Author: Rimsha Malik

A significant change in global security occurred on 5 February 2026. The New START treaty, the final treaty that restricted the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons expired. Along with it, there is no longer a framework that was used to manage nuclear competition over a decade.

This moment is not important in terms of numbers, but rather in terms of predictability.

New START put explicit limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems over ten years. More to the point, it also enabled both parties to peep into the arsenals of each other. There was inspection, notification as well as regular data exchanges which meant that both Washington and Moscow did not need to make any guesses regarding the other nuclear postures. The treaty led to the lessening of suspicion since it minimized uncertainty.

That is no longer the transparency layer.

This does not imply that there is an impending arms race. Both nations already have more than sufficient nuclear potentials to deter one another many folds. The lack of validation alters the psychology of strategic planning. Previously, intelligence tests that were backed by inspection reports will be more based on assumptions and indirect observation. Military planners hedge when there is a decrease in certainty. And with planners hedging, the requirements tend to magnify.

Very few arms competitions start with any dramatic political speech. They start small – by humble adaptations which are explained as precautionary measures.

The United States and Russia have both the technical capability to add the number of warheads deployed with the attachment of more weapons to the existing missiles and submarines. Any slight gains, reflected on the other end, would cause a chain of action-reaction. Not because leaders seek escalation, but because none wants to be seen to be strategically disadvantaged.

The modern nuclear world cannot be viewed as an extension of the Cold War as it was bipolar. The present strategic world is more multifaceted. Various key powers have been modernizing their capacities to affect the world balance, depending on their vision of security and local dynamics. With strategic modernization being experienced in various parts of the world, the conventional bi-lateral model with which nuclear competition has been identified is no longer sufficient to cope with the emerging realities. This change does not necessarily presuppose confrontation, but it makes it more difficult to calculate, plan the force over the long term, and work to ensure predictability in the system.

This leads to a less solid and more fluid nuclear order.

The technological shift that is taking place in parallel with this moment is what makes it particularly fragile, however.

Nuclear deterrence is currently working in a digital ecosystem. The early warning systems are dependent on satellites and sensors. The leadership is linked to the launch authorities via communications networks. More and more, artificial intelligence helps to process data and find anomalies. These inventions are efficiency and speed guaranteed – but speed is not necessarily stabilizing.

Reflective time is a strategic resource in time of crisis. Decision making windows that are compressed through technologies diminish that asset. Hypersonic weapons move faster and manoeuvre in an unpredictable way and allow less confirmation. Cyber operations provide the opportunity that warning systems or communication network may be interrupted, spoofed, or degraded. Even a technical failure, when misunderstood, could be taken as an attempted sabotage.

Unwilled aggression is not the most disturbing threat in such an environment. It is misinterpretation.

When a satellite feed becomes dead, is it a failure? A cyber intrusion? A prelude to attack? Unless there are mechanisms of verification that would enhance mutual restraint, the leaders can make assumptions on the worst. Nuclear stability relies widely on confidence – confidence that signals are being interpreted the right way and systems are operating as they are supposed to. With the increasing complexity of digital, that trust is more difficult to maintain.

The expiry of New START has an even wider impact or the relations between U.S and Russia. Global non-proliferation regime is based on bad political bargain in which the states that are not nuclear promised to abandon them as a promise in the access to peace nuclear technology and the nuclear armed states promised to disarm. In cases where the visible arms control agreements fail, the promise is less believable. Though the expiry of one treaty does not necessarily result in proliferation, the moral and political justification of restraint suffers blow.

Nevertheless, it would be too early to say that the arms control has ceased completely.

It is historically known that even strong competitors are willing to negotiate when competition is too expensive or too risky. In the Cold War, it was not trust that led to the development of arms control, but vulnerability. This logic is applicable to this day. Development of nuclear weapons is not cheap. It is dangerous to deal with crises in a technologically overcrowded environment. Strategic necessity will eventually make new attempts at reducing risks.

The new contracts in the future will not be similar to the former though. The following stability metrics might require focusing more on the warhead counts, but also the issue of cyber interference, space security or the influence of artificial intelligence over the command-and-control systems. The systems of transparency might change over time. Confidence-building can be of a new type. It is all about saving the communication and minimizing the chances of disastrous misunderstanding.

The termination of New START does not imply the impending nuclear war. But it does imply that the latitude of error is decreased.

