The Baku-Moscow Rift: A Strategic Realignment in the South Caucasus

The Caucasus region is known for its unpredictable geopolitical trajectory. Any minor conflict could turn into a large-scale escalation, devastating not only the historical relations between the parties involved, but also impacting the energy security of Eurasia. The recent rift between Azerbaijan and Russia erupted when the Russian forces detained some ethnic Azerbaijani nationals from Yekaterinburg, resulting in the death of the two persons in custody. As a result, Baku went offensive: summoned Russian ambassador, arrested Russia media personals over criminal charges, and suspended cultural events. This incident cannot be analyzed in vacuum: it was only a triggering point amid growing frustration between Baku and Moscow. The Russian misadventure have a short-term and long-term implications for the bilateral relations between the both states as well as for the region.

It was June 27, 2025 when the Russian forces raided and arrested more than 50 ethnic Azerbaijanis over the criminal charges. They were alleged to be involved in a decades old murder case. In the process of investigation, as experts concluded, two brothers named Ziyaddin and Huseyn died from a blunt-force trauma. In response, Azerbaijan condemned the incident, calling it an extra-judicial killing. Also, the Russian ambassador was summoned in Baku and Moscow was asked for an independent investigation. The matter resulted in the diplomatic avalanche as the already planned cultural events were suspended, and the rapid visa restriction was enforced by Azerbaijan.

The following days also witnessed a swift and proportionate response by Azerbaijani authorities as the forces raided Sputnik Azerbaijan, a Russian media outlet, and arrested at least 7 staff-members – including top editors i.e. Yevgeny Belousov and Kartavykh. The charges of criminal activities, fraud, espionage, and illegal financing were applied. Previously, Baku had also revoked the accreditation of Sputnik and closed Russian Center (Rossotrudnichestvo) – a hub of Russia’s soft-power in Baku and an active resident tool of the Russian propaganda.

Apparently, it may seem as an action-reaction mechanism guided by the standard SOPs. But, several ruptures played a role in this regard. For instance, in December 2024, an Azerbaijani passenger airplane was shot by the Russian air defense system that killed 38 innocent citizens. Putin though offered condolence, no formal inquiry or probe was followed, inflicting a mistrust and damage to the bilateral ties. Moreover, Azerbaijan did take Russia into consideration when it claimed the disputed region after its victory in the third Nagorno-Karabakh War with Armenia in 2023. It showcase how the diplomatic push had originated long-before the recent incident unfolded.

While looking into the complex geopolitical discourse of Caucasus, one cannot ignore the historical dynamics as these predominantly shape the modern trends. The Caucasus region, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, was a part of USSR (now Russia) during the Cold War (an indirect ideologically driven war between the United States and the USSR that started with the end of WW-2 in 1945 and concluded with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, resulting in the formation of 15 new states). Throughout this period, Baku played a very important role in the energy security of the USSR, but finally broke away with it. Immediately, after its independence, Russia approached Azerbaijan following “near abroad” doctrine to maintain its sphere of influence in the region. But, Russia’s support to Armenia during the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from 1988 until 1994, compelled Azerbaijan to adopt strategic ambiguity in its foreign policy: limited cooperation with Russia while diversifying partnership with other actors.

Azerbaijan also avoided formal military alliance with Russia unlike Armenia. Under Putin, Russia, however, maintains a balanced approach foreign policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Russia mediated ceasefire agreement between the both states after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 despite having strong military cooperation with Armenia. But, Baku’s offense in 2023 highlights the declining influence of Russia and the reinforcement of the strategic autonomic posture of Azerbaijan in the region. As said by President Ilham Aliyev, “Azerbaijan’s sovereignty is non-negotiable”. Following this principle, Azerbaijan maintains balanced, multifold, and diverse relations with the regional powers.

Simultaneously, it enjoys partnership with CIS and EAEU, showcasing its reduced dependency on Russia and the evolving multi-vector foreign policy. The same was the guiding principle in the recent response to Russia’s adventure.

When it comes to forecasting the short and long-term implications of this incident, one can conclude saying that not only it will deteriorate the bilateral ties between Moscow and Baku, but also it will lead towards Baku choosing alternative options. Ultimately, it will reduce the Russian influence in the region and possibly create a domino effect.

By summoning Russian ambassador, adopting tit-for-tat policy, and cutting cultural links with Russia, President Ilyas has increased its domestic support base. Apparently, Azerbaijan is presenting itself as a broker of the status-quo and prioritizing national interests given the repetitive misadventures by Russia. It may lead Baku towards reducing its military imports from Moscow and increase its strategic ties with Ankara and Tel-Aviv. Israel already controls Sitalchay Military Airbase in Azerbaijan. Given the present rift and the evolving U.S. policy of breaking Russia’s sphere of influence may force Baku adopting similar measures in the near future.

For instance, the U.S. whether directly or through Israel could increase its military presence in Azerbaijan, with its advance surveillance and reconnaissance system, using Russian threat as a catalyst factor. Direct military presence near the Russian border would create a doomsday scenario for Russia. So, if both parties do not adopt de-escalatory measures, the anti-Russian actors, particularly the U.S. could benefit from the situation as it has historically been doing.

For EU, the rift, if stay longer than expected, would be beneficial for it in terms of economic and energy security. The geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan has surged since the start of Ukraine-Russia conflict. For instance, Europe eyes Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) or informally known as Middle Corridor which connects Europe and China via Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. It bypasses Russia and Iran and it is strategically important given its apolitical, autonomous, and fast route, with Azerbaijan as a key player.

The total volume of cargo passing through it has surged to 4.5 million tons as compared to 1.5 million tons in 2022. It is being seen as an alternative to Russian dominated Northern Corridor. The recent tug of war provides EU with the opportunity to completely shift its road-driven trade with the regional states towards the Middle Corridor. Adding more problems for Russia, the work has already fastened on the Ganja Pass Logistics Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line. The deepening ties of Azerbaijan and EU pose significant geo-economic threats to Russia: nullifies the importance of Russian connectivity projects and strengthens Azerbaijan’s position in the alterative corridors (as more than $ 10 Billion EU’s investment in Baku is already been pledged).

Above all, the animosity will affect the bilateral relations between the both states. Particularly, People-to-People contact, economic relations, cultural ties, soft-power influence, cooperation in the non-traditional security, and the convergence in the regional multilateral forums will be suffered. For reference, the restriction and tightening of the visa service will affect the billions of dollars of remittance in the both states. Russia will be viewed negatively throughout Central Asia. It may result in decreasing its image at the society-level across the region, something that Russia has firmly worked upon since the downfall of USSR. In general, the so called Russian sphere of influence is suspected to be reduce given its assertive-cum-defensive posture. Also, there are chances that Armenia and Azerbaijan could ignite independent bilateral talks in the near future.

In conclusion, one can say that the recent second wave of rift between Moscow and Baku have broader geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic implications. On the one side, it will deteriorate the bilateral economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the both states. On the other side, the conflict will spill over at the regional and global level: resulting in deeper security ties between Azerbaijan and anti-Russia elements, shifting the former into EU’s camp, and creating a domino effect.