Can AUKUS Spark Security Dilemma in the Asia Pacific?

#1 · 11th July 2023, 6:01 am

Quote from strafasia on 11th July 2023, 6:01 am
In September 2021, Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS) surprised the world by forming a new security alliance that involved transferring nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The move is said to be focused on containing China if its military strength grows, and even its plan of economic connectivity in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, if the unilateral exhibition of Chinese military prowess remains limited as compared to the country’s reliance on regional economics, the AUKUS will appear akin to a team trying to shoot the ball and defend the goalpost – it will just be reduced to a strategy of creating a threat to justify an offensive maneuver in the Asia Pacific, raising security dilemmas in return.
There is an ongoing concern over the security and proliferation of nuclear naval propulsion technology and the use and export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) submarine fuel, which AUKUS has triggered. However, the risk of proliferation and strategic instability predates the agreement. Russia has been proliferating nuclear submarine technology to India, breaking the non-proliferation norms for over three decades. Such technology transfer is a source of strategic instability and prompts other states to take necessary measures to address their security dilemma.
Due to their professed commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the partners contend that the AUKUS will not pose a proliferation threat. This is a dubious claim that China, Russia, and a growing horde of states hotly contest. They assert that exporting enriched weapon-grade uranium, even if the sealed powerpack of a submarine to another state, creates a risk of HEU supplied for propulsion being diverted to make nuclear weapons.
In complementary ways, both NPT and IAEA’s statutes prohibit NNWS from acquiring technologies that provide a pathway to make nuclear weapons. Articles II and III of the NPT require the NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in non-military nuclear activities. However, the nuclear powers of the NPT kept a safety clause for themselves and – now one realizes for their allies – to use enriched uranium to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. However, this is not explicitly stated in the two agreements.
Consequently, other security-conscious nations in the Asia Pacific, especially South Korea and Japan, are impacted by AUKUS but under pressure have walked back from their initial views of seeing the military pact as discriminatory – they had felt more entitled to receiving nuclear submarines than Australia, which has had no genuine security threat. In August 2020, South Korea announced its intention to build a nuclear submarine. Seoul wanted to use its defense links with the US to obtain SSNs. A significant indication of Japan’s intention for future military modernization was the recent rise in its defense budget, which reflected Tokyo’s perception of threat in the South Pacific Ocean. Japan faces the diplomatic predicament of being the sole major player in the region without a nuclear submarine if South Korea purchases one.
China has pointed out at the IAEA, Conference on Disarmament (CD), and in the UN General Assembly, that AUKUS undermines peace in the region and poses severe risks of nuclear proliferation in contradiction to the aims and purpose of the NPT.
The IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) regarding division of nuclear material for non-prohibited military purposes has a gap that experts have long recognized. When Britain and France attempted to sell nuclear submarines to Canada in 1980, the US blocked the sale on the grounds that it would violate the non-proliferation regime. The US is exploiting this gap for its own strategic purposes and trying to be the judge, jury, and executioner. Interestingly, Britain has not recalled its 1980 U-turn and took another one without remorse. Likewise, Canada has yet to raise any voice against AUKUS either.
The IAEA seems to have taken the Chinese concerns over safeguards verification regarding AUKUS lightly and is endorsing the military pact. The transfer of nuclear submarines and enriched uranium to Australia would seriously affect the already ailing NPT-based non-proliferation regime that selectively applies its laws and norms on all and sundry.
According to some academics, the nuclear submarine loophole in Article III of the NPT should not be used as a reason for NWS to share nuclear submarines with NNWSs. States without nuclear weapons could find excuses to acquire nuclear warheads, setting a precedent. For instance, Iran has opposed AUKUS and claimed that the US is using a double standard by pressuring Iran not to enrich uranium above 70 percent while concurrently giving SSNs to Australia with at least 90 percent enriched uranium. Even if it is low enriched uranium (LEU) powered nuclear reactor, a technologically advanced state like Australia or some states like North Korea and India could still make a bomb.
Although the NPT does not define nuclear submarines as a proscribed military weapon, it is essential to note that nuclear submarines based in the US and UK are fueled by weapons-grade uranium that is 90 percent or above enriched. Since this can easily be converted into a nuclear bomb, the IAEA must ban it because it does not fall under the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The AUKUS states have tried to lull these genuine concerns by saying that the fuel in SSNs will last its lifetime and the reactor will be sealed. However, what will be the mechanism to verify if these seals have not been tampered with? Indeed, Australia’s possession of a fleet of nuclear submarines and providing its bases to the US and UK for their SSBNs, SSNs, and strategic bomber aircraft will raise Chinese security concerns and that of other states in the Asia-Pacific. AUKUS will force their hand to take requisite countermeasures to address their security as if the oversized American and British nuclear submarine fleets and air forces were not enough to counter Russian and Chinese militaries combined. Was it difficult for them to get basing facilities to a rentier state rather than giving them the technology? If Australia is a sheep (NNWS) in wolf’s (NWS) clothing, the SSNs supplied to Australia will be step one for its ultimate NWS ambition.
If the IAEA does not declare SSNs of AUKUS a proscribed military activity, it may create a legal justification for the acquisition of technology and nuclear weapons by NNWSs. The use of HEU in nuclear submarines is another concern. The US and UK use high and low-enriched weapon-grade uranium to fuel SSNs, which could be diverted to make nuclear warheads. Thus, for the NPT to redeem itself from making exceptions to its laws, the state parties should review AUKUS and similar exceptions that India silently secured from Russia without inviting any attention. A safe and secure global strategic environment must be the priority of all states to ensure collective win-wins.

