In the past decade, global arms control regimes have slowly eroded. In 2019, the INF Treaty was abandoned, with each side accusing the other of treaty violations. By the end of 2020, the United States had formally withdrawn from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty that provided for mutual overflight inspections. And now, New START, the last major strategic arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia, has already expired with no feasible future planning. The withdrawal from treaties from the Cold War era sends a clear message that limits on nuclear weapons and missiles are now optional.
These developments such as the erosion of arms control frameworks, modernization of arsenals, implications of emerging technologies, and the weakening of disarmament norms, concern South Asia, given that the region hosts two nuclear armed states India and Pakistan. Both countries lack any bilateral arms-control framework between them. India now has around 180 nuclear warheads and continues to develop and modernize its arsenals. Recent developments like the deployment of new ‘canisterised’ road-mobile missiles, including Agni-Prime (Agni-P) and MIRV-capable Agni-5, that can carry nuclear warheads are indicators of such modernization. This will create security dilemma for Pakistan which currently has about 170 warheads is actively modernizing and diversifying its arsenals, a development that could further destabilize the region. In context of South Asia, these developments undermine any restraint each side may wish to exert. Certainly, both sides profess only a ‘minimal credible deterrent,’ but their expanding capabilities, missile ranges, warhead deployment, and air defences have been making any crisis much more volatile. The roughly 2024 growth of India and Pakistan’s continuing fissile buildup suggests the possibility of a competitive arms race in the coming decade is inevitable.
The global arms-control norms are weakening too. Neither India nor Pakistan has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); while both are observing an informal moratorium on testing, Pakistan has refused to come to the CTBT unless India does and vice versa. The progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is similarly slowed down; Pakistan insists that there should be any agreement that cover existing weapon-grade stockpiles (to prevent ‘freezing’ advantages in India’s favour), and, unsurprisingly, New Delhi is not prepared to commit to limits that delay its program of development.
In this vacuum of formal limits, nuclear buildups are frequently justified on grounds for self-defence. When major powers give up their treaties, middle and smaller powers often feel entitled to do so as well. Pakistan’s leadership has stated openly that a new arms race with India is ‘inevitable’ as long as India continues to modernize while simultaneously getting favours in current system. The nuclear weapons ‘do not ensure security’; they involve ‘immense risks of escalation and catastrophic outcomes’—even with the reminder provided by a minor crisis. In an environment of distrust and volatile protocols, what sometimes appears to be routine correspondence can suddenly become disastrous.
The Pulwama–Balakot episode of 2019 and recently may 2025 skirmish are startling in terms of how close India and Pakistan came to a major military escalation under nuclear overhang. Following a suicide bombing in Kashmir in February 2019, India responded with cross-border air strikes, marking the first such engagement since 1971. Pakistan retaliated days later, downed Indian fighter jets in a crisis that only ended through ad hoc diplomacy and outside mediation.
Amidst such situation, the institutional framework for navigating these strategic shifts requires careful revision to ensure it reflects the ground realities of South Asian security. However, while policy expertise is necessary to maintain restraint, efforts face a vacuum in the absence of a corresponding bilateral framework from India. Despite the presence of the active India-Pakistan Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline the region remains dependent on crisis-time diplomacy rather than permanent, comprehensive risk-reduction measures.
Global powers need to lead by example and reinvest in arms control so all regions can follow without any discrimination. Current frameworks are often viewed as discriminatory, particularly as they appear more favourable to India—the 2005 US-India nuclear deal — which increases distrust in countries like Pakistan toward universal arms control regimes. There should be an extension of New START beyond 2026 to limit the US and Russian arsenals. The US and Russia should begin discussions on next-generation arms, e.g., hypersonic missile defence systems, cyber strikes, and even space-based systems.
India and Pakistan could achieve satisfactory confidence-building measures. They could make their 1999 nuclear test moratorium stronger by pledging never to resume testing. However, global trends are complicating the situation; for example, the US has recently signaled a potential return to testing, frequently citing allegations of Chinese nuclear tests as justification. In such a shifting global environment, South Asian states face immense pressure on their own moratoriums.
They should also expand the 2005 Missile Test Pre-Notification Agreement — which is currently in place and requires 72 hours advance notification prior to a ballistic missile launch — to include current systems such as cruise missiles. Establishing a permanent nuclear risk-reduction centre or a dedicated nuclear hotline – made up of the existing DGMO line to provide real-time alerts about potential hazardous events – could further reduce the chance of miscommunication. To ensure that routine communications are never broken, they could also need open communications in all branches of their militaries. Continuous high-level dialogue on security issues (potentially with neutral mediators) can also help diffuse rising tensions.
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