Who Gets What in the Sino-India Border Patrolling Settlement?

In a sudden turn of events, the standoff between India and China in eastern Ladakh – which began in the spring of 2020 – now seems to be reaching an apparent settlement. As per the latest reports coming from the Indian media, Indian and Chinese troops have disengaged at two friction points of Depsang and Demchok. The disengagement came after the Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, on October 21, announced that the Indian negotiators and their Chinese counterparts have reached “an agreement” over patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control. In a follow up, the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, affirmed the foreign secretary’s statement and further  claimed that the situation was set to go back to ‘pre-2020 level’. However, critical and reliable details pertaining to the recent settlement remain undisclosed. In the lead up to the events, what appears obvious is that contrary to Jaishankar’s claim, there are no signs of the situation at LAC going back to the pre-2020 level. The contemporary trends indicate that New Delhi could have given up some of its territorial claims in Depsang, in order to arrive at a settlement with China on Chinese terms. There are also signs that despite the enthusiasm, the settlement in substance may offer little in terms of actually settling New Delhi’s patrolling claims in the longer-run.

The Depsang plains was perhaps the most significant friction point in eastern Ladakh. Reportedly, the Chinese forces had established positions up to 18 kilometers (km) within Indian-claimed territories in the Depsang plains. As per Indian news sources – since the onset of the border standoff and simultaneous talks – Beijing has been displaying a good deal of unwillingness in holding talks over this region, citing it to be a ‘legacy issues’ i.e. unrelated to the 2020 standoff.

For China, Depsang’s proximity to the Aksai Chin region, which links Tibet with Xinjiang through the G219 highway – offers logistical mobility to the Chinese military along its western borders. Through the Depsang plains, the Chinese military can check the operations of Indian troops and can hinder their ability to reinforce positions near the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). To India, the Depsang Plains offer proximity to DBO which homes India’s northernmost airbase, which supports India’s northern operational air presence. It is located in India’s Sub Sector North which is sandwiched between the Siachen Glacier on one side and Aksai Chin on the other. Hence, India deems it crucial for reinforcing India’s position in northern Ladakh by keeping supply lines open to DBO, and for potentially disrupting Chinese logistics in a possible skirmish or limited confrontation.

In this scenario, the two states arriving at a probable settlement could indicate some progress. However, there are signs of New Delhi making some serious concessions with regards to its claims in Depsang, in an effort to mend fences with Beijing.

First, the status of permanent Chinese settlements remains unclear. Since the beginning of the standoff, New Delhi has particularly been vocal about Chinese construction of permanent structures in eastern Ladakh as Beijing’s attempts to permanently alter the status quo at the LAC. In 2021, New Delhi claimed that the Chinese troops had built up additional auxiliary structures, support buildings, observation posts, towers, and fencing in the Depsang region. Some rather recent Indian reports indicated that China has also constructed roads and highways in the Depsang region. Of now, while there are some reports regarding the partial removal of temporary structures in the Depsang region, it is in fact the status of permanent structures that shall be decisive in ascertaining that who gets the dominating positions, and a consequent operational advantage.

Second, the terms of patrolling protocols in the Depsang region arrived at by the two parties are not known. This is important because the patrolling terms will indicate the concessions and exceptions made by either of the two sides. In the lead up to the announcement of the settlement, it was being estimated by New Delhi-based analysts that the schedule for border patrolling was under discussion, whereby both parties were expected to conduct monthly review meetings and a continuous monitoring of the contested regions. However, on November 6, it was reported that military talks aimed at working out the modalities of patrols in Depsang had reached a deadlock over the issue of the “extent and routes of patrolling”, particularly on patrolling points patrol points 10, 11, 11A, 12, and 13 in Depsang. It is important that both parties agree on tangible and definitive terms on border patrolling over patrolling points to ensure that any future clashes over the issue are avoided.

Third, this time around, the option of creation of buffer zones at the friction points appears not be on table. Had such a zone been created, it would have been favorable to China. In May 2024, Chinese negotiators had rejected India’s suggestion of creating a 3 to 4 km buffer zone. In response, they had instead proposed the creation of a 15 to 20 km buffer zone, which was pushing well within Indian-claimed territory. Otherwise as well, the earlier establishment of buffer zones – in the Galwan River valley, Gogra – hot springs, and Pangong Tso –New Delhi had let go of chunks of its claimed territories. Within New Delhi, this was viewed as Indian government’s capitulation of its territorial claims. Hence going forward, it could be expected that any potential creation of a buffer zone could leave India at a disadvantageous position, as has been the case in other friction points.

In this scenario, what possibly explains the apparent reproachment between India and China? In the aftermath of the 2020 border standoff, After the 2020 border standoff, New Delhi took cosmetic measures, such as banning over 200 Chinese apps for data security concerns, and placing restrictions on Chinese investments in telecom and infrastructure. Nevertheless, the larger bilateral economic interactions remained considerably unhinged. In fiscal year 2023-24, China ranked as India’s largest trading partner. Hence, going forward, the thaw in Sino-India border issues may be pegged with a bolstered bilateral economic cooperation. More importantly, in recent months, particularly since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the limits of US-India strategic partnership have increasingly been tested. This could be a key factor pushing New Delhi to coming to terms with Beijing on the border issue. New Delhi’s ‘strategic autonomy’ appears to have been straitening Washington’s patience for New Delhi, a factor evident from Washington’s claims of the Indian government orchestrating assassination plots against US citizens, its concerns for democratic regression in India, and its hesitation in sharing key military technologies with New Delhi. In addition to this, the BRICS summit in Kazan, following immediately after the announcement of the settlement, is one immediate yet defining explanation.

Whatever be the reasons for New Delhi’s reconciliation with Beijing from a disadvantaged position, border issues are likely to remain persistent irritant in Sino-India relations. While temporary arrangements may create an appearance of “peace and tranquility” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the broader trust deficit may continue to impinge on bilateral border issues.