The Need of 21st Century: A Written Nuclear Doctrine for Pakistan

Nuclear posture continues to occupy a critical place in Pakistani strategy in the changing nature of the strategic environment of South Asia. However, Pakistan’s nuclear force, which constitutes one of the most active nuclear triads in the world, does not have an officially stated nuclear strategy. On the other hand, India, a South Asian neighbor of Pakistan and regional rival, has always declared its no first use (NFU) policy. However, there has been some debate on how ambiguous this is.

The lack of a nuclear doctrine formulation for Pakistan led to confusion about its strategic goals and nuclear postures for its regional neighbors and globally. Pakistan needs to announce its written nuclear doctrine for several reasons, including the improved policy of mutual relations and the stabilization of deterrence in South Asia.

For decades, Pakistan has maintained a strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear doctrine, particularly in relation to India. While this approach may have provided Pakistan with flexibility, the risks associated with it are becoming apparent. As the security environment in South Asia becomes more complex, there is a pressing need for Pakistan to declare a clear, written nuclear doctrine. A formal written doctrine would not only enhance Pakistan’s strategic capability, but also contribute to regional stability.

The major argument that Pakistan must declare its nuclear doctrine is the need for strategic clarity. Currently, the nuclear posture of Pakistan is vague, and it has its advantages, but also creates confusion, especially in a region as volatile as South Asia.

For example, India’s declared No First Use (NFU) policy, while not without its critics, provides a framework that adversaries can understand. Although India has left open the possibility of changing its NFU policy, the existence of such a doctrine allows for more predictable and stable dynamics.

The Rational Deterrence Theory emphasizes how credibility, communication, and calculated threats help maintain peace. For deterrence to work, an adversary must believe that the costs of aggression are more than the potential gains. According to this theory, a country’s nuclear deterrence posture must be credible and communicated clearly to avoid misinterpretation.

Currently, the nuclear ambiguity of Pakistan may prevent adversaries from completely understanding its red lines, which in turn may increase the risk of miscalculation during times of crisis. Pakistan’s reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as part of its “full-spectrum deterrence” highlights the tension between maintaining flexibility and ensuring clear deterrence. Tactical nukes were designed to counter India’s conventional military superiority. However, their lower threshold may increase the likelihood of escalation.

This is where things get risky. Without a declared written doctrine, adversaries may misread Pakistan’s intentions. This may escalate to catastrophic miscalculation. This would result in regional instability. On the other hand, a declared nuclear doctrine would prove to be better. In the latter, nuclear response strategies would align with Rational Deterrence Theory. This can be achieved by providing a clear framework for adversaries to understand Pakistan’s threshold.

Credibility is key in this case. Deterrence fails if the adversary does not believe a threat will occur. Currently, the lack of a formal doctrine leaves room for doubt regarding Pakistan’s strategic intentions. India, for instance, has a nuclear doctrine based on a “No First Use” (NFU) policy, although there are signs that it might shift away from this stance. Pakistan, on the other hand, has maintained ambiguity, emphasizing nuclear use under “minimum credible deterrence” without providing clear guidelines. By communicating the conditions under which Pakistan would escort for nuclear use, the country can reinforce its deterrence and reduce the likelihood of conflict. For example, a clear indication of red lines—whether linked to territorial integrity or responses to conventional attacks—-would provide adversaries with well-defined limits.

The risk of conflict is high in South Asia, where there are always issues between Pakistan and India,. Nuclear escalation is possible because of misunderstandings or miscalculations. Without a clear nuclear doctrine, crises such as the 2019 Balakot airstrike can quickly spiral out of control, as adversaries are left to guess Pakistan’s potential nuclear responses. If Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine would have been clear in such instances, the outcome would have been different, compared to the past outcomes of mismanagement.

Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons has also complicated the region’s strategic environment. These weapons, designed to deter India’s conventional military strength, blur the line between conventional and nuclear conflicts. This increases the risk of unintended nuclear exchange. Again, according to the Rational Deterrence Theory, clear communication of a state’s deterrence posture is essential to avoid such risks.

Qualitative data from regional surveys suggests that misperceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear intentions are widespread. A 2019 survey by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) found that 63% of Indian respondents believed Pakistan would be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

Globally, states with transparent and well-defined nuclear policies are considered more responsible and predictable. All nuclear-armed states except Pakistan have declared their nuclear doctrines. For Pakistan, doing so would signal its responsibility as a nuclear power and help counter the negative perceptions of its nuclear program.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has grown to approximately 170 warheads, as compared to India’s 172. Despite this, nuclear policy has been criticized all over the world because there is no transparency and predictability.

A declared nuclear doctrine can also support Pakistan’s diplomatic objectives. While Pakistan’s nuclear posture is centered on deterrence, it must also balance its military strategy with diplomatic efforts to reduce regional tensions. Rational Deterrence Theory underscores that deterrence is most effective when combined with diplomacy, allowing adversaries to engage in dialogue rather than resort to military action.

The ambiguity of Pakistan’s nuclear policy currently hinders its diplomatic outreach; as other states view the intentions of the country as suspicious. By formally declaring a nuclear doctrine, the country could open the door to confidence-building measures with India and other regional powers.  Additionally, a declared doctrine would provide Pakistan with a platform to engage more effectively in global non-proliferation discussions, signaling its commitment to strategic stability in South Asia.

Given the risks associated with ambiguity and the benefits of a clear nuclear posture, Pakistan should take concrete steps to formalize and declare its nuclear doctrine. Some of the recommendations that can be done to align Pakistan’s nuclear strategy with regional deterrence theory while promoting regional and global stability are as follows:

1. Nuclear use thresholds should be clearly articulated. This includes defining the red lines related to nuclear retaliation, conventional military threats, and territorial integrity. Moreover, Pakistan should specify the role of tactical nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy, ensuring that these weapons are used only in response to specific, high-threat scenarios, reducing the likelihood of nuclear escalation.
2. To avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations, Pakistan should adopt better communication mechanisms with adversaries, particularly India. This could include establishing direct communication links during times of crisis to prevent escalation.
3. Bilateral or multilateral confidence-building initiatives with India and other regional powers are also effective in reducing the risk of mismanagement during conflicts. By declaring its nuclear doctrine, Pakistan can improve its international image and establish itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional and global security.

Pakistan’s current nuclear ambiguity policy has served this purpose. However, the evolving security dynamics in South Asia require a more transparent approach. The rational deterrence theory highlights the importance of communication in maintaining effective deterrence, and Pakistan must adapt to these principles to ensure long-term stability. By declaring a formal nuclear doctrine, Pakistan would not only reduce the risk of miscalculations but also strengthen its deterrence posture, contributing to a more stable South Asia.