Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January, a flurry of his decisions has left Europeans wondering whether the continent can be defended without support from the United States (US). These insecurities stem primarily from Mr Trump’s decision to unilaterally engage with Russia for a ceasefire in Ukraine, without consulting the Ukrainian government. This was followed by the public spat with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Accompanied by this was the usual Trump rhetoric of increasing European defence spending. The fact that Europeans have started thinking about a more “self-reliant” security architecture on the continent is not something altogether new. However, the idea is constrained by a number of factors including inadequate manpower, lack of interoperability, and gaps in the European defence industrial base.
Five years earlier, during the first Trump administration, French President Emmanuel Macron called for a “true European Army” that can protect Europe from in terms of threats from “China, Russia and even the US.” Much earlier, six European states signed the treaty for forming a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 to establish common armed forces of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands under supranational control on lines similar to the EU. The EDC did not materialise because France and Italy never ratified the treaty. However, it reflected aspirations within Europe to form a common security mechanism for the continent to complement NATO. Now that the question of an autonomous European security architecture is once again in the headlines, it is important to assess whether such an arrangement can be materialised – with or without U.S. support.
Donald Trump’s calls for increasing defence spending in Europe in both the previous and the present administrations are not unfounded. It is only after the Russia-Ukraine war that defence spending among NATO members has risen, with as many as 23 members now complying with the minimum number. Earlier it fluctuated at an average of six members complying between 2014 and 2022. Now both US administration and the NATO Secretary General, however, recommend a much higher spending of 3.5 per cent of GDP to match the perceived threat from Russia’s growing defence industrial base and capacity to mobilise. According to another estimate at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, a credible European deterrence would require 300,000 troops equipped with 1400 tanks, 2000 infantry vehicles, and 700 artillery pieces.
To achieve the anticipated defence spending targets, the European Union has initiated a ReArm Europe Plan that aims to increase the defence spending of member states by 1.5 per cent on average, raising about EUR 650 billion, and providing EUR 150 billion worth of loans for defence investments. In addition to financing, the problem with any defence integration in Europe is that collective defence efforts must synchronise the armies of several countries. To illustrate the gravity of the complexity, one estimate from the Harvard International Review notes that there are 14 different tank platforms and 30 different helicopter models that operate among European militaries.
A further complication lies within the European defence industrial base which, despite huge potential, is currently faced with a number of limitations at present. A study in Germany by Deka Bank and Ernst & Young estimated that an incremental increase in defence spending shall open up a range of 160,000 to 760,000 new jobs in the defence industry by 2030. This means increased manufacturing capacity and employment. Yet, the Harvard study informs us that an increase in turnover of the European defence industry does not always mean a direct benefits to European militaries. By 2021, about 67 per cent of total European defence industrial turnover (~ EUR 250 billion) was being exported to non-European clients.
To offset these challenges the European governments and militaries will require concrete measures. First, to substantially increase their defence spending to primarily to raise manpower and industrial capacity. Second, to improve interoperability and coordination along the defence industrial base in the continent to improve economies of scale in manufacturing certain platforms (for example tanks and vehicles in Germany, aircraft in Italy and Sweden, etc.) and ensure that these changes benefit European militaries. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) advances preliminary efforts to ensure that half of European procurement budgets are spent on defence equipment manufactured within the continent.
In conclusion, while European defence planners – and even the public at large – would prefer greater self-dependence in security, there is much to be done before it can be called a viable possibility. The weariness of U.S. decision-makers has been reflected once again in the leaked conversation of the principals committee, where the Vice President and Secretary of Defense expressed disdain towards “European free-loading.” It is now up to the European nations to decide whether the changes in policy will lead to real change around this time, or be another one of the oft-promised but never materialised changes to the European security architecture.
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