The Limits of Populist Foreign Policy

It is an undeniable fact that the BJP’s politics revolves around three elements: Hindu supremacy, the Muslim threat, and typical anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Such politics is the primary reason why even a person of the diplomatic stature of S. Jaishankar, the current Minister of External Affairs of India, could not restrain his frustration over Pakistan’s defining role in mediation efforts between the US and Iran. He not only defended New Delhi’s diplomatic failure but also used non-parliamentary language for Pakistan over an act that India, in the BJP’s imagination, claims it achieved between Russia and Ukraine recently.

It is important to understand where all this started. The BJP formed the government at the centre in 2014, and since then, Narendra Modi has served as the Prime Minister, currently in his third term. He has made nearly 100 international trips since 2014, covering more than 70 countries. Most of his visits have been to the United States, France, Russia, Japan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, and Germany. It is estimated that around INR 815 crore (approximately $86.05 million) has been spent on Modi’s foreign visits.

Not all these visits and expenses went to waste. India, Israel, the UAE, and the US established the I2U2 Grouping in 2022, which is more commonly known as the West Asian Quad. New Delhi hosted the G20 Summit in 2023, securing consensus on the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration despite deep divisions over the Russia–Ukraine war. It can also be praised for being labelled a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. New Delhi announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which is an ambitious connectivity project aimed at linking India to Europe via the Middle East through rail, ports, energy, and digital infrastructure.

However, its long-standing strategy of intervening in other states’ affairs has cost it diplomatically. Sheikh Hasina’s ouster exposed prolonged Indian interference in Bangladesh. Similar “India Out” sentiments have emerged following political shifts in Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Analysts observe that New Delhi’s overreliance on its ideological rhetoric, “Akhand Bharat” has seriously undermined its “Neighbourhood First” policy and portrays it as a regional bully, much like Israel, which, according to Narendra Modi, is “fatherland,” while India is “motherland.” 

Moreover, the May 2025 conflict proved to be a major turning point, as India—despite its extensive and costly diplomatic efforts—could not find a single nation openly supporting it against Pakistan. In contrast, Pakistan managed to secure a stronger diplomatic foothold and reinforce its deterrence. New Delhi made every effort to reverse the damage caused by its unprovoked aggression but was unsuccessful, which Islamabad effectively leveraged on every possible front. As a result, it is now increasingly and ambitiously positioning itself as a potential net stabilizer in the region. Which is why the Indian frustration is understandable.

If we imagine that India, instead of Pakistan, had been given the role of mediator between the United States and Iran, while the other mediating partners, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye, remained the same, the situation would have been portrayed very differently. The same Indian circles that are currently using non-parliamentary language against Pakistan for being in the room would have called it a major diplomatic victory and a great setback for Pakistan.

The Indian media would have devoted hours of talk shows criticizing Pakistan as a “terrorist state,” claiming that this is the reason no nation trusts it. New advertisements, songs, and perhaps even a couple of Bollywood movies would have been made to portray how India gained the upper hand over Pakistan on the diplomatic front. In those movies, Narendra Modi and Jaishankar would likely have been given credit for opening the Strait of Hormuz, and scenes might have depicted the current Iranian Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei; Modi’s “friend,” Mr. Donald Trump; and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, personally meeting Modi and expressing that they trust him above all others, along with many other such portrayals. A small disclaimer would then appear at the end of the films: “This is a work of fiction.”

But when the same role is given to Islamabad, it becomes difficult to digest in our neighbourhood, which reflects the hostility that the BJP government has toward Pakistan. The irony is that, instead of realizing that foreign policymaking is a serious responsibility—while reel-making is entirely different and should be left to content creators—the honourable Minister is still projecting a strong image to generate more reels about himself, which has been one of his notable achievements in recent years. A person of his stature, instead of allowing the current leadership to turn foreign policy into a circus, should be taking it seriously. However, he appears to be satisfying the leadership at the cost of India’s diplomatic standing.

To sum up, hostility is not a sane option between the two nuclear rivals. Things need to be cooled down, and paths should be created for dialogue, which remains the only viable way to end the conflict—something that no war has achieved so far, nor is likely to achieve in the future. Leadership must have the courage to take necessary steps for peace, even if it requires making unpopular decisions, something that is clearly lacking at present.

Populism may be effective for winning elections, but it becomes dangerous when it interferes with foreign policymaking—a realization that appears to be missing in Indian foreign policy. Instead of growing frustrated over its setbacks, New Delhi should reflect on where it went wrong and why it chose violence and imprudence over restraint and reason. The May 2025 conflict proved to be a major turning point in India’s decline—one that was entirely avoidable—and what followed appears to be an attempt to cover up the defeat, the humiliation that ensued, and the subsequent series of failures.

About Asadullah Raisani 2 Articles
Asadullah Raisani is a Research Officer in Balochistan Think Tank Network, Quetta

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