Tehran’s growing enchantment with the present Taliban administration is deeply rooted in the concept of managing security threats emanating from Afghanistan. A statement by the Afghanistan Foreign Ministry is the best depiction of how Tehran gauges Afghanistan in her grand strategy. It pronounced, “Iran wants to make sure that a post-conflict Afghanistan will not be a safe haven for terrorist groups [but] will remain a center of regional and international cooperation”. This statement was given under the pretext of Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) extending its outreach across Afghanistan and its implications for larger security dynamics of Iran.
From the U.S. led Coalition Forces to ISKP
Despite ideological differences and bitter historical rivalry, Tehran’s pertinence with the present Taliban government is growing exponentially. At the beginning, Tehran vehemently opposed the Taliban movement and provided financial assistance to the anti-Taliban groups. The chaotic initial phase further soured after the killing of nine Iranian diplomats allegedly by the Taliban in 1998.
For the purpose of settling old scores, Iran assisted the Western coalition forces in toppling the Taliban government after 9/11. Tehran’s collaboration was instrumental in locating the air bombing targets for the US-led forces in Afghanistan. In his famous speech, George. W. Bush tinted Iran as part of the “axis of evil” in 2002. This statement subconsciously steered Iran towards the Taliban. At that moment, Iranian leadership realized that a bigger problem is the presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan not the outgoing Taliban. This led to Tehran’s multidimensional engagement with the Taliban who were the only powerful insurgent group challenging the authority of NATO across the country.
Subsequently in later years, the higher American officials like Defense Secretary Robert Gates and General Stanley A Chrystal severely criticized Iran’s “ambiguous role” in Afghanistan, stating that Tehran is harbouring the Taliban insurgents against the US-led forces with crucial support like intelligence sharing, modern weaponry and financial support. Tehran also allowed the Taliban to recruit militants from among Afghan immigrants in cities like Zahedan and Mashad. Tehran even facilitated Taliban offensives against US military bases, such as Shindand Air Base, and dams in Herat and Nimrouz.
Following the rise of ISKP in 2015, Tehran found another justification to cooperate with the Taliban: containing ISKP jihadists whom Iran viewed as a threat against its border security. The hidden collaboration became further visible after the Taliban captured Kabul on 15 August, 2021: Tehran was among those countries which kept its embassy operating, albeit at a reduced level. Iranian suppliers continued to ship gasoline and other fuels into Afghanistan as well, reportedly after a request from the Taliban. Two months later, Iranian Foreign Minister and the Islamic Emirate’s acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi exchanged visits for consolidating their mutual relationship.
Convergence of Interests Against ISKP
Tehran seems disturbed at the meteoric rise of ISKP in Afghanistan as a serious security threat. For Iran, ISKP represents a different threat from other jihadi groups at its borders. For example, Jaish al-Adl has posed minimal threats to Iran, including the abduction of Iranian nationals and bombings in border regions. On the other hand, ISKP seeks the annihilation of Shi’is and the establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with the Sharia Law. Tehran changed its passive approach and increased its involvement in Afghanistan in an attempt to pre-empt a potential spillover across its borders.
In the early 2015, Tehran became convinced that the Taliban assistant is necessary to defeat ISKP. While portraying their engagement with the Taliban as an attempt to facilitate intra-Afghan dialogue. To further woo the Taliban, Tehran also adopted the policy of increasing its influence within the group. Later in 2016, Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid was quoted as saying that the group was “establishing new relations with Tehran”.
Later events of suicide bombings confirmed Tehran’s apprehensions true. In 2017, ISKP launched a series of attacks inside Iran: including Parliament, the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ahvaz military parade. Tehran’s counter-offensives against the radical Sunni Islamist factions further aggravated the security situation to the point of no return: on April 5, 2022, ISKP launched a mass shooting at the Shiraz shrine in revenge of Tehran’s high-handed approach against the group.
Tehran and the Taliban government set up a joint commission in May 2022 to co-ordinate military patrols along their common border. A former commander confirmed the existence of intelligence cooperation between the IRGC and the Taliban’s GDI dedicated to the eradication of ISKP. After the Kerman blast in January 2024, at a ceremony commemorating the assassination of General Qasim Sulaimani, ISKP took responsibility for the blasts.
The growing partnership between Tehran and the Taliban has also international ramifications. Hasan Kazimi Qomi referred to the Islamic Emirate as a part of the “axis of resistance”, and a firm ally in the struggle against Zionism. Senior Taliban figures also voiced support for Iran’s retaliatory missile strike against Israel in April 2024. The Iranian foreign ministry arranged meetings between Isma’il Haniyyah and the Taliban to discuss ways in which they might engage in ‘joint action’ in support of HAMAS.
The Taliban have regularly condemned attacks on Shia mosques and districts of Afghanistan, presumably being carried out by ISKP. The group also allowed Shias to commemorate Ashura, a holy holiday, in Mazar-i-Sharaf. As the Taliban approached Kabul in 2021, a senior figure told Iranian television that they ‘will assure [Afghanistan’s] Shi’is that no discriminatory action will be taken against them’.
Tehran’s regional influence has recently faced many setbacks in Syria, Lebanon and other regions of the world. By engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran would likely be able to influence the policy of the Taliban in view of security threats emanating from Afghanistan against Iran. However, History shows that the coalition of different ideologies doesn’t last long. Considering the incongruous between Tehran and the Taliban, this alliance between “enemies of enemies” might work in the coming years, but it seems unlikely that it will ever end up in the permanent strategic partnership.
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