Tag: Nuclear Deterrent

Challenges to the Arms Reduction and Nuclear Disarmament

To live in an anxiety free world and non -violent environment, the utility and use of weapons should be reduced. Arms reduction plays a fundamental role in state security and government’s decision-making regarding political and economic affairs as well as the relations with other states. It is necessary for the development of a nation or a region to resolve the disputes with their neighbors. International disputes have always given a fair chance with dialogue between the parties as an integral component. Different states can coexist with friendly neighbor resulting in greater benefit of the people of the country. It brings peace and stability in the region. For the progress of humanity peace is an essential element. To avoid war and hostility, an element of understanding and mutual survival will be established among the states. Hence states will learn to co-exist peacefully. The attainment and flaws of the arms limitation are described below.

No argument regarding nuclear disarmament can be concluded without considering the global arms reduction mechanism. In the cold war period, arms limitation decisions included many stages. During the initial stage, the two nations attained symmetry in armament holdings through bilateral arms reduction and demobilization. During the final stage, states established principles regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and to limit the use of nuclear warheads by states. Given the pursuit of national interests, an element of uncertainty is developed among states. Nuclear powers face many challenges because of the political considerations of the international community. To limit and reduce the use of anti-ballistic missiles and capability, the two nations Soviet Union and the United States agreed and signed a treaty known as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 1972. Both sides agreed not to develop missile defense system at sea, air and in space. Soviet Union and the United States negotiated the ABM treaty to limit the intensity of the nuclear arms race. Both the sides believed that limited the defense systems can reduce the need to build new or offensive weapons and to overcome all defenses that your opponent can muster. By prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons will bring stability, ameliorate safety dilemmas, enhance deterrence, and in the long run prevent war.

For allies, the issue of arms limitation is the termination of existing treaties. For instance in 2002, United State left the ABM Treaty which limits the number of missiles that United States and Russia can keep. Another problem is non-compliance. The meaning of current regime is changing. They were created at different times against the background of a variety of political and military threats. To put an end to the significantly improved weapons, another treaty of multilateral nature as the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was signed in 1996. Russia signed and ratified while the United States signed (but not ratified) and agreed to the prohibition of nuclear tests for both civilian and military purposes in all environments. The weapons kept by both the states were enough to cause destruction on large scale. However, the possibility of violent struggle existed between the two nations. Therefore, a number of such type of initiatives were taken to prevent hostility between the two great powers.

There was a ban on countries using missiles to protect themselves from incoming missiles. For survival countries increase size and quality of military resources to gain military and political superiority over one another. By doing so, states develop conflicts, the example of Pakistan and India can be considered as a context. Conflict is based on politics, religion and territory between India and Pakistan. A lot of states from across the globe supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed in 1968. The purpose of the NPT was to stop the spread of nuclear technology and weapons innovation to develop collaboration between countries and promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Besides prohibiting the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, a nuclear-free zone was created. Nuclear warheads are not allowed in that area, not only of that country but also other countries were forbidden from keeping weapons, selling them or pilling them in stocks for use. Hence, the neighboring countries will feel safe and secure.

Still, however, a lot of issues and problems have been faced by states in the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is also because some states more importantly the nuclear powers like India, Pakistan, and Israel are yet to sign the NPT which has challenged the utility of the regime.

Some states have nuclear weapons and can use them in their defense, but don’t use them to threaten the other state. As the other state does not have similar weapons in its possession and cannot fight back. This is the concept of negative self-assurance between states.

Therefore, a fundamental principle should be followed by states not to develop nuclear weapons, and those who already have should not have excess numbers that can be stockpiled for use in the distant future.

A convention was signed in 1993 known as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention (BCWC). This was aimed to prevent the use of Bacteria and other viruses that were used earlier to destroy men, animals or food. But the issue of chemical and biological weapons is less important than the deployment of nuclear weapons. In addition to adhering to a non-universal protocol, there are several reasons why the bio-chemical weapons problem persists.

