In an increasingly bipolar world, where regionalism is both a shield and a sword, BIMSTEC has emerged less as a cooperative framework and more as a geopolitical battleground. Born in 1997 with the noble aim of fostering technical and economic cooperation among countries bordering the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), the initiative has morphed especially in recent years into a tool of India’s hegemonic designs. As SAARC lies in deep freeze, BIMSTEC has been revived under India’s stewardship, not as a neutral alternative, but as a strategic weapon to isolate Pakistan and counter China’s expanding footprint in South and Southeast Asia.
India’s growing assertiveness in the Bay of Bengal under the guise of regional integration betrays a deeper motive. As the self-proclaimed regional stabilizer, India has maneuvered BIMSTEC into its own diplomatic orbit, using it to construct economic corridors, expand military cooperation, and propagate its narrative. Its attempts to shift the regional focus away from SAARC to BIMSTEC came soon after the 2016 Uri attack, when it boycotted the SAARC summit and cast Pakistan as the habitual spoiler of regional peace. Since then, India has actively lobbied for BIMSTEC’s elevation, hoping to create a forum where its dominance goes uncontested and Pakistan remains voiceless.
BIMSTEC’s revival cannot be divorced from the strategic competition between India and China. With countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka actively engaging with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India is clearly feeling the pressure. To prevent its neighbors from leaning too far toward Beijing, New Delhi has turned to BIMSTEC as a strategic buffer. Through initiatives like the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, cross-border energy grids, and maritime partnerships, India is offering its own version of connectivity. But this shift doesn’t stem from a shared regional vision. It’s more a reaction to rising geopolitical anxiety. India’s growing involvement in Indo-Pacific alliances like the Quad and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) reflects a broader strategy: to assert regional influence, push back against China’s rise, and at the same time, quietly edge Pakistan out of the regional equation.
Despite being a Bay of Bengal littoral state and a significant player in South Asia, Pakistan remains deliberately excluded from BIMSTEC. With India leading key portfolios like security, energy, and connectivity, and contributing nearly a third of the bloc’s funding, the structure tilts heavily in its favor, leaving little space for alternative voices. This imbalance becomes even more troubling when BIMSTEC is used to shape regional security narratives, often with indirect references to Pakistan, such as after the April 2025 Pahalgam attack while offering no platform for Pakistan to respond or clarify its stance.
While India touts BIMSTEC as the future of regionalism, internal frictions within the bloc tell a different story. Myanmar’s ongoing civil conflict has halted progress on key corridors like the trilateral highway. Bangladesh and India have seen periodic diplomatic tensions over water sharing and migration. Bhutan has voiced discomfort over India’s dominant role, while Sri Lanka has been quietly balancing between China and India, wary of overdependence on either.
The 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok (April 2025) showcased ambitious plans like the Bangkok Vision 2030 and a Maritime Transport Agreement, but beneath the surface, unease lingers. While smaller states benefit from India-led initiatives, many quietly worry about being pulled too closely into New Delhi’s strategic aim. BIMSTEC, it seems, is less a unified bloc and more a balancing act shaped by Indian ambition and regional caution.
In this shifting landscape, Pakistan can’t afford to remain on the sidelines. Though not a member, it must assert its relevance whether by seeking observer status, strengthening ties with key BIMSTEC states, or using platforms like the SCO and OIC to keep its regional voice heard.
Most importantly, Pakistan should champion the revival of SAARC, positioning itself as a responsible nuclear state willing to engage India in dialogue over cross-border terrorism, economic cooperation, and environmental security. South Asia cannot afford to let regional cooperation be reduced to a zero-sum game between India and its excluded rival.
For regionalism to truly work, South and Southeast Asian nations must ask: Is India pursuing regional peace, or merely redrawing the map to suit its own ambition? Until this question is confronted, BIMSTEC risks becoming a house divided, with India at the head of the table and Pakistan locked out of the room entirely.
The answer lies in rethinking the regional order, not redrawing it along artificial lines. If peace is the ultimate goal, then India must be urged to return to the SAARC framework and resume constructive engagement with Pakistan. As two nuclear-armed neighbors, both countries bear the responsibility to steer South Asia away from conflict and toward cooperation. Diplomacy, after all, is a two-way street not a one-man parade.
Be the first to comment