TTP and Baloch Militant Groups: An Examination of their Relationship

On June 26, 2024, the Balochistan government held a press conference where they disclosed the arrest of a prominent leader from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). His confessions reveal an alarming trend of cooperation between the banned TTP and Baloch militant factions. Highlighting their sole aim to instigate turmoil in Balochistan and undermine the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, a significant trend has emerged: the TTP’s increasing overtures to Baloch militant groups to form a united front against Pakistan’s security forces in Balochistan. The TTP’s division of Balochistan into the Kalat-Makran and Zhob chapters is particularly telling of their long-term ambitions. Clearly, they want to convey that the areas with a Baloch majority are not excluded from their security strategy. In addition to bringing four Baloch militant groups into their fold, the TTP has also been using social media to broadcast sympathetic messages and video content addressing critical issues in Balochistan. Such as forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and poor development index.

Since the unfortunate demise of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in 2006, Balochistan has remained embroiled in over twenty years of anti-state insurgency. In this context, the TTP’s media campaign encouraging Baloch people to rise against Pakistan has been ongoing since 2014. Reports indicate that the connections between the TTP and Baloch militant factions began to solidify in the caves of Afghanistan during the period from 2015 to 2020.

The ideological divides between Baloch militant factions advocating for ethnic and secular objectives and TTP’s Islamic ideology have not hindered their shared concept of a united resistance against the Pakistani establishment. The tacit approval by Baloch separatists of TTP’s unrestricted operations within their territory underscores their shared commitment to the conflict against the security forces.

TTP’s supportive rhetoric towards Balochistan extends beyond mere propaganda. Certain arms left behind following the U.S. military withdrawal have been appropriated by Baloch armed groups. Following the coordinated assaults in Nushki and Panjgur last year, Pakistan’s interior minister remarked that the Baloch militants lack the capacity to execute significant attacks. In contrast, TTP possesses the capability, experience, and advanced NATO weaponry to carry out such operations. The U.S. abandoned military assets are valued at approximately $7 billion. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) benefits from extensive military training provided by TTP, which includes expertise in the utilization of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). In exchange, TTP receives logistical assistance within Balochistan.

Moreover, TTP has offered refuge to Baloch insurgents in the Barmal district of Paktika, neighboring Pakistan’s South Waziristan tribal area. Historical precedents also highlight Afghanistan’s backing of Baloch insurgents. For instance, Aslam Baloch, a prominent BLA commander, was in hiding in Afghanistan at the time of his assassination. Additionally, Brahumdagh Bugti, the grandson of the late nationalist figure Nawab Akbar Bugti, survived suicide attacks in Afghanistan before escaping to Switzerland in 2011.

The Baloch militant factions recognize that their alignment with the TTP will alleviate the pressure exerted by the Afghan Taliban. For instance, the Taliban  apprehended eight Baloch refugees in Nimroz, with exiled Baloch separatist activists alleging that these individuals were accused of having ties to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K).

The Baloch separatists represent the largest community in exile within Afghanistan, predominantly found in the southern province of Nimroz, along with adjacent regions of Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah provinces. However, the majority returned to Pakistan following the assaults led by the Islamabad-backed Afghan mujahedin after the fall of Afghanistan’s pro-Soviet socialist regime in 1992. Currently, the circumstances appear to be less violent for the Baloch community compared to past conflicts.

Despite differing religious perspectives, the TTP shares numerous connections with Baloch nationalist factions. In August 2020, the anti-Shia sectarian militant organization, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), aligned with the TTP. The Kurd faction of LeJ also operated out of Balochistan, resulting in many militants within the TTP possessing an in-depth understanding of the region’s security dynamics. Mufti Hidayatullah, a prominent religious figure, was among the founding members of the LeJ in Mastung. His madrassa, situated in the Kali Kandawa area of Mastung, functioned as a refuge for LeJ members following assaults on the Hazara Shia community in Mastung and Quetta.

Baloch groups are forming alliances with factions they traditionally oppose ideologically. Ayesha Siddiqa observes  that Balochistan, which shares borders with Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan’s volatile tribal regions, is a melting pot of various sectarian, separatist, and foreign militant groups, including the Afghan Taliban. The Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda have both adopted strategies aimed at engaging with local movements and addressing regional issues.

The TTP’s expansion into Balochistan transcends a mere public relations initiative; it underscores a shift in Pakistan’s security orientation alongside a transformation within the group itself. This evolving security landscape is poised to trigger a rise in violence across the province. The TTP is actively disseminating statements of solidarity to cultivate the loyalty of the lower ranks of Baloch militants.