It is clear that the 1925 Protocol does not contain any production or ownership information and prohibits their use. Many countries maintain reservations, often restrict compliance with obligations only if they are associated with other parties, or allow hostile states to lose their freedom if they do not comply with the provisions of the Protocol. Additionally, there are no conditions for viewing the records. Thus, the possibility of revenge instead of survival under the 1925 Protocol prevented significant use of biological and chemical weapons during World War II. However, it was not successful.

Under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe (CFE), no nations or group of nations at present has the ability to start a military invasion in Europe. Limits on the use of military equipment were observed by countries after the Cold War. A number of conflicts among nations have seen the use of anti-personnel mines. Because of the destruction caused by mines, they were prohibited, not allowed to be pilled in stocks, not to be produced or transferred. This was to reduce the intensity of causalities to end conflicts between states. Restriction was imposed on the use of anti-personnel mines. However, this convention does not have legal interpretations.

Some conventions were successful in achieving their objectives and some were not. Some states have nuclear weapons and the capability to threaten other states, while many states don’t have nuclear weapons and cannot defend themselves. However, the disputes can be resolved peacefully as the major source of conflicts which can reduce the utility of weapons. The selection of arms reduction initiatives should be based on mutual agreement of the parties or states. As states security is a crucial concern for a state itself. Whether absolute disarmament would be possible or not? The questions will continue to persist.

Credibility of Accountable Nuclear Deterrents?

Recently a new arms control paradigm was proposed. The tenets of this proposition centre around two arguments. First, how much is too much? Second, what kind of changes in size of arsenal, types of warheads and nuclear doctrine could make this environmental and humanitarian disaster avoidable? The proponent of this idea, George Perkovich, analyses the nuclear non-proliferation discussion in environmental and climatic (humanitarian) perspectives in his paper titled Towards Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? Whether the ideas put forth in this paper withstand the evolving strategic realities of the global security environment is the central inquiry of this critique.

The author goes on to explain in some detail how his suggestions combine the desirability and feasibility of minimizing a nuclear catastrophe risk. The author’s discussed premises are nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-proliferation and disarmament debate within the framework of NPT, the idea of deterrence works, nuclear weapons against a conventionally superior adversary, and the issue of escalation, escalation dominance and destabilizing arms race, to mention few.

George Perkovich proposes two global and multilateral initiatives for achieving his stated objective of arms control and minimizing the damage to the environment in a nuclear war. One, he recommends that NWS, along with non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), need to conduct advanced scientific studies to precisely determine the impact on climate and environment if a nuclear exchange takes place between two states. To draw maximum benefits from such endeavours, the author suggests involving experts from computing, modelling and data sciences in those studies.

The other initiative would involve assessing all nuclear weapon states’ commitments to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and then evaluating whether their arsenals’ size and nuclear operational plans conform to their declared commitments to IHL. While discussing these two initiatives, the author introduces a new term, accountable deterrents. Accountable deterrents, according to the author, are those nuclear weapon systems which are acceptable to all countries in their strategic, legal and environmental terms. This type of deterrence, in author’s opinion, would be more credible than escalation dominance and prohibitionist models.

The author adds that the civil society, along with non-nuclear weapon states should also be included in non-proliferation discussions to make the proposed initiatives more acceptable. These proposals meet the need for nuclear deterrence on which state security hinges and helps decrease the risk of nuclear war, a fundamental concern of the society. Apart from the civil society, the author emphasizes that China could play an important role in promoting his ideas as China’s approach in terms of nuclear doctrine, nuclear force development and postures has remained restrained.

Critical Overview

The paper attempts to initiate a serious discussion on the environmental consequences of a nuclear war. Amongst the two proposed initiatives, the first initiative, to conduct scientific investigation of environmental consequences of nuclear detonation, is likely to find support among both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. On the other point, the author emphasizes adherence to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons in the second proposal. This may be problematic for states to accept. Deterrence has been the central pillar of nuclear weapon states’ security policies since the end of WWII. Considered as non-usable weapons, the amount of damage that these may possibly cause makes them the most potent feature in a state’s deterrent structure.

