The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was kept vague by design to ensure that as many countries as possible would sign it. Because at that time, nuclear technology was so difficult and expensive to obtain that the technical efficiency was left to mere political barriers between civilian and military uses. This dual-use trap gives rise to the dilemma where its members use the technical loopholes built into Article IV on “inalienable right” to peaceful uses to bypass the political spirit of the treaty, the “intent” to never seek a weapon, in violation of Article II.
The key dilemma arises from the selective and discriminatory implementation of the treaty. Preventing proliferation and preserving Article II of the treaty through unilateral sanctions and preventive military strikes, in the case of Iran, violates the legal rights of its members under Article IV. These counter-proliferation measures, while trying to preserve non-proliferation, eventually increase the value of the nuclear deterrent, thus questioning the essence of the very regime they try to preserve when the risk of proliferation emerges from within the regime more than outside it.
The treaty is as technical as it is political due to the inherent dual-use nature of nuclear technology it regulates. This political versus technical dilemma creates a feedback loop where technical gaps create political opportunities and political choices degrade technical oversight. The treaty is structured so paradoxically that a member state can “legally” acquire nuclear technology for weapons under the guise of peaceful uses, such as North Korea, which eventually led to a nuclear weapons program. Or a member may face challenges to avail itself of the “inalienable legal right” to exploitation of nuclear technology, such as Iran, which questions the most important leg of the treaty on promoting Peaceful uses of nuclear technology without any discrimination. Between two starkly different cases of North Korea and Iran, the NPT suffers from a political paradox and leaves a negative precedent for its members and those outside the treaty.
The NPT, under article IV, avails its members an inalienable right, from a technical point of view, to uranium enrichment for energy (3-5%) and prohibits further enrichment (90% for weapons), even though both paths use the same centrifuge technology and fuel cycle. This selective and limited prohibition applies to the latter part of the fuel cycle for its NNWS, without effectively regulating the former. For instance, under Article IV, Iran claims it has the legal right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, with reported enrichment levels that are a short-technical step from weapons-grade fissile material, which would be a violation of the treaty if Iran crosses the threshold. However, equally controversial is the US demand for Zero-Enrichment, which denies Iran its rights under Article IV of the treaty and thus imposes asymmetric obligations on a member in violation of the treaty it aims to preserve.
To prevent this dilemma, the NPT entrusts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the verification mechanism through safeguards, which again offer little help in avoiding the inherent dilemma. Because the verification relies on inspections and monitoring to verify “non-diversion” of nuclear material and misuse of the technology. The current safeguards, called the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), for NNWS, rely merely on “state declarations” of nuclear material and facilities, which leave a loophole for “clandestine” nuclear programs. This loophole was instrumental in secret nuclear facilities in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which could not materialize, but was successful in the case of North Korea. The loophole triggered the Model Additional Protocol (1997), with “intrusive inspections” and “access rights” to “undeclared” nuclear facilities, which Iran has not ratified so far, and refuses to do so due to a principled stance on its sovereign rights and discriminatory treatment within the Treaty.
Interestingly and ironically, India, an NPT outlier, has signed a “tailored” Additional Protocol (AP) that systemically legitimises the same loophole, by “flexibly” permitting the movement of nuclear material between “safeguarded” and “unsafeguarded” facilities, which the original Protocol aimed to prevent. This further strengthens Iran’s argument that it is being punished for the same reasons within the treaty that are legally facilitated by its influential members for those outside the treaty.
This loophole is further facilitated by the Exit clause (Article X), where a state that has acquired nuclear technology and material under the NPT withdraws from the Treaty and uses the same infrastructure for weapons. And if the international community exercises sanctions and military action to reverse “suspected” treaty violations, the same pressure tactics and military use of force amount to the qualification of “extraordinary circumstances” that threaten the “supreme national interest” of the member, thus legitimising its withdrawal under the exit clause. Hence, no more treaty obligations on non-proliferation for that member.
Additionally, the NPT’s dilemma is that it cannot technically verify whether a program is peaceful if a state refuses intrusive inspections, yet enforcing such inspections violates the members’ sovereignty. The “breakout” remains technically undetected until it is declared. And the threshold for breakout, which is the acquisition of enough fissile material just for one weapon, can be crossed easily if a member state chooses to do so. This breakout time has shrunk so short that not only Iran but a large number of the NPT members, with significant technology and non-weaponised sources of fissile material, are just days and weeks away from the bomb. The NPT implementation mechanism, likewise, is too slow to respond and reverse such rapid technical shifts. It leaves diplomacy at a disadvantage against technological advancement, so much so that once a country crosses the Rubicon, it becomes a fait accompli.
So far, Iran has not threatened to “quit the NPT to acquire” nuclear weapons. Even though Iran lives up to the religious verdict of its supreme leader, who ruled against nuclear weapons. The assassination of the same religious figure not only puts the verdict’s validity in question, but may also compel reconsideration of Iran’s past restraint, in the wake of June 2025 and February 2026 foreign aggression. Because nuclear weapons, in the case of North Korea, have proven to offer a credible deterrent against foreign aggression, and may compel Iran to seek an ultimate defence against its adversaries. The unilateral economic sanctions and preventive military strikes may create the very justification for Iran’s withdrawal, thereby legally ending its treaty obligations to accept international oversight. Hence, these preventive tactics would just end up with what they aim to prevent: an inevitable nuclear option for Iran.
And finally, unequal treatment and a legitimacy crisis question the very sanctity of the treaty, where Israel is reported to possess weapons and remains immune to international pressure that Iran faces for mere suspicion of developing the capability. This double standard suggests the inherent discriminatory nature of the NPT, its technical dilemma and political instrumentality, which undermine the treaty’s legitimacy when it punishes Iran’s nuclear program, which remains “manifestly” peaceful till the time, and spares others. Additionally, ignoring treaty violations in other areas, such as NATO’s nuclear sharing, AUKUS nuclear deal, and exceptional nuclear commerce with India outside the treaty, in violation of Articles I, II, and III concerning transfer, hosting, and flawed and flexible safeguards, questions the legitimacy of selective non-proliferation and undermines the sanctity of the regime.
Therefore, to overcome the NPT paradox and its inherent dilemma, there is a greater need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime rather than undermine it. There is a need to develop sound technical means, including safeguards and impartial verification mechanisms, to prevent proliferation and to address all cases of proliferation within and outside the treaty on equal and fair grounds. Above all, there is a greater need than ever for the “normalisation” and “universalisation” of the regime through sincere efforts, rather than exceptionalism and manipulation of the regime.
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