Previously, strategic stability was based on the quantity of missiles and warheads. Nowadays, it also relies on the preservation of digital networks, the ability to communicate clearly and effectively avoid misperception of technology. The barriers that were used to control competition over the years have disintegrated. It will take a conscious political work and tactical imagination to substitute them.

Stability will not be self-reinforcing in an AI-driven, cyber-specialized, multipolar world. It will need to be reinstated deliberate, aware and prior to the next crisis trying the system.

We once imagined warfare as something you could see—soldiers on borders, jets roaring overhead, headlines warning of strikes and counterstrikes. But that picture is outdated. The most dangerous battles today don’t make noise. They unfold quietly, across screens and social feeds, where manipulated narratives travel faster than truth, and the boundary between fact and fiction grows thinner by the hour. Pakistan, like many other nations, is now caught in a new kind of warfare—one that doesn’t need boots on the ground, only algorithms and intention.

It didn’t happen overnight. As globalization sped up and information technology transformed how we connect, a vast human network emerged—more connected than ever in history. But that same network, while powerful, also opened the door to something darker: information leaks, data theft, and psychological manipulation on a mass scale. Social media platforms, designed for communication and expression, are now being used to distort reality. And the consequences are becoming harder to ignore.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2025 didn’t hold back—it named disinformation and misinformation as immediate global threats. Why? Because they undermine trust, paralyze institutions, and make it harder for societies to respond to crises. In Pakistan, we’re seeing this play out in real-time. From manipulated hashtags to AI-generated videos, our information space is being shaped by actors who don’t want to inform—they want to influence.

Much of this manipulation targets the most active part of our population: young people. For many of them, social media isn’t just a tool—it’s the lens through which they see the world. But that lens is often warped. According to the Digital Habits of Pakistani Youth, 2023 report by Bytes for All, over 60% of young users encountered online conflicts that left them confused and emotionally distressed. That statistic isn’t just troubling—it’s a warning sign. When confusion becomes the norm, trust erodes, and once that happens, it’s much easier to sway public opinion with falsehoods.

The danger isn’t just domestic. In 2021, EU Disinfo Lab uncovered a massive network of 750 fake media outlets operating across 116 countries, many linked to India. These sites didn’t just report misinformation; they were designed to look like credible international news sources while pushing anti-Pakistan narratives. Their goal wasn’t just to discredit Pakistan abroad—it was to sow doubt within.

We’ve seen how effective these tactics can be. During the Jaffar Express terrorist attack, fabricated content—including old footage, AI-generated images, and misleading captions—spread quickly on social media. People were misled, panic grew, and attention shifted away from the real perpetrators. This kind of distortion isn’t just about misinformation—it’s about destabilization.

The digital front lines are perhaps most active in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Indian media machinery focuses much of its energy here, producing images of unrest and dissatisfaction as if they define daily life in the region. But anyone who’s spent time in AJK—or even followed local media closely—knows that narrative doesn’t hold. The reality is far less dramatic and far more grounded in national sentiment.

Whether it’s Independence Day, Defence Day, or Kashmir Solidarity Day, people in AJK come out in large numbers, not out of fear or force, but because the connection they feel to Pakistan is genuine. These aren’t symbolic gestures—they’re expressions of belonging. And when you place that alongside the situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, where India tries hard to manufacture the appearance of normalcy or local approval, the contrast is impossible to ignore.

Still, we can’t rely on resilience alone. Awareness is growing, yes—but awareness must lead to action. Pakistan needs a coordinated strategy to confront this challenge. We need media literacy programs that go beyond schools and reach parents, professionals, and communities. People must learn how to question sources, resist emotional manipulation, and think critically before they share. But education is just one piece of the puzzle.

There must also be stronger cyber laws, not just to punish individual offenders but to dismantle the networks behind them. This requires collaboration—between the state, tech companies, civil society, and the media. Without shared responsibility, we’ll keep reacting after the damage is done. And we can’t afford to be reactive anymore.

International cooperation is also essential. Disinformation crosses borders effortlessly, so we must partner with other countries to track and expose coordinated campaigns. We’ve already seen how international investigations like EU DisinfoLab can help. But we need our own infrastructure to monitor, respond, and push back with facts—quickly and convincingly.

