The political transition following the August 2024 ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has triggered a fundamental recalibration of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Under the newly elected BNP leader, Tarique Rahman, the party secured a decisive electoral victory in February 2026. With the change in internal politics, Dhaka has shifted from its historically India-centric posture toward a more diversified and assertive diplomatic approach.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is back in power after 20 years. Following the death of Khaleda Zia, Tarique Rahman succeeded to the leadership of the party and secured a decisive electoral victory. Tarique Rahman has won two-thirds majority by securing 212 seats, followed by 77 for the Jamaat-led alliance out of 297 parliamentary seats. These elections were significant not only for Bangladesh but also for the entire South Asian region. Following a regime change, a state’s foreign policy orientation often undergoes a significant transformation. The downfall of Sheikh Hasina’s government has led to significant changes in bilateral relations between Bangladesh and neighboring states, especially India.
It is important to discuss Dhaka and New Delhi’s bilateral relations, as in the Awami League’s tenure, Bangladesh-India relations reached an unprecedented level of strategic cooperation. But with the collapse of the Awami League government, the relations between the two worsened. Following Hasina’s reported flight to India after her resignation had intensified the anti-Indian sentiment among Bangladeshis. The relationship that was once described as a strategic partnership has deteriorated into cautious mistrust. Despite the intensification of anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, trade between the two neighbors is surging.
Recently, in a tentative sign of de-escalation, visa services are being restored. After months of suspension that began in late 2024 and intensified through December 2025. Both countries have taken steps to normalize consular operations. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s upcoming visit to New Delhi, where he will meet with S. Jaishankar, Ajit Doval, and other senior officials, offers a potential off-ramp. But the agenda will be brutally difficult. The 1996 Farakka Water Treaty expires in 2026, and negotiations over the Ganges’ dry-season flow have always been a flashpoint. Add to that Bangladesh’s demand for a greater share of the Teesta River waters and a resolution to persistent border killings, and the path to normalization looks steep.
Bilateral relations between Islamabad and Dhaka under the Hasina government have seen significant improvement since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. This shift between the two countries after decades of frozen relations is remarkable, due to unresolved historical baggage from the 1971 Liberation War. This improvement in relations includes High-level diplomatic exchanges. In August 2025, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Dhaka, marking the highest-level Pakistani official visit in years. This is one of the diplomatic wins in the relations between the two countries after years of frozen relations. During the visit, both sides agreed to expand trade, resume direct air links, and explore defense cooperation. Pakistan has also offered 300 fully funded scholarships for Bangladeshi students, a symbolic gesture of goodwill.
Simultaneously, Bangladesh has pivoted decisively toward China. Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s first bilateral visit to Beijing was a carefully choreographed statement of intent. The $2.1 billion in loans, investments, and grants that followed, including funds for Mongla Port, etc. It reflects a deepening economic embrace. For China, Bangladesh offers a critical node in its Indian Ocean strategy. For Bangladesh, Beijing provides an alternative to Indian dominance and a partner with no historical baggage over 1971.
What does this all mean for South Asia? The simple answer is that the region’s bipolar order is India versus Pakistan. The smaller states expected to choose sides are giving way to something more fluid. Bangladesh is not abandoning its ties with New Delhi, but it is no longer willing to be defined by them only. By cultivating Pakistan and deepening engagement with China, Dhaka is asserting its right to a genuinely multi-aligned foreign policy. Conclusively, for India, the challenge is to recognize that the old model of neighborhood relying on friendly regimes has reached its limits. The new government in Dhaka is neither hostile nor pliable. It is simply, and finally, acting in its own interest. The next chapter of India-Bangladesh relations may be one of competition or constructive coexistence.
Be the first to comment