Pakistan Has No Rationale to Develop Long-Range Missiles that Might Threaten the United States

On December 19th, 2024, United States (US) Principal Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA), Jonathan Finer, made some shocking claims about Pakistan’s missile program at Carnegie. While outlining the outgoing Biden administration’s WMD policies, he asserted that Pakistan has developed “increasingly sophisticated missile technology”, such as “long-range ballistic missile systems” and equipment to “enable testing of significantly larger rocket motors”. He added that if the trends persist, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States”. While questioning Pakistan’s intentions, he stated that only three “adversarial” countries — Russia, China, and North Korea — possess “nuclear weapons and the missile capability” to strike targets at the US homeland, adding that it’s “hard” for the US to view Pakistan’s missile developments as “anything other than an emerging threat”.

During the interactive session, DNSA Finer further elaborated on his comments. Paradoxically, while declining to “speculate” on Pakistan’s motivations, he very much speculated that Pakistan’s missile developments are “fundamentally focused” on the US — an “inescapable conclusion” he claimed to have derived from “looking at the map and looking at ranges.” He did not miss cautioning that the US cannot “simply sit back” and watch the development of a capability that “can pose a threat ultimately down the road”.

DNSA Finer’s remarks followed the imposition of US sanctions a day earlier against four Pakistani entities linked to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program — the fourth round of sanctions since October 2023. Interestingly, DNSA Finer contextualized the sanctions against the backdrop of what the US perceives to be an “emerging threat” from Pakistan while the statements issued for each round of sanctions did not make any mention of the threat perception and framed these as furthering the US’ global non-proliferation agenda.

Given the grave nature of the DNSA Finer’s assertions and their potential fallout for Pakistan’s geostrategic orientation and overall US-Pakistan relations, the claims merit phlegmatic scrutiny from political and technical standpoints, which constitutes the central objective of this piece.

First, the claim that Pakistan’s missile developments could be ever “focused” on the US, even in the foreseeable future, is fundamentally in contravention to the rationale for Pakistan’s acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons capability. It is part of duly documented and uncontested history that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program started as a security-driven response following the loss of its Eastern wing in 1971 at the hands of archrival India and was catalyzed by New Delhi’s maiden nuclear test in 1974. After overtly demonstrating its nuclear weapons capability in 1998 — also in response to New Delhi’s second round of nuclear tests — Pakistan’s nuclear doctrinal preferences and force posture development remain solely, exclusively, and entirely focused on deterring aggression and adventurism from India. Pakistan’s current missile ranges (maximum being 2,750 km of Shaheen-III) are adequate to cover all parts of India and there is no rationale or incentive for Pakistan to extend the range further. Pakistan has been exceedingly cautious regarding its missile ranges to underscore its exclusive focus on India and avoid the ruffling of feathers elsewhere. It is worth underscoring that at no point in time, did any of the statements from Pakistan make even an oblique reference that any other country, except India, could be a focus of Pakistan’s strategic program. Hence, the claim that the US could feature within the calculus of Pakistan’s strategic program is divorced from reality and does not stand by any logic.

Second, the major concern for the US appears to be Pakistan’s acquisition of equipment used in the testing of “large-diameter rocket motors”, which Washington believes could enable Pakistan to develop Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), capable of reaching the US mainland. However, large-diameter rocket motors do not necessarily always mean a technological push towards ICBMs. According to Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute, “it is a huge leap to suggest that the only reason” for Pakistan to develop large-diameter rocket motors is to develop an ICBM capable of reaching the US. Lewis highlights that China and India are using large space rocket motors (3.5m and 2.8m respectively) in Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs). He conjectures that Pakistan might want to use an ICBM-class motor to strike targets at intermediate ranges referring to the example of Russia’s SS-20 missile, which used the first and second stages of Soviet ICBM design Temp-2S. Lewis also highlights the recent use of the first two stages of RS-24 Yars ICBM by Russia to strike targets in Ukraine at a small range of 1,000 km.

