The Costly Gamble of Ukraine’s Denuclearization

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine inherited a substantial nuclear stockpile—making it the third-largest nuclear power globally. This nuclear arsenal included 1900 strategic and 2,600 tactical nuclear warheads, and delivery systems including 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 44 strategic bombers armed with AS-15 Kent cruise missiles. On May 23, 1992, Lisbon Protocol, was signed between Russia, and newly created Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to return Soviet Union nuclear weapons to Russia and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, Ukraine was reluctant to abide by all aforementioned commitments seeking security assurances, economic compensation, and partial retention of nuclear weapons.

The turning point came in the form of Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 05, 1994 during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit. The Memorandum, signed by Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, pledged respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It emphasized non-interference and non-aggression, with an agreement to consult if Ukraine’s security was threatened. On the very day the Memorandum was signed, Ukraine joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state, marking the formal end of its nuclear arsenal. Over time, Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal was either returned or dismantled. By 1996, Ukraine had returned all nuclear warheads to Russia. Last nuclear delivery system was dismantled in 2001 under the 1991 START-I. In 2008, joint declaration by Washington and Moscow reconfirmed their commitments to Ukraine after expiration of START-I.

The Budapest Memorandum, although regarded as remarkable success in arms control, is now often viewed with skepticism considering the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The current situation thus raises the question: Should Ukraine have retained its nuclear arsenal to deter any potential aggression against Russia?

No clear answer to this question can be given. However, to address this question, it’s crucial to understand the realities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance at that time. Retaining nuclear stockpile during time of independence would have been a very challenging undertaking for Kyiv. In brief four reasons can be highlighted.

First, Ukraine lacked technical control over its nuclear stockpile. Mere possession of Soviet-origin nuclear weapons does not mean that Ukraine would have exercised complete control over them. In fact, the technical control was in possession of Moscow. The warheads were equipped with electronic locks, known as Permissive Action Links (PALs), which could only be activated with codes held by Russian authorities. Even if Ukraine had bypassed these security systems—an improbable feat—it lacked the infrastructure and expertise necessary to safeguard those warheads. Second, maintenance of such vast nuclear stockpile was also beyond Ukraine’s capacity. Due to decaying radio-active material, a functioning replacement cycle was required to sustain the operational lifespan of warheads. Without a credible replacement option, these warheads would have become obsolete after certain interval of time. In any case, poor maintenance would have increased the risk of accident or similar hazards. Third, considering Ukraine’s financial constraints at the time of independence, maintaining a large nuclear arsenal and various delivery systems was an expansive endeavor beyond its economic capacity. And finally, by possessing nuclear weapons, Ukraine would have defied the global nuclear disarmament efforts thus causing severe geopolitical ramifications. Diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions would have crippled the Kyiv as functional government.

Despite the aforementioned reasons, even if we assume that Ukraine had kept nuclear weapons, the credibility of its deterrence would have been dubious. Unlike nuclear-free Ukraine with NPT membership, nuclear-armed Ukraine would have been perceived as a threat by Russia as well as NATO. With the majority of stockpile retired or non-functional, Ukraine would have possessed only a handful nuclear weapons which would have been inadequate to reliably deter foreign aggression. Nuclear-armed Ukraine might have provoked more aggressive preemptive actions from Russia. Historical precedent suggests that Moscow views a hostile nuclear neighbor as intolerable. Targeted strikes on Ukraine’s nuclear facilities could have escalated regional tensions, leading to catastrophic consequences. Similarly, the risk of losing nuclear weapons’ control due to political instability or security crisis would also have been a major threat.

The actual issue is not the denuclearization of Ukraine, but the lack of credibility of security assurances provided to Kyiv by United States as well as Russia. The Budapest Memorandum constituted a diplomatic promise rather than a binding defense pact. Its failure to deter subsequent violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty exposes the limitations of unenforceable security guarantees. If Ukraine had secured NATO’s membership in return of dismantling its nuclear stockpile, circumstances would have been very different for Kyiv. However, security assurances without legal binding and tangible enforcement mechanisms leave nations vulnerable to the threats they sought to counter. Ukraine’s case serves as an example in this regard.

Russia-Ukraine war is still going on. Hundreds of thousands have lost their lives. Despite stiff resistance, powered by Western military and financial support, Russia still controls approximately 25% of Ukrainian territory. The frontline is almost frozen and no considerable advance can be hoped for from the Ukrainian side. The question now lingers about pathway which Ukraine will adopt in future after termination of conflict. Will Ukraine continue to look towards NATO membership for achieving collective security umbrella? Or will it seek to develop nuclear deterrent of its own? Both pathways seem equally unrealistic now. Moscow won’t sit on negotiation table unless denial of Ukrainian membership in NATO is guaranteed. In contrast, with stringent measures in place, Ukraine simply no longer has any opportunity in its disposal to ensure development of its own nuclear weapons. This route will not only yield severe international backlash and will destabilize the region even further.

In the end, it can be argued that Ukraine’s decision to disarm its nuclear capacity was shaped by necessity, not choice. It was not a gamble, but a byproduct of circumstances. The grim situation Kyiv faces today is due to inadequacy of international security commitments. From a realistic perspective, in an anarchic world, self-help and power are the only credible options available for survival of any nation. As history unfolds, the lessons of Ukraine’s denuclearization will undoubtedly shape global discourse on arms control and national security for years to come.