South Asia is home to approximately one-quarter of the world’s population, but it remains one of the least economically interconnected areas in the world. Despite shared history, cultural links, and geographic proximity, regional collaboration has not resulted in significant advancement. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, originally envisioned as a forum for collective growth, is today mainly inert and politically paralyzed. The failure of SAARC reflects larger structural and political issues in the area, particularly the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan. As other regional groups gain prominence, South Asia faces a fundamental policy question: should SAARC be modified, or is it time to replace it with a new regional structure?
SAARC, founded in 1985, aims to foster economic growth, social progress, and regional stability among its member countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In principle, the organization provided a forum for discussion, trade cooperation, and conflict resolution. However, over time, SAARC failed to transform its goal into real results. Intra-regional commerce remains less than 5% of overall trade among member states, in striking contrast to regional blocs like ASEAN and the European Union. Many accords, notably the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), were signed but inadequately executed. Meetings were routinely rescheduled, and summits grew more unusual.
The fundamental weakness of SAARC is its consensus-based decision-making process, which allows any one-member state to veto collective actions. While this was designed to protect smaller states, it has instead left the organization subject to political disagreements, particularly those between its two largest members. SAARC’s stagnation is rooted in the ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since gaining independence in 1947, the two states have fought numerous wars and continue to contest the province of Kashmir. These tensions have periodically spilled over into regional diplomacy, putting SAARC vulnerable to bilateral politics.
The cancelation of the 2016 SAARC meeting in Islamabad signalled a turning point. Following escalating tensions and allegations of cross-border terrorism, India and a number of other member states boycotted the summit. Since then, SAARC summits have not been held, thereby freezing the organization’s highest decision-making platform.
This circumstance demonstrates a critical institutional flaw: SAARC lacks tools to protect regional collaboration against bilateral conflict. Unlike other regional organizations, it lacks a conflict resolution framework or provisions that allow collaboration to continue even when political tensions grow. As a result, when relations between India and Pakistan worsen, the organization is unable to function.
As SAARC’s influence faded, new regional frameworks emerged to fill the void. One of the most visible of these is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, which connects South Asian and Southeast Asian countries excluding Pakistan. India has increased its diplomatic and economic participation with BIMSTEC, seeing it as a more flexible and politically viable platform. BIMSTEC’s emphasis on connectivity, energy cooperation, and maritime security is consistent with India’s overall Indo-Pacific strategy. The group has held frequent conferences and launched actual cooperation projects, indicating an increasing pace.
The decline of SAARC has had significant economic and strategic consequences for South Asia. Despite geographical proximity and shared markets, South Asian countries trade more with distant partners than with each other. High tariffs, restrictive visa regimes, and poor connectivity continue to hinder economic integration.
The absence of an effective regional platform also limits collective responses to transnational challenges such as climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and water management. Issues like glacier melt in the Himalayas or cross-border river disputes require coordinated regional solutions, yet the current institutional framework remains too weak to address them. Moreover, the fragmentation of regionalism undermines South Asia’s collective bargaining power in global forums. While other regions present unified positions on trade, climate negotiations, and development financing, South Asian states often act individually, reducing their influence on the international stage.
Given its current state, many analysts argue that SAARC has become obsolete. However, abandoning the organization altogether would ignore its symbolic and institutional value. SAARC remains the only platform that includes all South Asian states, including Pakistan and Afghanistan, making it uniquely positioned to address region-wide issues.
Reforming SAARC would require significant institutional changes. First, the organization should consider adopting flexible decision-making mechanisms that allow subsets of member states to proceed with cooperation even if consensus is not achieved. This “coalition of the willing” model has been used effectively in other regional organizations to prevent paralysis. Second, SAARC needs to strengthen its secretariat and technical bodies, giving them greater autonomy to implement projects independent of political fluctuations. Enhanced funding, professional staffing, and clearer mandates could help transform the secretariat from a symbolic entity into an active driver of regional initiatives.
Finally, member states must agree to compartmentalize bilateral disputes and prevent them from disrupting regional cooperation. While this is politically difficult, it is not unprecedented; organizations such as ASEAN have managed to maintain cooperation despite ongoing territorial disputes among members. If meaningful reform proves impossible, South Asia may need to accept a gradual transition toward a new regional architecture based on overlapping and flexible groupings. BIMSTEC, BBIN, and other sub-regional frameworks could collectively form a networked model of regionalism rather than a single centralized organization.
However, this approach carries risks. Excluding Pakistan from emerging regional arrangements could deepen political divisions and further fragment the region. A regional order built on selective participation may deliver short-term efficiency but at the cost of long-term stability and inclusivity. Therefore, the most pragmatic approach may lie in a hybrid model: maintaining SAARC as a broad, inclusive platform for dialogue while allowing smaller and more flexible groupings to handle functional cooperation in trade, energy, and connectivity.
South Asia today stands at a critical juncture in its regional evolution. The failure of SAARC is not merely an institutional problem; it reflects deeper geopolitical tensions and competing national priorities. Yet the costs of regional fragmentation are too high to ignore. Whether through reform or replacement, South Asia urgently needs a functional framework for cooperation. Reviving SAARC with institutional reforms would preserve regional inclusivity, while expanding alternative groupings could ensure progress in areas where consensus is elusive. The challenge for policymakers is to strike a balance between political realities and the long-term benefits of regional integration. The future of South Asian regionalism will depend not only on institutional design but also on the political will of its member states. Without a renewed commitment to cooperation, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle of missed opportunities and unrealized potential.
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