India’s military doctrine has undergone significant evolution over the years, transitioning from a focus on border defense to a more nuanced strategy centered on integrated commands. This evolutionary process can generally be attributable to various geopolitical and strategic challenges in the region, reflecting changes in its threat perceptions and assessments. This shift has not only been influenced by changing security dynamics but also have significant implications for regional geopolitics, particularly in the context of India-Pakistan relations as well as security calculus.
In late 20th century India considered predominant security challenges from Pakistan. During this period, the threat of a conventional conflict with Pakistan, characterized by the potential for short notice, short duration and rapid escalation with possible asymmetric tactics involved, shaped India’s military thinking. The Sundarji Doctrine was developed in response to India’s experiences in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and the 1971 Indo- Pak War. This doctrine emphasised on the need for a proactive and an offensive posture to deter and defeat Pakistan in a limited war scenario. The Doctrine called for holding limited territorial objectives and launching deep strikes into enemy territory to apply pressure and secure favourable outcomes.
In 21st Century, India’s threat perception evolved due to the growing influence of non-state actors, terrorism, and the spectre of nuclear escalation. The Kargil War in 1999 highlighted the limitations of India’s mobilization and offensive capabilities under Sundarji Doctrine. Mainly, in 2001, Operation Parakram’s massive troop mobilization proved ineffective under Sundar Ji Doctrine, leading to a shift towards the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in 2004, which was focussed on reduced warning time in mobilization.
The Cold Start Doctrine was conceived to address mobility challenges by advocating for rapid mobilization and offensive operations to deter aggression from Pakistan while avoiding the nuclear threshold to get triggered. The CSD emphasized integrated agile forces, greater firepower, air power dominance, and enhanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. However, the execution of the CSD faced challenges after the Mumbai attacks of 2008 in the form of limited deterrence and military preparedness. Also Mumbai Attacks highlighted the need for more comprehensive military doctrine to address the emerging threats. Post-2008, the Indian military engaged in substantial exercises to overhaul its offensive capabilities and prepare for executing the CSD.
Post 2010, India’s threat perceptions underwent further changes due to shifting regional dynamics, including China’s growing assertiveness and the evolving nature of hybrid threats. Consequently, in 2018, India adopted a new Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD), which marked a departure from the Cold Start Doctrine’s emphasis on swift, limited offensive operations.
Unlike Sundarji and Cold Start Doctrine with focus was on border defence, the Land Warfare Doctrine focuses on integrated commands. LWD emphasises on the integration of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in a unified approach to warfare, emphasizing joint-manship and the ability to respond effectively to a spectrum of threats. It emphasizes the need for proactive and offensive strategies while also highlighting the importance of defensive operations and protection of national interests. The Land Warfare Doctrine reflected a broader understanding of security challenges, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to warfare.
In recent years, India has embarked on a comprehensive military restructuring efforts aimed at modernizing its armed forces, enhancing organizational effectiveness, and addressing evolving security challenges. This military/force restructuring is also a part of India’s Land Warfare Doctrine to make it successful and not the failure like the previous doctrines. These restructuring initiatives encompass changes in force structure, command and control mechanisms, training methodologies, procurement strategies, and operational concepts. Main aspect of recent military restructuring efforts includes Integrated Theatre Commands.
The concept of integrated theatre commands (ITCs) was proposed by the Shekatkar Committee in 2016 to address concerns about the lack of jointness within the Indian military and to bring together different branches of military under a unified command structure. The committee recommended the establishment of three ITCs: Southern, Western, and Northern. To expedite the operationalization of ITCs, the Inter-Services Organizations (Command, Control and Discipline) Bill 2023 was passed by the Lok Sabha on August 4, 2023. This bill enables the commanders of each ITC to discipline personnel from all three services under their command, signalling the government’s commitment to this initiative.
The plan aims to consolidate the current 17 commands of the Indian military into three commands, promoting “tri-services synergy”, foster interoperability and efficient resource utilization, as emphasized by former Indian Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane. Each theatre command will integrate elements from the army, navy, and air force under a single commander, reporting directly to the chief of defence staff for effective command and control. This transition toward ITCs seeks to address existing gaps in the Indian military due to a lack of jointness among services.
By integrating forces into Theatre Commands, India aims to improve jointness, streamline decision making process and to enhance its overall military capabilities. How this shift in Indian military is particularly significant in the context of the evolving nature of warfare, where seamless coordination between different branches of military is essential.
The ITCs will follow the principle of One Border One Force, with two land-based commands and one focused on maritime boundaries. The first phase involves establishing two ITCs with headquarters in Jaipur and Lucknow to counter threats from Pakistan and China. In the second phase, a marine theatre command (MTC) headquartered in Karwar will be established to safeguard Indian interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. These Theatre Commands will be supported by other functional agencies including Air Defence, Space, Cyber and Special Forces.
The shift in India’s military doctrines in the form of LWD and its military modernization drive may upsurge India’s standing in the region. Pakistan’s economy is not equipped to engage in an arms race with India, leading to increased conventional asymmetries favouring India. This shift in the balance of power could create a security dilemma for Pakistan, compelling it to enhance its military capabilities to maintain a credible deterrence against India. Moreover, India’s pursuit of a more aggressive military doctrine may destabilize the fragile strategic environment in South Asia. India’s military modernization efforts can also potentially lead to a limited war scenario in the region.
To respond to India’s military modernization, Pakistan needs to invest significantly in its indigenous arms industry to maintain strategic equilibrium in conventional deterrence. This would involve acquiring modern weapons, such as long-range air defence systems, spy satellites, and advanced artillery guns, to counter Indian threats.
Particularly, from Maritime Theatre Command (MTC) significant strategic challenges are being posed to maritime security of Pakistan, which requires nuanced and adaptive response. Pakistan should primarily focus on enhancing its own maritime capabilities, fostering regional collaborations, engaging in diplomatic initiatives, and diversifying its economic activities to navigate complex maritime landscape shaped by emergence of MTC.
The doctrinal shifts and formation of Integrated Theatre Commands by India signify strategic shift that reflects the changing geopolitical landscape and security challenges for Pakistan. ITC’s are aimed to form a more versatile and dynamic Indian Military which will directly impact and reshape the strategic dynamics of the region. Therefore, Pakistan needs a significant and collective national level approach to deal with such developments.
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