In September 2021, Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS) surprised the world by forming a new security alliance that involved transferring nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The move is said to be focused on containing China if its military strength grows, and even its plan of economic connectivity in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, if the unilateral exhibition of Chinese military prowess remains limited as compared to the country’s reliance on regional economics, the AUKUS will appear akin to a team trying to shoot the ball and defend the goalpost – it will just be reduced to a strategy of creating a threat to justify an offensive maneuver in the Asia Pacific, raising security dilemmas in return.

There is an ongoing concern over the security and proliferation of nuclear naval propulsion technology and the use and export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) submarine fuel, which AUKUS has triggered. However, the risk of proliferation and strategic instability predates the agreement. Russia has been proliferating nuclear submarine technology to India, breaking the non-proliferation norms for over three decades. Such technology transfer is a source of strategic instability and prompts other states to take necessary measures to address their security dilemma.

Due to their professed commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the partners contend that the AUKUS will not pose a proliferation threat. This is a dubious claim that China, Russia, and a growing horde of states hotly contest. They assert that exporting enriched weapon-grade uranium, even if the sealed powerpack of a submarine to another state, creates a risk of HEU supplied for propulsion being diverted to make nuclear weapons.

In complementary ways, both NPT and IAEA’s statutes prohibit NNWS from acquiring technologies that provide a pathway to make nuclear weapons. Articles II and III of the NPT require the NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in non-military nuclear activities. However, the nuclear powers of the NPT kept a safety clause for themselves and – now one realizes for their allies – to use enriched uranium to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. However, this is not explicitly stated in the two agreements.

Consequently, other security-conscious nations in the Asia Pacific, especially South Korea and Japan, are impacted by AUKUS but under pressure have walked back from their initial views of seeing the military pact as discriminatory – they had felt more entitled to receiving nuclear submarines than Australia, which has had no genuine security threat. In August 2020, South Korea announced its intention to build a nuclear submarine. Seoul wanted to use its defense links with the US to obtain SSNs. A significant indication of Japan’s intention for future military modernization was the recent rise in its defense budget, which reflected Tokyo’s perception of threat in the South Pacific Ocean. Japan faces the diplomatic predicament of being the sole major player in the region without a nuclear submarine if South Korea purchases one.

China has pointed out at the IAEA, Conference on Disarmament (CD), and in the UN General Assembly, that AUKUS undermines peace in the region and poses severe risks of nuclear proliferation in contradiction to the aims and purpose of the NPT.

The IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) regarding division of nuclear material for non-prohibited military purposes has a gap that experts have long recognized. When Britain and France attempted to sell nuclear submarines to Canada in 1980, the US blocked the sale on the grounds that it would violate the non-proliferation regime. The US is exploiting this gap for its own strategic purposes and trying to be the judge, jury, and executioner. Interestingly, Britain has not recalled its 1980 U-turn and took another one without remorse. Likewise, Canada has yet to raise any voice against AUKUS either.

The IAEA seems to have taken the Chinese concerns over safeguards verification regarding AUKUS lightly and is endorsing the military pact. The transfer of nuclear submarines and enriched uranium to Australia would seriously affect the already ailing NPT-based non-proliferation regime that selectively applies its laws and norms on all and sundry.

According to some academics, the nuclear submarine loophole in Article III of the NPT should not be used as a reason for NWS to share nuclear submarines with NNWSs. States without nuclear weapons could find excuses to acquire nuclear warheads, setting a precedent. For instance, Iran has opposed AUKUS and claimed that the US is using a double standard by pressuring Iran not to enrich uranium above 70 percent while concurrently giving SSNs to Australia with at least 90 percent enriched uranium. Even if it is low enriched uranium (LEU) powered nuclear reactor, a technologically advanced state like Australia or some states like North Korea and India could still make a bomb.

Although the NPT does not define nuclear submarines as a proscribed military weapon, it is essential to note that nuclear submarines based in the US and UK are fueled by weapons-grade uranium that is 90 percent or above enriched. Since this can easily be converted into a nuclear bomb, the IAEA must ban it because it does not fall under the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The AUKUS states have tried to lull these genuine concerns by saying that the fuel in SSNs will last its lifetime and the reactor will be sealed. However, what will be the mechanism to verify if these seals have not been tampered with? Indeed, Australia’s possession of a fleet of nuclear submarines and providing its bases to the US and UK for their SSBNs, SSNs, and strategic bomber aircraft will raise Chinese security concerns and that of other states in the Asia-Pacific. AUKUS will force their hand to take requisite countermeasures to address their security as if the oversized American and British nuclear submarine fleets and air forces were not enough to counter Russian and Chinese militaries combined. Was it difficult for them to get basing facilities to a rentier state rather than giving them the technology? If Australia is a sheep (NNWS) in wolf’s (NWS) clothing, the SSNs supplied to Australia will be step one for its ultimate NWS ambition.

If the IAEA does not declare SSNs of AUKUS a proscribed military activity, it may create a legal justification for the acquisition of technology and nuclear weapons by NNWSs. The use of HEU in nuclear submarines is another concern. The US and UK use high and low-enriched weapon-grade uranium to fuel SSNs, which could be diverted to make nuclear warheads. Thus, for the NPT to redeem itself from making exceptions to its laws, the state parties should review AUKUS and similar exceptions that India silently secured from Russia without inviting any attention. A safe and secure global strategic environment must be the priority of all states to ensure collective win-wins.