The Munition Gap: Industrial Constraints and the Credibility of the U.S. Extended Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific

The United States is openly urging missile makers to double, or even quadruple, the number of missile weapons systems. It indicates that the current missile stockpile is not ample to support a war with China. This request, which is specially rejuvenated by “Munitions Acceleration Council“, demanded under Deputy Secretary Feinberg, shows a ruthless appreciation at the Pentagon that deterrence will no longer be discussed, but calculated by the score of missiles to be in the air after the first week is over. The underlying veneer of a sense of urgency is a brutally familiar fact: the U.S. is supplying legacy munitions and highly sophisticated, but not as fast as domestic production plants can cover with their own.

The U.S. has already deployed millions of rounds of conventional artillery and thousands of advanced guided munitions to Ukraine in the last three years, many of which were already in stock. It has been analysed that these transfers have dug into the inventories of the U.S. To illustrate the point, recent commentary claims that the U.S is gradually losing its capability to deter China, since missile and shell stocks are being consumed at a rate that exceeds new stocks being replenished. Meanwhile, U.S. ordnance managers have cautioned that certain precision munitions, particularly interceptors and sophisticated strike missiles, are in danger of failing to meet demand surges. These trends might have been acceptable in supporting Ukraine’s mode, but have a strategic fault in a high-end war in the Asia-Pacific.

War games and war planners keep on warning about the very same mismatch. In various U.S.-China conflict exercises, long-range precision-guided munitions are consumed within a few weeks; reserves are depleted, and commanders either have to ration or postpone firing. An example of such a situation occurred during the recent Pentagon-led initiative: the planners noted that even a small COA (course-of-action) to attack Chinese ships or missiles burns up U.S. inventories before new factories can replenish them. The message is unwavering: if a war were to erupt, the United States could lose the margin of war. With time, it is the margin that achieves deterrence.

The missile and rocket production evinced structural problems. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Boeing are being strained out of peacetime rates; however, long lead times, high qualification cycles, supplier constraints, and small reserves of spare capacity are undermining any abrupt leap. Pratt Whitney, rocket engine companies, semiconductor companies, special optics and seeker companies, and rare earth supply chains are all choke points. The U.S. industrial base is not sized to the type of attrition warfare needed to engage a major peer. Although new contracts are flowing, and capital is being invested, there will be many lines that do not scale to meaningful size until 2027-2028 or later.

The security peril is augmented in the Indo-Pacific theatre. The U.S. cannot just import munitions, as the supply route is not contested, and bases are denied. The allies will insist on moving stocks in front of Japan, Guam, Australia, and in the sea. It implies that substantial stockpiles in the theatre itself are not only in U.S. home depots. In that regard, the shock of the Typhon missile system (which can fire SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles) to Iwakuni, Japan, in September 2025, as part of Exercise Resolute Dragon, in itself is eloquent. It was not discharged in the exercise, but its demonstration on allied ground is a policy message regarding ability and determination. Its exhibit is insufficient unless the munitions turn quickly in the time of crisis.

The war industry of China is the opposite. Beijing habitually maintains its defense industry on wartime alert, and civilian factories are on the verge of becoming militarized. It’s Victory Day parade, which was held at the start of this month, publicly and with pageantry, rolled out a complete land-sea-air nuclear triad, new strategic missiles, anti-satellite systems, hypersonic platforms, and sea drones. It can be seen as a measured message: China would deter U.S. intervention on the conventional as well as strategic level.  The fact that China can manufacture missiles, drones, and munitions in large quantities provides the country with an industrial counterweight that American rivals now not only openly source-code-processing but are also parading. The calculus would be as follows: Beijing can reinvest the loss daily, and the U.S. is not; deterrence would tip.

Allies do not underrate that change. In recent months, Japan has stepped up the pace of development of missiles and their acquisition, with experimentation in domestically manufactured cruise and ballistic missiles. The changing security doctrine of Tokyo no longer views strike-back as an extra-curricular activity, but as part of its burden-sharing. Plans for guided weapons in Australia have been established: Canberra is making investments in a local production facility of NSM/JSM, and is already in a closer collaboration with U.S. missile research and production. Quietly, missile capacity or stockpiles are investigated by many allies of the Southeast Asian nations. Although such moves usually complement, not abolish, U.S. guarantees, they are symptomatic of a more basic change. Its allies are hedging, not because they lack trust, but because they are realistic.

When American allies start to challenge the ability of Washington to make a fight, the chain of alliances breaks. Alliances may be ad hoc, transactional, and fragmented instead of synchronized chains of deterrents. During an emergency, U.S. spouses/dependents seek preferential treatment regarding avenues to U.S. stores (actual or even promised), and American troops may face a logistical lock-out, immediate rationing, or customer-state irritation about distributions. Deterrence is heavily relationship-based: the opponent should believe that this is not a war that the U.S. will engage in, but a war it will be able to maintain. When the consumption exceeds the production, the opponent might gamble.

The policy instruments carried out by the Pentagon are currently part of this response, but are not yet a solution. The impetus to the need to produce twice or thrice is honest urgency and awareness. The “Big, Beautiful Bill” through Congress (invigorated into action in 2025) added about 25 billion to munitions and capacity build-up, but in the realm of defence, it is essential to add even more money to reach such ambitious growth curves. Multi-year procurement contracts are being organized to stabilize the demand and provide confidence to the manufacturers so they can invest. It is growing in co-production with partners: AUKUS Pillar II project publicly involves missile and hypersonic-related cooperation, and Quad-based defence discussions increasingly emphasize the importance of mutual industrial supply resiliency. It is when implemented with all its forces that it takes years before such initiatives start achieving strategic fruit.

The U. S. must have an industrial surge logic in munitions for basic production or near capacity and ordered to increase under pressure, not peacetime budgeting that restricts production. It involves bringing on board redundancy in the vendor, requalifying several lines of suppliers, enhancing the sourcing of rare earth and specialty materials, establishing pre-stocks in theatres, licensing of the allied companies on scale, and simplifying export-license regimes. Part of the steps have already been commenced (e.g., antimony contracts to enhance strategic materials supply). Later in the month of September, modifications were made towards the supply of antimony ingots to the Defence Department in the United States, with the U.S. Antimony Corporation winning a Pentagon contract valued at up to 245 million dollars. It is part of an effort to enhance resilience in the supply chain. Those are rather incremental patches and not solution packages.

It is too late to play on the safe side. China is not stalling at this time as factories are being constructed. Already, deterrence is frayed across the first island chain because of the PLA naval patrols, missile tests, grey-zone coercion, and island-development manoeuvres. Before warheads are launched, a confrontation on the Taiwan Strait, or worse still, a blockade or missile war, would put pressure on American logistics. New and predictive indications of intelligence, and even of diplomacy, all favour time compression: the enemy can get first in on the lag in U.S scale-up. Every hesitation or failure to get on track will be viewed as a sign of weakness by allies.

Deterrence resides now in factories, inventories, bunkers, and logistics nodes just as it does in aircraft carriers and alliances. The U.S should not regard munitions as a commodity of consumption but rather as the sinew of world power. India will have to make commitments, which are supported by a strong industrial posture, to maintain credibility in the Asia-Pacific. Once missiles are grounded, then deterrence is just a fiction.