Multi-alignment approach and India’s Iran dilemma?

The recent US-Israel military strikes on Iran have not only destabilized the Middle Eastern region; but also challenged the carefully curated image of India in regional organizations especially BRICS. As Iran, which joined the BRICS in January 2024, is under military strikes, India finds itself in a very critical situation in its dealing with Iran (a BRICS member) and the US-Israel (its defence partners). Traditionally, India has adopted a ‘multi-alignment’ strategy but current conflict in Iran is testing limits of India’s neutrality regarding the recent military confrontation in Iran.

The India-Israel relations are not just limited to diplomacy; it’s a structural necessity. Since the late 1990s, Israel has become India’s defense partner, providing the technologies, including Barak-8 air defense systems in 2006 and certain specialized technologies that were denied to India by many. This collaboration extends more into the loitering munitions, such as the IAI Harop-a drone capable of tracking and crash into enemy radar systems and Elbit Systems (SkyStriker). The recent strikes on Iran actually showcase a collision between India’s defense ties with Israel and the trade relations it maintains with Iran and the BRICS solidarity. India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ with a neutral stance on the Ukraine crisis—balancing rival powers for its own benefit—has succeeded so far, but experts warn this high-wire act is not a permanent or universal solution. As the conflict prolonged, India discovered that remaining non-aligned is no longer suitable to survive but is a strategic vulnerability. This cooperation has moved beyond buyer-seller dynamics into deep intelligence-sharing and joint research and development.

Nonetheless, the recent war on Iran has resulted in a clash between the India-Iran bilateral relations and the Indian commitment to other nations in the multilateral arrangements. Iran is strategically important as it is the gateway for India to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Eurasian markets through the Chabahar Port. New Delhi is gambling on its calculated ambiguity being tolerated by a polarized global South by not explicitly condemning the recent war of the US and Israel against Iran. Recently, the signing of the agreements in February 2026 during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel is an indicator of a change in India in terms of diplomatic posture. This warming effect signifies the shift in Indian foreign policy. Historically, India maintained a more balanced position regarding Israel and regional disputes such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The current situation in Iran introduces a new element to the recent political discourse. transactional neutrality. Historically, India’s non-alignment strategy was rooted in broader decolonial agenda that was prevalent during, the Cold War. Today, India’s multi-alignment approach reflects pragmatism rooted in its national interests. While other members of BRICS, including Brazil, Russia, and China, have critically condemned the conflict and portrayed the United States and Israel as violator of International law. India’s approach reflects its interests where military-technological ties with the US and Israel outweigh the normative solidarity under the BRICS framework. This has unveiled a critical fault line within the BRICS members creates a ‘normative vacuum.’

This shift in Indian posture towards a more overt pro-Israel policy signals a departure from its historical role as a balanced mediator in the Middle East. If BRICS cannot protect or even politically shield its own members from external strikes voluntarily, the bloc risks becoming a ‘rhetorical coalition’ rather than a functional alternative to Western-led structures.

What is often missed in current analyses is the intelligence-industrial complex. India’s silence is likely tied to its dependency on Israeli and American signals intelligence (SIGINT) to monitor its own borders. Even with its own growing satellite network, India still depends on Western partners because their advanced sensors can intercept much weaker signals that India’s domestic systems might miss. In a world of hybrid warfare, India cannot afford to alienate the providers of the very digital ‘eyes’ it uses for national security. If New Delhi allows a fellow member to be targeted without any diplomatic approach, it signals to other members that India’s strategic autonomy is a ‘Western tethered autonomy.’ This perception could lead to the sidelining of India in any future Eurasian security platform led by global south.

India is hosting the 18th summit of BRICS in 2026; its strength has always been its pragmatism. However, the US-Israel war in Iran is challenging the Indian position in BRICS as an existential test for the political coherence within the BRICS members. The ‘India Model’ was supposed to be neutrals for the countries in Africa and Southeast Asia. However, the recent situation in the Middle East and strikes in Iran showcase that if India is going to stay silent on what’s happening in Iran, it’ll damage its ‘multi-alignment’ strategy making it difficult for India to navigate through crisis situation.

The policy currently used by India may not be enough to continue to navigate India through this geopolitical crisis. India has a process that is able to balance between the interests of the Middle East allied with the domestic defence relations of India. Strategic autonomy has strength as it can influence the outcomes in the region rather than just a place of escape against picking sides. In case of interest in bilateral defence relations, New Delhi could not be in a strategic position, as the cost of multilateralism is inferior to its isolation, where it has numerous partners in the levels of transactions but not good allies. The multi-alignment of India in the multipolar world is identified to be sustainable in the long term through the power of the Indian state to mediate its special position in working diplomacy.

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