The Idle at CD

#1 · 9th March 2021, 12:49 am

Quote from Tanzeela Khalil on 9th March 2021, 12:49 am
Strategic competition between major powers is a defining factor that shapes global environment. The existing state of arms control is deteriorating because of growing multi-polarity, intensifying strategic rivalries, evolving alliances and competition for strategic dominance. For instance, the U.S. statement at the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 22 Feb 21, criticized the anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted by Russia in Dec 20 while conveniently overlooking the testing of ASAT by India in 2019. This reflects U.S.’ discriminatory approach where destructive and destabilizing behavior of allies and partners is acceptable while the same is forbidden for other states.
This particular U.S. behavior is at the root of discontent among the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWs), which has kept them disenchanted from the established global norms and forums like NPT and CD that are ought to pursue disarmament. The continued and increasing discrimination of nuclear haves and haves not within the ambit of NPT and CD resulted in the rise of frustration among NNWs eventually leading to the initiatives like Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). TPNW, which gathered immense support within the NNWs and entered into force in Jan 21, was not mentioned in the statement delivered by the U.S. The U.S. has been continuously opposing TPNW since the treaty was introduced stating that the treaty does not address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary and will not enhance any country’s security, nor international peace and security. The U.S. is not alone in opposing the TPNW, the opposition is equally shared amongst all the possessors of nuclear weapons. However, the security concerns of NNWSs merit equal consideration – if not more.
The U.S. and Indian statements at the CD emphasized upon the immediate commencement of negotiations on fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). After 15 years of Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and NSG waiver, the U.S. and India are at a position of comfort to talk about FMCT. Statement by India in the CD plenary held on 28 May 2009 is in complete contradiction with its current stance where India categorically mentioned that “it will not accept obligations not in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder our nuclear program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program. The treaty should not place undue burden on military non-proscribed activities.” Given the U.S.’ exceptionalism vis-à-vis India, the contradiction in Indian statements at CD is understandable as it now has one of the fastest growing nuclear program with largest stocks of unsafeguarded fissile materials among all the NPT outlier states.
While referring to the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted to CD in 2007, India reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of global, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, the upward trajectory of strategic developments and defense acquisitions by India project it as pursuing a path of arming itself rather than working in the direction of disarmament that it often misgivingly advocates. The Western appeasement policy allows India to continue pursuing great power status by advancing its military capabilities and forces, way beyond its regional security requirements. It took a formal start from Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal in 2005, exceptional waiver of NSG in 2008, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative in 2012, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement in 2016, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018, Industrial Security Annex in 2019, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) signed in Oct 2020. These agreements will enhance India’s military situational awareness, preparedness and ability to plan precision strikes which will prove detrimental for the deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s statement reminded the extra regional players to be mindful of their responsibility not to further accentuate military imbalance and carefully review the impact of their geo-political strategies on strategic stability in South Asia.
Pakistan identified weaponization of space, advancements in emerging technologies, development of hypersonic missiles and ballistic missile defense system as major risks to regional and international security. These are dangerous developments particularly in the absence of any legally binding arrangement to govern their destabilizing application. It is, therefore, imperative that these domains are regulated before it becomes impossible to do so at any later stage. It is important for all states to look at global security beyond their myopic and short-sighted self-interests. The only credible and representative disarmament negotiating body – i.e. the CD – is unfortunately used to serve the interests of select-few while overlooking the genuine demands and security considerations of most of the countries. Issues like FMCT enable such countries to project themselves as stepping in the direction of disarmament without really having to do so. Whereas any steps in the direction of the disarmament, negative security assurances, and PAROS would require these major powers to actually restrict their options and give up their hegemony on the global security landscape.

Strategic competition between major powers is a defining factor that shapes global environment. The existing state of arms control is deteriorating because of growing multi-polarity, intensifying strategic rivalries, evolving alliances and competition for strategic dominance. For instance, the U.S. statement at the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 22 Feb 21, criticized the anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted by Russia in Dec 20 while conveniently overlooking the testing of ASAT by India in 2019. This reflects U.S.’ discriminatory approach where destructive and destabilizing behavior of allies and partners is acceptable while the same is forbidden for other states.

This particular U.S. behavior is at the root of discontent among the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWs), which has kept them disenchanted from the established global norms and forums like NPT and CD that are ought to pursue disarmament. The continued and increasing discrimination of nuclear haves and haves not within the ambit of NPT and CD resulted in the rise of frustration among NNWs eventually leading to the initiatives like Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). TPNW, which gathered immense support within the NNWs and entered into force in Jan 21, was not mentioned in the statement delivered by the U.S. The U.S. has been continuously opposing TPNW since the treaty was introduced stating that the treaty does not address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary and will not enhance any country’s security, nor international peace and security. The U.S. is not alone in opposing the TPNW, the opposition is equally shared amongst all the possessors of nuclear weapons. However, the security concerns of NNWSs merit equal consideration – if not more.

The U.S. and Indian statements at the CD emphasized upon the immediate commencement of negotiations on fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). After 15 years of Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and NSG waiver, the U.S. and India are at a position of comfort to talk about FMCT. Statement by India in the CD plenary held on 28 May 2009 is in complete contradiction with its current stance where India categorically mentioned that “it will not accept obligations not in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder our nuclear program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program. The treaty should not place undue burden on military non-proscribed activities.” Given the U.S.’ exceptionalism vis-à-vis India, the contradiction in Indian statements at CD is understandable as it now has one of the fastest growing nuclear program with largest stocks of unsafeguarded fissile materials among all the NPT outlier states.

While referring to the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted to CD in 2007, India reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of global, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, the upward trajectory of strategic developments and defense acquisitions by India project it as pursuing a path of arming itself rather than working in the direction of disarmament that it often misgivingly advocates. The Western appeasement policy allows India to continue pursuing great power status by advancing its military capabilities and forces, way beyond its regional security requirements. It took a formal start from Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal in 2005, exceptional waiver of NSG in 2008, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative in 2012, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement in 2016, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018, Industrial Security Annex in 2019, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) signed in Oct 2020. These agreements will enhance India’s military situational awareness, preparedness and ability to plan precision strikes which will prove detrimental for the deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s statement reminded the extra regional players to be mindful of their responsibility not to further accentuate military imbalance and carefully review the impact of their geo-political strategies on strategic stability in South Asia.

Pakistan identified weaponization of space, advancements in emerging technologies, development of hypersonic missiles and ballistic missile defense system as major risks to regional and international security. These are dangerous developments particularly in the absence of any legally binding arrangement to govern their destabilizing application. It is, therefore, imperative that these domains are regulated before it becomes impossible to do so at any later stage. It is important for all states to look at global security beyond their myopic and short-sighted self-interests. The only credible and representative disarmament negotiating body – i.e. the CD – is unfortunately used to serve the interests of select-few while overlooking the genuine demands and security considerations of most of the countries. Issues like FMCT enable such countries to project themselves as stepping in the direction of disarmament without really having to do so. Whereas any steps in the direction of the disarmament, negative security assurances, and PAROS would require these major powers to actually restrict their options and give up their hegemony on the global security landscape.