The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is well-known for its excessive focus on non-traditional security cooperation with different actors. Historically, the unique pattern has been observed in the region: the spillover of the NTS cooperation into the traditional domain (encompassing economic, strategic, and defense cooperation). In this realm, China’s soft power strategy supplements ASEAN’s NTS vision. Marked by educational exchanges, health diplomacy, Confucius institutions, cultural ties, disaster relief mechanism, non-traditional maritime security cooperation, and the image building, China’s soft power in ASEAN has gained a significant importance owing to the growth in the scale, ambition, reception, and above all, due to its multifold framework (supplementing China’s strategic goals in the region). This article highlights the complex dynamics of ASEAN’s perception of Beijing’s soft power with the dichotomy of clear acceptance and rejection paradox alongside the emerging domain of hybridization.
China’s soft power appeal in ASEAN is backed by the economic incentives for the targeted states. For instance, through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, Beijing has invested billions of dollars in the infrastructure and capacity-building projects in ASEAN; something that would not have been possible otherwise, despite the documented ambition for similar measures on an indigenous basis in the ASEAN summits (in the 2020s). The success of BRI can be analyzed by the notion that the ASEAN states are more inclined towards China instead of other actors with similar offers, i.e., Japan (given its FOIP that aims for the alternative regional order), and the U.S. (through its Indo-Pacific strategy). The main reason for the inclination towards Dragon is the norm-based aid and investment plans by the other actors that follow excessive interference into the domestic politics of the partner states.
On the other hand, despite the non-interference rhetoric, the measures China is adopting are not directionless. For instance, through the complex network of Confucius institutions, think-tanks, educational exchange programs, aid, and debt diplomacy, Beijing fosters its regional and global outlook to curb the voices of the international civil society against the domestic oppression of its minority groups in Xinjiang. At the regional level, the soft power helps Beijing curb the activism of the state as well as non-state actors against China’s coercive attitude towards the small and weak states in the South China Sea, i.e. Philippines and Taiwan.
Overall, it has resulted in promoting the positive view of China in the region, particularly among the youth. For instance, Indonesian students now choose China over the U.S for their higher studies, citing the comparatively easier access and visa approval ratio as compared to the U.S. and EU, coupled with the normative appeal of Beijing. In a recent survey by ERIA and FPCI, the positive public perception about China stands out at 32% which supersedes the U.S. and other global actors. Moreover, 42% of the youth see China as a rising economic power. This showcases the pragmatic outputs of Beijing’s Soft Power appeal in ASEAN.
Despite all these efforts, the fragility remains in the ASEAN-China relations. For instance, many states (i.e. Philippines) view China as a coercive regional hegemon, and remain cautious in their dealings due to the assertive attitude of China in the disputed South China Sea. Many times, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) throws water pumps at the Philippines’ coast guards, projects its strength via drills, hinders the naval and merchant vessels of other states from entering the disputed waters, initiates the construction of artificial islands, and adopts other similar measures against its counterparts. These grey zone tactics take a pivotal shift when the private militia joins hands with the PLAN in its alleged operations and patrolling.
Resultantly, as The Lowy Institute considers, “trust deficit” remains the primary reason behind the partial (instead of complete) success of China’s soft power techniques. Many leaders, such as Indonesia’s Widodo and Malaysia’s Ibrahim, fear sovereignty issues when it comes to deepening NTS ties with Beijing. Moreover, the “China shock”, the massive decrease in the domestic industrial outputs given the cheap imported Chinese products, is another reason that the youth dislike China despite all the positive factors they endorse.
Yet, there is another dimension of this complex equation as well: the hybridization approach (the selective acceptance of China’s influence while hedging against the possible alternative in the areas of mutual distress to maximize the benefits). Many countries that were the traditional allies of Beijing are now moving towards balancing their external relations owing to the evolving geopolitical proximity in the region. For instance, Singapore and Thailand, though they welcome Chinese investment and soft power diplomacy, maintain strategic neutrality and ambiguity in order to safeguard their sovereignty and national interests.
ASEAN has also re-hyphenated its centrality principle due to the pragmatic pathways its member states were individually choosing in their bilateral relationship: i.e., Timor-Leste, Brunei, and Cambodia were more concerned with their bilateral ties with China instead of ASEAN’s institutional engagement with China, something that was weakening ASEAN’s position as a unit on matters involving regional security and governance. Now, ASEAN is more into regulating the relationship of its member states with Beijing to avoid unforeseen circumstances and the influx of Beijing in the region (whether digital or via traditional footprints). It highlights the simultaneous coexistence of ASEAN being a geopolitically polygamous and exertion as an autonomous bloc.
In conclusion, one can say that ASEAN’s perception of China’s soft power has been affected by the sociological differences (intra-group), bilateral engagement, and participation in the BRI project. But the acceptance-rejection dilemma extends further to incorporate the hybrid models owing to the pressure both actors face from the uncertain trade policies of Trump 2.0. Moreover, in comparison to earlier statistics, one has to accept that the soft power approach of China is pretty successful. Also, it is encompassing the digital realm nowadays, with states looking at Beijing for their digital governance, data security, and the e-infrastructure instead of other actors, i.e., Japan.
Be the first to comment