India’s nuclear program embeds various loose ends related to safety and security, missile tests, and incidents of misfire. There are concerns regarding the theft of radiological materials, export control, and the existence of a black nuclear market for sensitive technologies and materials. These loose ends not only challenge India’s claims of being a responsible and normalized nuclear power but also present serious threats of radiological terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
The recurring incidents of nuclear theft and smuggling of radiological materials in India suggest the existence of a nuclear black market there. Over the years, several instances of theft and illegal trade of radioactive substances have been reported. This trend continued unabated with the theft of the highly radioactive substance Californium from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in 2024. There were around 18 incidents of nuclear material theft and loss in India, totaling approximately 200 kg of uranium, from 1994 to 2021. In 2021 alone, three incidents of nuclear theft were reported. Two instances are particularly noteworthy: one involved an Indian politician and sitting member of the Parliament, who was connected to the illegal trade of uranium in 1998), and another involved a terror outfit that was caught possessing radioactive material in 2003. These incidents, besides cases indicating potential collusion between government officials and terrorist groups, also underscore the seriousness of the challenges faced and the extent of incompetence and negligence within the system.
Similarly, in 1996, some 130 instances of safety-related concerns about nuclear facilities and 147 instances of mishaps in atomic energy plants were reported in a mere three years, from 1995 to 1998. More than half a dozen major incidents were also reported at different nuclear facilities in India from 1998 onwards. In two years, from 2010 to 2011, India’s premier intelligence agency (CBI) reported some 25 Intrusions and security breach incidents, at BARC, in 2012.
This same facility had encountered a fire accident in 2010, killing two people, for ‘unknown triggers’. In a particular instance, a disgruntled employee at India’s Kaiga Atomic Power Station in Karnataka State had reportedly contaminated a drinking water supply with heavy water from the plant which led to the poisoning of 45 employees at the facility. In another incident, personnel of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), assigned to guard the facility, opened fire and killed several employees working within the facility. Similarly, BRAC scientists have previously been selling ‘black diamonds’ for commercial purposes and could use sensitive technology out of greed for financial gain.
According to sources reporting on nuclear issues, most of the theft of these materials originates from enrichment facilities in India such as BARC and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). It has a poor record of enacting barriers, by limiting access to fissile material and international safeguards on nuclear facilities, to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. India’s Home Ministry had reported that the CISF responsible for guarding Indian nuclear warheads and protecting weapon systems at various sites remains understaffed, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained to perform its duties. Based on its flaws in nuclear safety and security, India is ranked at 23 out of 25 countries, only above Iran and North Korea, which possess weapon-grade uranium.
These incidents severely question insider role, inadequate safety and security measures, and failure to fulfill international obligations under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), and the IAEA Protocols: most importantly, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). At the risk of oversimplification, it is necessary to mention that BARC and DAE are strategic organizations that oversee India’s nuclear weapons program and negligence at their end may cause severe challenges.
Likewise, India’s missile program operates under a veil of secrecy, which also obscures its flaws and loose ends associated with it. For example, in March 2022, India’s nuclear-capable BrahMos missile was ‘misfired’ and traveled some 124 km into Pakistani territory. Again, in March 2023, India’s three surface-to-air missiles were misfired during a military exercise due to a ‘technical glitch’. These incidents of missile misfire into the territory of another nuclear-armed country and test failures in a peacetime military exercise, close to the same country: Pakistan, set a dangerous precedent in an already risk-prone region.
In the first incident, India provided a minimal explanation, attributing it to a “technical error.” The second case was reported as a malfunction and “accidental launch”. An officer dismissed for the March 2022 misfire, stated that he was “not trained for operational problems” and “had acted in complete obedience to the SOP” (Standing Operating Procedures)”. Another official connected to BrahMos misfire suggested that “localizing the liability to the Squadron level was to camouflage the policy failure at the HG level”. From an outsider’s perspective, these incidents “expose(d) many loopholes and technical lapses in India’s handling of its strategic weapons”, yet this negligence has largely escaped international scrutiny.
These intentional “misfires” have been aimed at ‘tempting the fates’ and urging the adversary into untoward crisis escalation. This raises concerns about individuals having the authority to launch a missile. The situation also prompts questions about the “strict civilian command and control” over India’s nuclear arsenal. India’s negligence and incompetence set a risky precedent for two nuclear-armed arch-rivals. Given the geopolitical and security environment in which these countries operate, the potential for loss of restraint could lead to severe misjudgment and catastrophic consequences.
Similarly, an American expert notes that “Indian export controls are poorly implemented and the possibility of onward proliferation-where imported items are re-exported- remains a serious concern”. The challenge of acquiring sensitive technology and materials poses significant proliferation concerns, particularly when these technologies are re-exported and potentially fall into the wrong hands. This concern is exacerbated when state entities illegally transfer imported technologies, as it can lead to serious threats to peace and security in the region and beyond, including the risk of radiological terrorism.
In sum, despite India’s significant proliferation record, poor safety and security regulations exist, along with a thriving black market in the illicit trade of sensitive technology and radioactive materials. Nonetheless, the West has turned a blind eye to its poor record. The non-proliferation regimes, backed by western countries for their vested interests, further facilitate India’s loose ends and complicate global efforts to prevent proliferation and ensure the physical protection of radiological material. Additionally, the engagement of western countries with India through non-proliferation regimes not only facilitates these activities but also strains the already weak export control regulations, potentially leading to a systemic breakdown of export control institutions in the country.
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