The world has witnessed the destruction of a singular relatively lower-yield atomic bomb (commonly known as a nuclear weapon) in August 1945, when the United States of America (USA) dropped the two nuclear bombs separately on two different Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, in a matter of just three days. The atomic bombing caused an immense death toll, killing approximately 150,000 people in total. The destructive nature of the atomic bombings had proved to be consequential in bringing Imperial Japan to surrender, marking the official end to World War II.
With Japan’s surrender, the horrendous World War II came to an end, but it paved the way for another geopolitical tussle between the two giants of the Allied powers: the US and the former USSR. The wrestle for influence at the global stage was ideologically driven, based on the establishment of their own particular global governance model. The US was the proponent of a free-market economy based on the ideals of Capitalism. On the other hand, the USSR was promoting the ideology of collectivism, where the distribution of resources should be equal among the general masses by the central authority (the state government), based on the socialist proposition of Marxism.
The struggle for promoting their respective ideological influence in the world was not just limited to verbal political posturing; instead, it took a dangerous shift in 1949 when the USSR formally emerged as the second Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) after the US on the global scene. With the possession of nuclear weapons, the Soviets embarked on an offensive path to develop long-range delivery vehicles (Ballistic Missiles) to ascertain the credibility of nuclear deterrence against the rival US. From there on, the world experienced one of the most volatile security dynamics for four decades. Scattered proxy wars around the world were supported by both the US and the USSR, and the nuclear arms race between them was one when both sides equipped themselves with thousands of nuclear weapons. This period of bilateral confrontation, contestation, and contention is politically known as the Cold War (1949–1991).
During the Cold War, these strategic weapons posed a direct and indirect threat to each of the superpowers on occasion, such as the most prominent among all, the Cuban Missile Crisis, when both sides were on the verge of nuclear exchange. In the 1960s, proliferation was taking a horizontal spread, with the inclusion of China in the group in 1964 raising concerns about further proliferation. However, in 1967, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was presented to the states as an incentive to get a civil nuclear program. The treaty prohibited the development of nuclear weapons by any state except for the states that had already developed prior to the cut-off date (January 01, 1967) – the US, the former USSR, Great Britain, France, and China.
On the other hand, it was precisely when the Cold War was in full swing. Both states were developing the tit for tat strategic weaponries. Despite the dangerous arms race, the US and USSR both are cognizant of the fact that such an aggressive posturing was not beneficial for either of them. This realization resulted in one after another treaty to initially limit (SALT-I and SALT-II) and later reduce (INF Treaty and START-I) the number of nuclear weapons.
Though the case study of the Cold War reveals that the two nuclear super-powers refrained from engaging in the direct military stand-off in view of the clearly defined strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), but at the same time several proxy wars were fought in the different regions of the world at the behest of the then bi-pols, such as like in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, indicates the indirect confrontations can take place. The Cold War case cemented the view that nuclear bipolar powers do not fight each other, but they fight for their respective influence.
In 1991, the USSR disintegrated, marking the formal end of bipolarity. The US emerged as the sole superpower in the global arena. However, with the disintegration of the USSR, the major cleanup operation of nuclear weapons from the previous Soviet Republics began under the policing of the US. The most prominent among them is the case of Ukrainian disarmament in 1994, which took place in the aftermath of the extensive discussions at the Budapest Convention. Ukraine’s case attracted global attention because of its geographical proximity to neighbouring Russia on the one hand and Poland and Belarus – close Russian confidants – on the other, termed as the buffer state between Europe and Russia. Even the Western elites were also sceptical of the Ukrainian disarmament back then, as according to them, giving up the nuclear weapons would endanger its survival against the much larger neighbouring military and nuclear might of Russia.
Most prominent among such voices, professor John J. Mearsheimer who wrote an article in Foreign Policy magazine in 1993 titled, ‘A Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence,’ arguing that Ukraine should not disarm nuclear weapons based on the fact that Ukraine-Russia possess historical adversarial ties which in the post-USSR set-up they inherited based on the ethically driven territorial disputes at the bordering region. Professor Mearsheimer argued that nuclear deterrence is the only reliable guarantee against aggression from a stronger adversary, as conventional or diplomatic assurances tend to fail in the asymmetrical power duel. This is exactly what we have been witnessing since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The only case in point that validates Professor Mearsheimer’s argument is the India-Pakistan nuclear deterrent. The world experienced horizontal nuclear proliferation in the late 1990s, when both arch-rivals India and Pakistan tested their respective nuclear devices in May 1998, though India had already nuclearized the South Asian region in 1974. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created in 1975 in response to the Indian nuclear test The nuclearization of the South Asian region in the backdrop of the historical rivalry between India and Pakistan has presented another immense challenge to global security and stability. Few military standoffs took place in the post-1998 era, but it has always been the element of nuclear deterrence that has prompted both states, despite the asymmetrical conventional military composition of both states, to refrain from full-scale war or invasion. The Pulwama-Balakot in 2019 and Post-Pahalgam in May 2025 military standoffs are corroborating the prior argument of credible nuclear deterrence despite conventional military asymmetry between India and Pakistan.
In 2022, the invasion of Ukraine further dented US security assurances in the absence of a nuclear deterrent. This led to the debate of nuclear weapons acquisition, such as in Japan and South Korea, which began to ponder upon establishing a nuclear deterrent of their own to ensure their security vis-a-vis their nuclear-armed rivals – China and North Korea, respectively. Mistrust has been at its highest level in the international system since the interwar period (1919–1939). The complete erosion of nuclear arms control treaties and agreements, with the recent expiration of New START in February 2026, will push the world towards uncharted paths of nuclear proliferation. The current developments in the Middle East further erode trust in the international system, with immense repercussions not only for the security regime but also for the non-proliferation regime.
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