The Selective Multilateralism and the Fragmentation of the Liberal World Order.

As a result of the world wars, the liberal institutions were created on the premise, namely, that the universal institutions would lessen power politics by means of rules-based order, shared norms and collective security. The Bretton Woods institutions and subsequently the World Trade Organization enshrined a vision that universality, that is participation of all states, on the basis of equal standards would create stability and cooperation. Instead of focusing solely on national state centric interests in a world overly consumed by real-politic. However, in the contemporary international world there is an implication of transformation in the modern strategic setting. Although Universalism has not been out rightly dejected by the modern nation state; it has been subjugated. It is replaced by a logic of utility that is more often the driving force of institutional interaction, giving rise to concepts of monolatrist-cooperation of regional actors, instead of multilateralism.

The United States has always been the key architect and guarantor of liberal internationalism; it is now symbolizing this breakdown of global norms. Rather than reforming the existing structures, such as The United Nations UN, either their alternate forums are made, or they are being abandoned. Ultimately maximizing those agencies which provide strategic benefit and avoid or limiting those that restrict policy choice. This re-calibration points to a larger structural process of global governing, namely; the conditionality of universality, and the institutions are more appreciated because of their strategic role.

During the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. foreign policy was characterized by the growth of liberal norms, democracy promotion, interdependence of economies, and multilateral problem solving. Institutions did not exist as mere policy implementing mechanisms, but as representatives of a larger normative project. It was assumed that the open markets and inclusive system of governance would be beneficial to all actors and will eventually reduce the geopolitical competition. The premise has now faced renewed great-power rivalry, supply chain weaknesses, asymmetric insecurities across the regions, rise of non-traditional threats.

Participation in global governance processes is now subject to competitive logic and is no longer unconditional. As witnessed recently, the backing out of US from more than sixty-five UN agencies goes to show the monetary significance of liberal institutions. Their economic viability rather than their moral utility has more value to be led by the power which founded these institutions and also used to stand for the values these institutions promote. This change depicts “selective liberalism”, where a selective assimilation of institutions based on how well they serve strategic interests. Where the institutions are reinforced to strengthen the U.S. power or aid deterrence, they are strengthened. Where they restrict economic, technological or territorial manoeuvrability, they are avoided.

The NATO provides the good example of ‘utility-based engagement’. The alliance has been rejuvenated due to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, with more deployments and increased burden sharing commitments. The survival of NATO is an indication of its strategic usefulness in containing Russia and preventing further aggression. However, in the discourse of the United States, there has been a change of focus to consolidate contributions and mutual expenses and has highlighted a transactional aspect that was not present in earlier eras of encompassing multilateral idealism.
Similarly, the QUAD and the AUKUS are monoliteral frameworks in which has been prioritized by the U.S in the Indo Pacific. These arrangements are exclusive clubs of likeminded states tied together by certain strategic interests, especially the maritime security and technological co-ordination. Their layout is efficient and strategic based instead of being inclusive. Only states that can have a commonality in threat perception and have compatible operations, can participate. This form of monoliteral is an evolution in world governance.
The existence of universal institutions does not mean that they have lost their form, yet they are increasingly being replaced by smaller but purposeful coalitions that produce substantive results. Universality loses on utility in terms of speed, coherence and strategic alignment.
Economic statecraft represents the most obvious expression of utility, as opposed to universality. The assumption of liberalism of interdependence leading to the cause of peace has been replaced by the appreciation of the fact that interdependence may be as well a source of vulnerability. The U.S export controls on state-of-the-art semiconductor technologies and the signing of the CHIPS and Science Act can be seen as strategic changes in economic policy. Instead of favoring efficiency in the global market under WTO arrangements, U.S. policy is progressively securitizing the supply chains, especially in the area of critical minerals and advanced technologies. Geopolitical competition is carried out by the use of trade and industrial policy.
The reasoning is decidedly realist: economic networks are not the arenas of mutual benefit but arenas of power. This change puts pressure on universal trade governance mechanisms. The dispute settlement system of the WTO has been stuck by the opposition of U.S. to its appellate systems. This preoccupation with “friend-shoring” and “de-risking” only further divides world trade into blocs made up of political trust, as opposed to open multilateralism. Universality in this environment is not thrown away in a rhetorical manner, but blurred out in practice. States justify selective arrangements because it is a necessary adaptation to insecurity. However, the overall impact is the “erosion” of universal liberal standards of governance.

The recent revival of the great power competition has brought back realist analytical frameworks that was believed to be overshadowed. Structural realism also stresses that survival and equilibrium among the states is superior to threats in an anarchic system. The modern policy of the U.S with its emphasis on building alliances, investing in military modernization, and limiting the technological development of the opponent, conforms to this logic. On the other hand, classical realism, supports prudence and extent of moral ambition in foreign policy. The current situation is the re-calibration towards the prudential calculation. The universal principles are rhetorically immortal, but they are applied through strategic necessity.

Notably, this is not a total abolition of liberalism, as we know it. The U.S still resorts to the rhetoric of democratic values and language of the rules-based order. Nevertheless, such language is now coexisting with clear actualizations that power politics is still core. Institutions are perpetuated in such a way that they stabilize the system to the advantage of the interests of the U.S, and where they hinder flexibilities or advantage, they are outflanked. This mixed way of approach that integrates realism into a liberal institutional shell is an example of what is meant by utility being more important than universality.

This recalibration in the U.S. has systemic effects. When the visionary of liberal order becomes selective in their engagement, other states follow suit. Regional institutions become more prominent and monoliteral alliances become more widespread and the international governance becomes splintered into overlapping zones of coordination.

The paralysis of the United Nations Security Council, UNSC during big wars highlights the limitation of the institutions in a polarizing environment. With the weakening of consensus among permanent members, states are looking at other platforms of coordination. Institutional collapse is replaced by functional redundancy. Furthermore, rivalry over crucial minerals required in renewable energy changes and superior technologies has brought a fresh spectrum of strategic competition. The geopolitics of resource security is becoming more of a reality, which supports the assumptions of the realists of scarcity and competition. Taken together, these developments are an indication that the world order is shifting towards the pragmatic, interest-based order as opposed to the universalist governance aspirations. The institutions survive, but their legitimacy is based on the strategic relevance, as opposed to normative commitment.

The liberal international order is not over. It has been reinterpreted. In contrast to its previous unconditional multilateralism, the United States’ contemporary foreign policy shows a dramatic shift toward selective institutional involvement that is guided by strategic calculation. NATO is made stronger by being deterrent, trade rules are challenged since they restrain, and monoliteral coalitions are favoured since they can deliver. This change incorporates the notion of a utilitarian principle against universalism. The liberal institutions are still present in the language of diplomacy and architectural form, and their functioning is viewed through the prism of realist demands. The fact that the erosion is non-radical and non-revolutionary is what makes it quiet. The concept of universality is not automatically obeyed in an era of insecurity where great-power rivalry, competition in technology and the geopolitics of resources are common. Usefulness that is defined in terms of the security, power, and strategic edge has taken precedence. What has been the consequence, is the hybrid order where liberal forms can survive but the realist logic remains dominant.