Just as importantly, we must invest in telling our own story. If we don’t define the narrative, others will do it for us—and not in our favor. That means supporting independent journalism, creating strong public diplomacy platforms, and funding content that reflects the complexity and diversity of Pakistan. Facts matter, but so do stories. And the best way to counter a lie is with a story that’s both true and powerful.

This isn’t about controlling speech—it’s about protecting sovereignty. In today’s world, sovereignty isn’t just about borders. It’s about controlling your narrative, owning your truth, and defending your people from digital harm. The fifth battlefield—after land, sea, air, and space—is already active. Whether we like it or not, we’re in it. The question is whether we’ll rise to meet it.

Cyberspace is now not only the domain of communication and exchange of information, but it has become a significant battlefield of the modern world, affecting national security, economic prosperity and social peace. In this regard, contemporary states have faced numerous challenges and issues in the new world, one of which is related to cyber sovereignty. To Pakistan, a country geographically located in a rather volatile region, ensuring nation’s protection of its cyberspace is not only desirable but mandatory.

 

Cyber Sovereignty

Cyber sovereignty refers to a nation’s ability to govern and protect its digital infrastructure, data, and online activities within its borders. As Kadlecová aptly notes, if governments are to retain their sovereign capacities, they have to seize a less tangible approach given the fast pace of evolution and the emergence of new technologies in computerized space. Cyber Sovereignty demonstrates how nations intentionally harness modern technology intertwining it with the Legal Order to direct the de-centralization of powers in the cyber world. Cyber sovereignty has become one of the most well-discussed topics in the international community with both democratic and authoritarian states all over the world striving in a rather intense race to assert their right to control cyberspace.

Detecting and countering state-sponsored cyber-sphere warfare is more challenging as the distinction between cyberwarfare and conventional warfare is blurring. As for the organized, non-state actors such as hacktivists and cybercrime groups, they wield quite a lot of power in cyberspace. In their actions, they add more layers to the concept of digital sovereignty, which is already a threat to law enforcement agencies and cyber security professionals. These cover activities such as ideological cyberattacks, financial crimes, and so forth. In addition, as defensive operations ‘get tougher’, the transnationality of the internet only aggravates the issue. In this case, it becomes relatively hard to apply conventional approaches such as deterrence. Instead, what is required is a new approach that targets cyberspace: an approach that has not yet arrived.

 

Enhancing Pakistan’s Cyber Readiness: Steps Forward

Pakistan has recently admitted to the installation of firewall. According to the officials, the step is justified by the need to counter threats to national security, prevent the dissemination of ‘extremist’ information and materials, and protect religion and culture from prohibited content. However, the main purpose of installation among public is recognized to be state’s attempt to have a tighter control over the cyberspace of the country. Pakistan could also have been influenced by the apparent success of such policy in certain countries for instance China. The reaction of the public has been mixed, while some think that regulating the internet will decrease crimes and maintain social order, others show a concerning attitude stating that this can violate privacy and freedom of speech saying and may hinder protests and infringe on people’s rights.

Ideally, states should employ protective systems for the decrease of cyber risk and the enhancement of cyber productivity because ICTs may be employed for positive or negative purposes. These methods include technological and administrative control for protection of ICT-dependent facilities and can be defined as cybersecurity. In the same way as sociopolitical goals are delivered through ICTs, these latter are considered not only technological tools, but also social institutes. In this regard they are a powerful social determinant of what is often referred to as cyber power, or national power. According to the official definition, cyber power means the ‘application of cyberspace to generate benefits and shape occurrences in other kinetic domains and across the five modes of operation’. Consequently, the effective use of ICTs instrumental in facilitating an effective and efficient government, better mechanisms of law and order, growth of the economy at a faster rate, and dominance in the military more efficiently.

However, even though Pakistan is now having a rapidly growing ICT infrastructure and Internet connection, several positive impacts originate from this attack, many significant cybersecurity threats. Such threats include cyberwar, organized cybercriminal activities, hacking, as well as cyber-terrorism. This is particularly so given the general insecurity situation within Pakistan as well as in its surrounding region. Cyber espionage targeting Pakistan is quite frequent while Indian hackers are frequently attacking Pakistan’s financial sector. Pakistan is also vulnerable to cyberattacks by terrorist organizations and as conflict has shifted towards the cyber-sphere more and more this is a possibility that India may launch cyber-attacks against Pakistan.

