading the two countries’ into recommitting to the 2003 ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control. However, both states’ troops remain locked in eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation along the LoC, with no further diplomatic rapprochement achieved as yet. The recent overtures by the Sharif administration are indicative of Islamabad’s bid to break the ice with New Delhi.  In June 2024, while addressing a gathering at Pakistan’s premier government-run think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan’s foreign minister Ishaq Dar stressed over Islamabad’s disbelief in a perpetual conflictual relation with New Delhi, the need for a peaceful solution to Kashmir issue and resumption of trade ties. On the other side, in an interesting turn of events, the BJP, which has otherwise considerably fared upon anti-Pakistan narrative over the years, has seemingly reoriented its approach vis-à-vis Pakistan by claiming that Islamabad no longer remains relevant to New Delhi. This apparent distancing may also explain New Delhi’s lackluster over any engagement with Islamabad.

However, amid this newfound reorientation, New Delhi continues to find space for scapegoating Islamabad over the on-going armed struggle in the Illegally Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K). Most recently, in parallel to the opening of PM Modi’s third stint in power, Jammu witnessed an uptick in armed struggle, with a number of attacks taking place in the districts of Reasi, Kathua, and Doda. Ironically, Jammu is a Hindu-majority area which has experienced comparatively lesser militant activity. Moreover, the attack in Kathua coincided with the martyrdom anniversary of (late) Burhan Wani, whose assassination by Indian Forces in July 2016 had expedited and strengthened the ongoing armed struggle in occupied region. While the recent attacks were claimed by the Kashmir Tigers and People’s Anti-Fascist Front, nevertheless, Pakistan was blamed by the Indian authorities. While blaming Pakistan has remained commonplace, it allows New Delhi to cover up for its flawed security policy resulting into ever-mounting grievances among the locals of Kashmir, and co-incidentally, detrimentally impacts bilateral ties with Pakistan.

Hence, in the case of the armed struggle picking-up pace in the occupied region, the future trajectory of India-Pakistan ties shall continue to be jeopardized by New Delhi’s unfounded claims of Pakistan’s alleged involvement in Kashmir’s resistance movement. S. Jaishankar’s reappointment as the Minster of External Affairs, also indicates a probable continuity in this direction. During his previous term as well, Jaishankar, while adopting a hawkish approach, had sought to limit India-Pakistan ties to the ambit of Pakistan’s so-to-say “sponsorship of terrorism” in India, while ruling out any chances of rapprochement.  The 2023 visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto, which was expected to offer a breather to India-Pakistan relations, was also overshadowed by Jaishankar’s fixation to ‘terrorism’. On the other side of the border, Islamabad too has been voicing concerns regarding India-sponsored terrorism. In April 2024, almost one year after Ottawa and Washington had claimed of Indian government to be orchestrating and executing assassination plots against Sikh activists on their territories, Pakistan also made a similar claim. Reports have been suggesting that India’s premier intelligence agency R&AW’s was responsible for carrying out around 20 assassinations within Pakistani territory since 2020. While the Indian foreign minister refrained from issuing any statement on the matter, however, Rajnath Singh, the defense minister accepted this claim, asserting that securing Indian interests by launching such offensives, while infringing other state’s territorial integrity was no big deal for New Delhi. Earlier, in 2021 as well, Pakistani officials had developed and furnished an intelligence-based dossier, which was suggestive of the involvement of India’s R&AW in sponsorship of terrorism within Pakistan’s territory.

Amid this impasse, a probable development that may further complicate India-Pakistan ties pertains to the BJP leadership’s bid to restore the statehood of IIOJ&K, and to hold state elections. In any polity, elections are indicative of democratic progress, however the context of IIOJ&K presents a distinctive case. Last year in December 2023, in response to 23 writ petitions challenging the legality of the revocation of Article 370, the Indian Supreme Court had upheld and endorsed the revocation of Article 370 and 35-A from the Indian constitution. The decision was not welcomed by the people of IIOJ&K, since it added a new layer of complexity to the conflict by further complicating the legal, demographic, and human rights-related concerns pertaining to the crisis. During the 2024 election campaign, PM Modi himself reiterated the promise of reinstating the statehood of IIOJ&K, while he was addressing a crowd in Srinagar. The announcement was once again met by disappointment from local Kashmiri leadership. Nevertheless, as per the directions of supreme court, the BJP administration plans to hold legislative assembly elections in IIOJ&K before September 2024. Of greater concern, however is the BJP’s push to alter the demography of the occupied valley, sanctioned through legislative maneuvers like the abrogation of Article 35-A, and the 2020 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Order. It is being reported that so far, around half a million people have been able to acquire the Kashmiri domicile. Hence, any state elections that may take place going forward, shall not be fully representative of Kashmiri hearts and minds. Such elections would only lead to further unrest, possibly further exacerbating Kashmiri grievances and the resultant armed struggle, and India-Pakistan relations.

Lastly, the instrumentalization of anti-Pakistan narratives and cliches for swaying ultra-nationalist sentiments in its favor has been a cornerstone of BJP’s electoral campaigns. In particular, the party’s 2019 election campaign, in the backdrop of the Pulwama incident, predominantly constructed and securitized the narrative of India’s security threats emanating from Pakistan. Contrary to this, BJP’s 2024 election campaign initially missed out on this aspect, and the party resorted to adopting anti-Pakistan narrative only towards the end of its election campaign, that too, to little avail. Coincidentally, the elections result was also a shocker for BJP as the party visibly failed to achieve its targeted number of seats. Perhaps, there could be a delayed awakening within the BJP leadership with regards to peddling-in anti-Pakistan narrative for reinvigorating domestic popularity. This becomes particularly relevant once the upcoming Lok Sabha (state) elections in Haryana, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, New Delhi, Bihar and IOJ&K are factored in. This may also explain the BJP leadership’s resumption of anti-Pakistan comments, soon after assuming its third stint in power. Such statements are also anti-thetical to BJP’s claims of Pakistan being irrelevant to India.

To quite an extent, the disjuncture between India and Pakistan has insurmountably expanded to a point where a reconciliation appears extremely hard to be struck. In the current context, achieving lasting peace and regional stability shall require a conciliatory policy, necessarily grounded in the resolution of core concerns of both states, and the resolution of Kashmir crisis as per the will of the indigenous people of the occupied valley. However, the first step in this direction continues to remain the need to incentivize peace and disincentivize confrontational narratives and tropes that impinge peaceful co-existence.