Islamabad’s re-emergence as a diplomatic venue for US–Iran engagement comes at a moment of acute regional uncertainty. The convergence of American, Iranian and Israeli interests now entangled in active confrontation has once again pushed diplomacy to the forefront. Yet beyond the choreography of negotiations lies a more fundamental constraint: the absence of trust.
This deficit is not incidental. It is structural. The United States enters these talks not as a neutral arbiter, but as a principal actor in the conflict it seeks to manage. The recent strikes on Iranian-linked targets, carried out in coordination with Israel, have reinforced a long-standing perception in Tehran that Washington’s diplomacy is rarely divorced from coercive leverage. Negotiations, in this framework, are not alternatives to force; they are extensions of it.
This duality complicates the credibility of any engagement.
For Iran, the issue is not limited to present circumstances. It is informed by a broader historical pattern in which American commitments have often been contingent on shifting strategic priorities. The US military engagements over the past decades from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate a consistent willingness to recalibrate policy, even at the cost of long-term stability. The withdrawal from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of war, culminating in the Taliban’s return to power, and the enduring consequences of the 2003 Iraq invasion, remain particularly instructive.
These precedents matter not because they are identical to the current crisis, but because they shape expectations.
In strategic terms, credibility is cumulative. It is built not on isolated assurances, but on the consistency of behaviour over time. Where that consistency is absent, even well-intentioned diplomacy struggles to gain power. This is the credibility gap confronting US–Iran negotiations today.
Tehran’s reluctance to engage under conditions of military pressure reflects a rational calculation. Negotiations conducted in the shadow of force tend to produce asymmetrical outcomes, where concessions are extracted without corresponding guarantees of durability. From Iran’s perspective, the risk is not simply entering a disadvantageous agreement but entering one that may later be reinterpreted or abandoned.
Such concerns are not easily dismissed.
The current round of talks in Islamabad underscores this tension. While diplomatic channels remain open, they operate within a highly volatile environment. Ceasefire arrangements are fragile, violations are contested, and the possibility of renewed escalation persists. In this context, negotiations risk functioning as temporary de-escalatory mechanisms rather than pathways to resolution.
Pakistan’s role as host is therefore significant but necessarily limited. Providing a neutral venue facilitates dialogue; it does not resolve the underlying asymmetry between the parties. The earlier rounds of engagement demonstrated that sustained communication is possible, even in periods of heightened tension. However, dialogue without trust remains inherently constrained.
At the core of this impasse lies a broader structural reality: the strategic flexibility of the United States.
As a global power, Washington retains the capacity to adjust its policies in response to evolving interests. This flexibility is often framed domestically as pragmatism. Internationally, however, it is frequently perceived as unpredictability. Agreements reached under one set of conditions may not endure under another. Commitments, therefore, are viewed as contingent rather than binding.
This is the context in which the assertion that “no one can guarantee America” must be understood.
It is not an ideological critique, but a reflection of systemic dynamics in international politics. States act in pursuit of their interests; great powers do so with greater latitude and fewer constraints. The consequence is a persistent uncertainty for counterparties, particularly those already positioned in adversarial relationships.
For Iran, this uncertainty translates into a strategic dilemma. Engagement offers the possibility of sanctions relief and de-escalation but carries the risk of future reversal. Non-engagement preserves autonomy but invites continued economic and military pressure. Neither option provides a stable equilibrium. The Islamabad talks are, in many ways, an attempt to navigate this dilemma. Yet their success will depend not only on the terms negotiated, but on the credibility of those terms over time.
Sustainable diplomacy requires more than convergence of interests at a single moment. It requires a degree of predictability that reassures all parties that commitments will be upheld beyond immediate tactical considerations. Without this, agreements are reduced to provisional arrangements useful in the short term, but inherently fragile.
The persistence of military signalling alongside diplomatic engagement further complicates this process. When the instruments of coercion remain active, they undermine the very assurances diplomacy seeks to establish. The result is a cycle in which trust is continuously deferred, and resolution remains elusive.
As Islamabad once again hosts these critical discussions, expectations should remain measured. Dialogue is necessary, but not sufficient. The deeper challenge lies in bridging a credibility gap that has been shaped over decades, not months.
Until that gap is addressed, scepticism will continue to define US–Iran engagement. Because in the final analysis, the durability of any agreement depends not on its wording, but on the confidence it inspires. And that confidence, at present, remains uncertain.
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