 

Future Outlook

Pakistan has to consider national cyber readiness as a priority to prevent itself from such problems. Despite some minor legislative developments in the cybersecurity field, the government has made inadequate efforts to construct technical organizations, organizational frameworks, and global partnerships. Thus, Pakistan has to develop an effective and comprehensive cybersecurity policy that integrates with the objectives of all related security, administrative, and economic entities. There is also the need to enhance collaboration between security agencies involved in cybersecurity operations. The latter pertains to strengthening the technological aspect on the Pakistani side and raising the level of cybersecurity awareness among the population.

Espionage, or the practice of gathering information covertly, has been around for thousands of years. However, it has evolved significantly over time, particularly with the advent of new technologies that have made it easier to gather and transmit information. Balloons have been one such technology that has been used in espionage. One of the earliest known uses of balloons in espionage occurred during the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century. French balloonist François Arban used a hot air balloon to conduct aerial reconnaissance of enemy positions, allowing French troops to better plan their attacks. This was one of the first instances of aerial reconnaissance being used in warfare.

During World War I, both the Allies and the Central Powers used balloons for aerial reconnaissance. The balloons were tethered to the ground and used to observe enemy troop movements and artillery positions. However, they were also vulnerable to attack, and many balloonists were killed by enemy fire.

In the Cold War era, balloons were used by both the United States and the Soviet Union for espionage purposes. The US used balloons to conduct surveillance of the Soviet Union, particularly in the early days of the Cold War before satellite technology was widely available. The most well-known of these balloon programs was the Project Mogul, which was a top-secret US government program that used high-altitude balloons to detect sound waves from potential Soviet nuclear tests. In the Soviet Union, balloons were used to transport spies and equipment across borders. For example, during the 1960s, the KGB used balloons to transport agents and equipment across the Iron Curtain into West Germany.

The United States shot down a Chinese spy balloon earlier this month after it had flown over a significant portion of North America. America has been mesmerized by the case of Chinese surveillance balloons and mysterious objects circling the country’s skies for several weeks. Some of these items are still unknown in terms of their origin and use. Yet regardless of how they end out, they have already set up a crisis in ties between the United States and China. The possibility that Chinese balloons may be spying on key military facilities has received the majority of attention and worry. Nevertheless, there is a more disturbing, more painful reason why covert high-altitude balloon flights are so unsettling: they have been used to attack America in the past, and they very well may do so again. This sordid past serves as another evidence of the urgent need for both the United States and China to reduce tensions, particularly in the area of aviation.

About 9,000 high-altitude balloons fired from Japan during World War II were used to launch successful, widespread attacks on the American mainland. Japan’s Fu-Go balloons used the same jet stream winds that carried China’s surveillance balloons over America to deliver a small explosive payload deep into the heart of the country. Just modest damage and regrettably a few deaths were brought on by these balloon explosives. But, the US administration was concerned that they may spread panic and lower morale, so they banned mention of the bizarre new weapon, which is one of the reasons they’ve been virtually forgotten. The leaders of China and the United States can learn three crucial lessons from the past of the Fu-Go balloons as they handle the current issue.

 First of all, despite the fact that they pose no direct threat to national security, invisible, high-altitude objects raise panic levels that are unjustified. The military utility of China’s spy balloons appears to be negligible, similar to the Fu-Go balloons. Nonetheless, it’s difficult to overstate how they affected the general public’s perspective and concern.

The second thing to learn is that balloons make surprisingly sneaky weapons. It took US investigators several months to put Japan’s balloon bomb operation together. China’s high-altitude balloons, on the other hand, seem to have taken advantage of what a senior Air Force officer called a “domain awareness gap,” passing through gaps in American air defense. Such gaps are particularly alarming if, like in the 1940s, they open up fresh entry points for enemies to strike American territory. Furthermore, The Fu-Go balloons taught us that crisis and conflict can be transformed into cooperation and the story of the Fu-Go balloon bombs had a happy ending due to the actions of individual Americans and Japanese who worked to transform wartime tragedy into postwar partnership. We must hope that the most recent crisis in US-China relations resolves similarly.

Regardless of the differences between the two countries, leaders in Beijing and Washington must create the conditions for this exchange to flourish. For its part, China needs to start by avoiding any more airborne intrusions into American airspace. The history of the Fu-Go balloons most importantly demonstrates that nations must use people-to-people interactions to better anchor their troubled relationship when tensions are as high, as they are between the United States and China — or risk causing the world to experience much greater instability.