On Nov 16th 2024, India test fired a Long-Range Hypersonic Missile (LRHM) from Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island from the cost of Odisha. This weapon system has the ability to engage targets over 1500 km, and can carry variety of payloads as reported by Indian media. This test has been celebrated as a major technological feat by the Indian military planners and strategic community. As per open sources, this missile had the ability to do terminal maneuvers while maintaining the hypersonic speeds.
Why India is aiming to develop such high-speed missiles having the ability to do terminal maneuvers? Hypersonic missiles are usually of two types: Hypersonic cruise missiles & Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV’s). In this discussion focus will be placed on the Indian development of hypersonic cruise missiles, related technologies, and shedding light on the rationale for developing these weapon systems. Eventually, this article will examine the implications of Indian acquisition of hypersonic cruise missiles on South Asian strategic stability.
Indian Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) took the lead initiative for development of scram-jet engine technology, which is considered as the core tech for the development of the hypersonic cruise missiles. During the first phase DRDO conducted theoretical studies to understand the technical nuances of the scram-jet engines and collaborated with different laboratories that focused on the high-speed aerodynamics. In 2010 DRDO commenced the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSDTV) program to validate the scram-jet engine technology for achieving sustained hypersonic flights. In lieu of the above-mentioned, ground tests as well as wind tunnel tests of HSDTV’s were conducted. In June 2019, DRDO conducted the first flight test of HSDTV, however it was not successful. In September 2020, DRDO again flight tested the HSDTV, and this time it sustained the flight at hypersonic speeds: Mach 6 for 20 seconds. Afterwards DRDO has worked to refine the functioning of scram-jet engine for developing hypersonic cruise missiles. Latest test of Indian LRHM is reflective of the fact that it has attained relative mastery in producing scram-jet engines.
Bernard Brodie in his seminal book, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, stressed on the fact that nuclear weapons are not weapons of actual use, but for deterrence. Building on this premise, it seems unplausible and irrational why India is developing hypersonic cruise missiles, if its deterrence needs can be met by other means.
India has a stated doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and a posture of No First Use (NFU). India aims to pursue massive retaliation for inflicting unacceptable damage on the adversary in case of a nuclear first strike. In any such case, why there is a need to develop hypersonic cruise missiles?
Hypersonic cruise missiles are known for their speed, maneuverability and a flight path within the atmosphere. In an operational sense, hypersonic missiles are used for precisely and swiftly engaging the counter-force, and counter military (battle-field) targets while minimizing the collateral damage.
For deterrence to work, a state must possess Assured Second-Strike Capability (ASSC). Hypersonic cruise missiles have a greater penetration capability due to their speed, maneuverability and are difficult to be tracked in most of the cases. Does the penetration capability strengthen the deterrence stability? It seems like that if a state has a weapon that is likely to hit the enemy targets, and evade missile defenses, it gives confidence to states to go for nuclear first strikes. Deterrence operates on the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and a balance of terror, acquisition of hypersonic cruise missiles might alter the strategic balance between adversaries, recognizing its penetrating potential. For an assured retaliation, development of hypersonic missiles might be more than what is needed.
It is high time to contemplate the possible and plausible Indian doctrinal rationales for the developing and testing of hypersonic cruise missiles. Various studies have quoted Indian statesman hinting at revisiting the NFU pledge, and creating doctrinal spaces for going nuclear first against Pakistan. Development of hypersonic cruise missiles that can carry variety of payloads (conventional or nuclear) might be materialization of this thinking.
Furthermore, Indian conventional military strategy as reflected in the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, has the provisions of pursuing limited conventional operations across the border. In such a situation hypersonic cruise missile with conventional payloads can be used to engage and hit counter military targets for easing the way for ingress. These missiles can be deployed to precisely target the Command & Control (C-2) centers of adversary forces. If launched from an aircraft, hypersonic cruise missiles can be used as an effective stand-off weapon. Indian Air Force’s (IAF) doctrine published in 2022, advocates its role in Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC’s). In November 2023, IAF test fired supersonic BrahMos missile from the Su-30 MKI, additionally it has test fired supersonic BrahMos missile from naval and land platforms. Test firing of supersonic cruise missiles from land, air and sea, adds plausibility to the idea that India is likely to develop and deploy hypersonic cruise missiles against Pakistan’s counter military and counter-force targets in a limited conventional conflict.
India is also acquiring advanced Air Defence Systems (ADS) from Russia having anti-ballistic capabilities over 400km: S-400. Russia has delivered first two batteries to India in 2021, deployed respectively at Adampur and Halwara Air Force Stations (AFS). As substantiated by above discussion, India is acquiring advanced air defenses alongside hypersonic cruise missiles, at the prima-facie these technological developments indicate that India is transitioning to a nuclear posture aimed at damage limitation. Meanwhile, Pakistan has also developed and acquired sophisticated air defenses, latest induction is HQ/9P to deny any such advantage to India. This air-defence system is capable of engaging aircrafts, cruise missiles and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons up to 100km with great accuracy, as per Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR).
Lawrence Freedman in his famous book “The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy” opines that nuclear war fighting doctrines entails the provisions of the graduated responses. A nuclear strategy based on graduated responses is based on the deterrence by denial model rather than on punishment model. Within the doctrinal framework of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), there exists no precedence for going for nuclear war fighting options, as CMD calls for a ASSC to ensure the deterrence. Development of Indian hypersonic cruise missiles that can carry conventional as well as nuclear payloads will compromise South Asian strategic stability by blurring the lines. However, unpredictable and maneuverable flight trajectories of hypersonic cruise missiles within the atmosphere make them less detectable and are difficult to be tracked as compared to ballistic missiles, this aspect reduces the response time for counter-measures. Ballistic missiles are easily detected by the space based infrared sensors in their boost phase and during the midcourse due to their predictable parabolic flying trajectory. Additionally, hypersonic cruise missiles have the ability to do terminal maneuvers, thus developing the potential for evading missile defenses. In that logic hypersonic weapons can be deployed to launch preemptive or counter-force strikes, thus threatening deterrence stability. Lastly, hypersonic cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional and nuclear warheads. In reference to South Asian strategic stability equation, deployment of missiles having ambiguity in their payloads will further complicate the crisis management and amplify the risks of escalation.
Development of hypersonic cruise missiles by India will increase the likelihood of arms race in the South Asia, and foster a false sense of confidence for India to pursue counter-force strikes against Pakistan; however, many operational hiccups are present for executing these strikes. India must pay heed to classical principles of minimum deterrence and avoid acquiring destabilizing technologies and missiles that alter the strategic balance in the region and stress South Asian strategic stability. India must accept the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) proposed by Pakistan in 1998, to avoid arms race in the region.
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