For this reason, the idea would particularly be unacceptable to P-5 states. These states are signatory to NPT and as signatories they pledged to take steps towards disarmament, even though there has been no move to redeem that pledge in the last fifty years. Furthermore if moral considerations and humanitarian grounds had traction in policies of nuclear weapon states, they would have joined negotiations when the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was proposed by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) countries as it presented an excellent opportunity for the NPT signatory nuclear states to develop a mechanism for universal nuclear disarmament. TPNW was rejected by not only nuclear weapon states but also the states which have nuclear security umbrella. There are two landmark judgments (though one is in advisory role) by International Court of Justice, Legality of Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 and Marshall Island Case 2016, in which ICJ clearly iterated that there was no international law or treaty which made possession and use (and threat of use) of nuclear weapons illegal for defence purposes. If there is a need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, major nuclear weapon states should focus on prevention of the use of force at all.

The author’s ‘accountable deterrents’ concept is totally hypothetical, unrealistic, and unachievable. Two countries in an adversarial relationship are not likely to be very considerate to others if their own national security is at risk. Nuclear weapons discussion apart, there is no evidence to support the view that a country’s operational plans including strategies that limit the damage to the climate. For the sake of discussion, if the notion of accountable deterrent is considered practical, it proposes that to avoid an environmental catastrophe, the size, yields and targets need to be reduced. If the size and yield of a nuclear weapon is reduced, it is more likely to be used against military targets, not against cities. Countries possessing small yield nuclear weapons in greater number will prioritize counter force targets over counter value targets. A nuclear strategy that aims at the destruction of counter force targets may start a fierce arms race among nuclear weapon states and look towards increasing the number of warheads in their arsenal.

Moreover, it is also unclear that which authority would verify the number, yield, and targeting capability in case one country claims to have accountable deterrence. As the author mainly focused on the environmental and climatic cost of nuclear weapons, it is really unfortunate that major countries, such as the U.S. and Russia, only use climate as a political agenda without any substantive steps in previous decade. The proposal of accountable deterrence and rationale of smaller size and lesser yield nuclear weapons is only to justify the new development of low-yield warheads by the U.S. as indicated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review presented by Donald Trump’s administration. The author suggests that China could extend the restraint in its nuclear force posture and play a pivotal role in building a new approach to arms control and disarmament, on humanitarian grounds. Putting the onus on China, the author overlooked the fact that UK and France also do not need nuclear weapons because of the absence of any existential threat to the two countries.

In South Asia’s context, the idea of accountable deterrent will be more destabilizing. Would it be acceptable for any country, in environmental, strategic or legal terms, to use low yield nuclear in densely populated urban or semi-urban border areas? On the issue of reduced size and low yield weapons, this kind of idea will give validation to current Indian thinking on revision of its No-First Use and targeting policy from counter value to counter force. It would serve the purpose of strategic stability in the region if a proposal on Strategic Restraint Regime, proposed by Pakistan, is endorsed rather than ideas such as accountable deterrence. The latter is nearly infeasible in practice, simply for its ability to reduce uncertainty brought through connotation of traditional nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.

On the whole, global norms are still far from being multilateral in approach, so there is a very limited role that the international civil society can play in shaping leaders’ opinions about nuclear weapons and deterrence. If multilateralism could play a role in global order, then forums such as the United Nations need to play an active role in conflict resolution.

Conclusion

The kind of modernization plan, which does not focus on nuclear disarmament, only adds to instability with regards to nuclear weapons’ possession and their use. This kind of approach gives nuclear weapon states logic to increase the number of nuclear weapons with reduced size and yield. The current debate on resumption of nuclear testing suggests that the trend is tilted towards nuclear armament instead of nuclear disarmament. Thus, the proposal pertaining to accountable deterrence is impractical and unlikely to make any impact on the thinking of nuclear weapon states.