Outline of Conflict in Tripura: On a Final Note

The conflict that has prevailed over Northeast region of India for many decades has diverse shades ranging from a historical demand for separate flag, region, and identity by Naga groups to the ethnic abruption of tribal against non-tribal communities. This conflict has displayed a saga of bloodshed and merciless killings in the region. Tripura, being a landlocked State, has witnessed a share in this horrific story. A reference can be made to the Mandai massacre of 8 June 1980 at Mandawi village, 30 kilometers from Agartala, the capital city of Tripura which has witnessed 250 to 400 merciless slaughters of innocent people or the horrific stories of Singicherra (under Khowai district) massacre of 13 January 2002 or Kamalnagar and Baralunga massacres which has witnessed thick bloodshed of hundreds at hamlets of the innocent Bengali community on 02 Oct 2003 by the rebels (Paul Manas: 2009).

On September 4 2024, a Memorandum of Settlement was signed between the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, and Government of Tripura, along with the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF) to shun 35 years of long drawn conflict in the State. Tripura is a small landlocked State with a population of approximately 4.11 million with an area of 10,492 sq km. It shares the largest chunk of 856 kilometers of international boundary with Bangladesh in the Northeast region. It has a mixed demography with an imbalanced character, in view of a timeline of large-scale migration of non-tribal communities from Bangladesh. A disruption in the ethnic balance in Tripura led to a long phase of conflict in the region, which is primarily a tribal vs non-tribal conflict. It has been believed that predominantly tribal identity of Tripura (comprising 19 tribes) was reduced to a minority status, in view of this influx of non-tribals outside the State.

This growing discontent due to grave demographic shift resulted in the first anti-Bengali armed struggle called as ‘Senkrak’ in 1967 The first attempt was supported by volunteers of the Mizo National Front (MNF) under the patronage of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which had an active presence in East Pakistan at the time. However, this movement fizzled out as it lacked structural, ideological, and organizational capacity (Kumar Kuldeep:2016). Another successive attempt was the formation of Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) formed in 1978 by a two tribal leaders Bijay Kumar Hrangkhawl and Dhananjay Reang to follow the same line of action. A unprecedented phase of turbulence was marked with the formation of National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in March 1989 by Dhanajay Reang of TNV. The aim of NLFT was ‘independence of Tripura’ from neo-colonialism and imperialism. Unfortunately, NLFT was split into various factions in view of the personal ambitions of its leadership. Kuldeep Kumar in book ‘Police and Counter Insurgency, the untold story of Tripura’s COIN campaign’ has argued that Dhanajay Reang, the founder of NLFT later formed Tripura Resurrection Army in 1994, following an attack over him by the sprinter group of NLFT. In fact, a major factor behind these developments was a split in the NLFT’s leadership along religious and sectarian lines. Further, the NLFT was outlawed by Union Government in April, 1997 under Prevention of Unlawful Act, 1967.

Another major episode in the ethnic standoff against non-tribals was the emergence of the All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) in July 1990, founded by Ranjit Debbarma, who was previously associated with TNV. He was not in line with the 1988 peace accord signed between Union Government and leadership of TNV. ATTF was undergone a change in its nomenclature with the word ‘tribal’ was replaced with ‘tiger’. By 1991, the ATTF expanded its sphere of activities. It is a known belief that both NLFT and ATTF profess the cause of tribal rights over the land and resources nevertheless, political jugglery even had influenced their modus openardi in the sense that both were branded as killer agents in case of political rivalries (Kumar Kuldeep:2016). NLFT also developed linkages with other rebel groups like NSCN(IM) of Nagaland, NDFB of Assam. Whereas, ATTF was lined up with ULFA of Assam and PLA of Manipur. These groupings were for made due to the purpose of arms supplies, ideological confluences and for obtaining operational and information related support in the region. The major thrust of activities of NLFT, ATTF was on extortion of illegal money, kidnapping for ransom in and around the bordering areas of Tripura and a sequence of targeting the Bengali inhabited areas in the State. The ATTF was also banned by the Union Government for unlawful activities in 1997.

In recent years, a series of coordinated efforts by the Tripura Police and Assam Rifles, with support from the Union and State Governments, has resulted in a significant transformation of the security scenario in the state. Sheikh Hasina’s rise to power in 2006 was a significant factor, as Bangladesh’s security agencies placed emphasis on securing the Indo-Bangla border region, which was later reinforced by Indian security agencies. Tripura became the first State in Northeast to witness the revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 2015. This has a positive follow-up in terms of full or partial revocation of AFSPA from rest of the North-eastern States in India.

The conclusive episode of Tripura’s conflict was this peace accord signed on 04 September, 2024. Tripura serves as a successful case study for understanding how an ethnic standoff can evolve into a nightmare for those involved. Tripura has made considerable progress in terms of connectivity, economic development. The Act East policy has become a game changer in the regression of conflict with an aim to transform it into a developed State. The only concern is of changing scenario at Bangladesh where, a kind of political turmoil is in existence. If a fractured political mandate continues to define Bangladesh’s future, it could pose a significant challenge to India’s Act East policy, where Tripura is set to become a key player. (The author has already argued for such role of Tripura in his earlier article published from the same platform).