Global Arms Control regimes rest on the international institutions, treaties, and norms that can mitigate the worst effects of anarchy by raising the costs of defection, increasing transparency, and bringing states into a cooperative system. The non-proliferation regime, built around the NPT and supported by the MTCR, NSG, and FMCT, is supposed to be the institutional framework that prevents uncontrolled nuclear and missile proliferation. India’s Agni-6 programme puts that logic to the test, and the regime is not passing the test, considering the institutional integrity of non-proliferation regimes. India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), though it gained admission to the regime in 2016, after decades of developing the missile technologies the MTCR was designed to restrict.
The 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement extended to New Delhi all the benefits of the non-proliferation order, civilian nuclear trade, fuel access, and international legitimacy while imposing none of its core obligations: no comprehensive safeguards on military reactors, no limits on fissile material production, no caps on delivery systems. The NSG waiver that followed was not earned through compliance. Rather, it was a geopolitical favour. Now, India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announces that the Agni-VI design phase is complete, and it awaits only a green light from the government for full-scale development. The Agni-VI will feature MIRV and MARV capabilities and a range of 10000–12000 km to defeat the most advanced missile defence systems in the world.
By any definition, this is an ICBM programme, and it is being pursued by a state that has never signed, let alone been restricted by, any of the instruments the international community claims to be responsible for. The global institutionalist would predict that institutions should either constrain this behaviour or lose legitimacy. That is precisely what is happening, but selectively. This is where global arms control regimes lose their institutional integrity when it comes to certain states receive favourable treatment for such developments and openly challenge their authority. While on the other hand, Pakistan has been unreasonably accused of developing ICBMs by the US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. India, by contrast, develops an ICBM with explicit counterforce and defence-penetration features, and the international community is silent.
The strategic implications of the Agni-VI reach beyond South Asia’s strategic landscape or India-China strategic competition. For decades, India’s missile program was viewed through the narrow lens of the “South Asian rivalry” with Pakistan. The Agni-VI shatters that lens. India’s missile range already covers Pakistan and China. The strategic rationale for developing an ICBM is questionable. International institutions are responsible to question India for developing missiles that can reach the US, Canada, and Europe without having any threat from those regions. Because Agni-VI is not only about range, but it’s an ambition to project power beyond the South Asian region to increase the sphere of influence.
While India celebrates its missile test, the reality is that the whole region is becoming more dangerous and more unstable. Over the past few years, India’s military modernization program has been alarming for regional stability, and the May 2025 standoff was a test case of India’s escalating strategic confidence due to its unchecked activities. Agni-VI is just the beginning; its deployment will reveal far more about India’s real intentions. This missile program shows India’s shift from credible minimum deterrence to ambitions of power projection. The world can also expect a shift from No First Use (NFU) to First Use because each time India reaches a milestone, it fuels India’s strategic confidence, and the world faces a new challenge for peace.
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