Drawing from Dr. Lewis’ assessment, it is safe to infer that Pakistan may seek to use large-diameter rocket motors [if it is acquiring at all] to improve the performance (i.e. to carry more payload) of existing long-range Shaheen-III (2,750 km, 1.4m) and Ababeel (2,200 km, 1.7m) missile systems. Moreover, the US sanctions’ fact sheet dated April 19, 2024, references Pakistan’s Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) as a potential receipt of equipment to test large-diameter rocket motors, which clearly points toward the fact that the large motors might be used in the development of SLVs for Pakistan’s growing space program, which includes a planned lunar mission.

Third, in today’s world, it is unambiguously irrational and runs against the fundamental principles of statecraft for any country’s policymakers to seek an increase in the number of adversaries, and if the potential adversary is one of the greatest military powers — the US, it could not be anything but approaching madness. In view of Pakistan’s special circumstances, wherein it grapples with a host of internal and external challenges, it does not make any sense to develop strategic capabilities that might be perceived as threatening by any countries other than its primary adversary India, and unnecessarily create more adversaries. Moreover, given that Pakistan has lately been seeking reorientation toward geo-economics, the country is vying to win more friends and economic partners, rather than adding to the number of its adversaries.

Fourth, Pakistan remained an important ally of the US during the Cold War, suffered huge losses as the frontline state in the US-led war against terrorism, and still holds the status of the US’ “major non-NATO ally”. Despite the inevitable decline in bilateral engagements following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US remains Pakistan’s biggest export market, is home to a vibrant Pakistani diaspora, and is among the most sought-after higher studies destinations for Pakistani students. Under the US-Pakistan “Green Alliance” framework, both countries are collaborating in fighting climate change and in promoting clean energy and smart agriculture. Most importantly, US support has reportedly been crucial in securing International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts for Pakistan to assuage its economic challenges. Last but not the least is “enduring military-to-military partnership” between Pakistan and the US spanning more than seven decades, and both countries continue to cooperate on counter-terrorism and hold joint military drills. Hence, it makes no sense for Pakistan to alienate an ally as important as the US and instead have an adversarial relationship.

Fifth, despite the relative decline of its global power and sway, the US remains the most powerful among the three great powers (the other two being China and Russia). In the wake of intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China, Pakistan has been walking a fine line on the geostrategic chessboard. Despite its close economic and military ties with China, Islamabad has reiterated multiple times that it does not want to become part of bloc politics, which is a testament to the country’s geostrategic orientation of not joining any geopolitical bloc or grouping, which could be deemed as threatening by Washington — let alone itself posing a threat to the US.

Based on the aforementioned debate, it can be safely argued that the US officials are deliberately hyperbolizing and misconstruing Pakistan’s capabilities to draw misplaced and flawed inferences, which are factually unfounded and can have several alternative (and more cogent) technical explanations. Such framing of Pakistan as a potential adversary could cast a seriously dark shadow over the bilateral relationship, which could undermine critical cooperation between the two countries in several key areas, including battling climate change and counter-terrorism.

Pakistan’s strategic program has been subject to US sanctions from the very outset; however, instead of bringing a positive change in the behavior — the stated goal, the sanctions have solidified a culture of nationalistic defiance in Pakistan and has cemented the belief that the US remains fundamentally dismissive of existential security threat to Pakistan emanating from India. Moreover, it has also solidified an acute sense of discrimination that only Pakistan is singled out for the sanctimonious application of the US’ non-proliferation agenda while India always gets a free pass. Strikingly, Jon Finer conveniently missed mentioning India in the list of countries that possess nuclear weapons and the delivery means to reach the US, even though India has conducted several tests of Agni-V, which is believed to have more than 7,000 km range. Moreover, driven by its global ambitions, India is ambitiously pursuing missile systems with even longer ranges, but the developments fail to ruffle any feathers in Washington or to catch Mr. Finer’s attention.

The US appears to have granted absolute impunity to India despite the latter’s great power ambitions, which it never endeavors to even thinly veil. Even though the US is bolstering India’s capabilities to act as a counterweight to China in Asia, India’s great power ambitions and the potential range of its nuclear delivery systems do not entail anything other than New Delhi being a direct adversary to Washington. However, it appears that the US foreign policy establishment — “the Blob” — is happy to survive with the delusive contentment of India’s perceived utility against China — until shaken by the vicious reality check of great power politics.