The US assumption that India would check the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region has been questioned following the 2024 China-India border patrol agreement. The efforts to normalize the border issues between China and India made by both countries is continuing, driven by their strong commitment to working together in bolstering shared interests in bilateral trade and multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is not unusual for India to navigate both side of the equation. While India is an active member of BRICS and the SCO, it also plays a leading role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), India, Israel and US, UAE (I2U2), and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). This approach mirrors India’s Cold War era non-alignment policy so called strategic autonomy. However, it has raised serious concerns in Washington about India’s utility in the context of the US grand strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-US partnership is primarily based on the assumption that India would assist countering China’s influence in the region.
Indian Foreign Ministry disclosed a momentous disengagement deal between India and China in the recent 2024 BRICS summit in Russia. Both countries agreed to drawdown the number of troops at the two unsettled friction points at the India-China border. The deal resumed the regular pattern of patrolling before their 2020 border clash. According to Sushant Singh, a lecturer at Yale University, if India wants to increase its economic growth, it needs Chinese investment. India’s business community values India’s business relations with China, which could have contributed to the Modi-Xi détente. This patch up between China and India is quite concerning for the US, as Washington’s primary interest toward South Asia underlines India’s action to counter the rise of China.
India is non-Western and not anti-West; it always adopts a midway in great power competition. Hedging between BRICS and Quad with safe hand demonstrates India’s commitment to maintaining its traditional approach toward international relations. It is more astonishing to look at how US has misconstrued India’s attitude and bets on it to counter the rise of China. It is far from becoming a part of the US’s “hub and spoke” model. Being the largest democracy and one of the fastest-growing economies, Delhi has long viewed the BRICS platform as an opportunity to assert its influence, particularly in the Global South. It has substantial stakes in the region, with growing markets in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. This Indian aspiration competes with the US view of India.
For India, the BRICS platform offers a natural space to exert its economic and political influence. Bilateral trade between the US and India touched $200 billion in 2024, indicating the strengthening of their economic ties. However, Trump’s aggressive stance on BRICS and his tariff threats could put India in a tough position. If other BRICS member countries continue to push for the use of local currencies in trade, India might be forced to make a difficult choice. It could align more closely with the BRICS bloc, which provides a platform to amplify its influence in the Global South and could risk alienating Washington by continuing its participation in BRICS. Furthermore, the idea of BRICS is a brainchild of India, as Delhi wants to become a leader of the Global South.
In the face of Trump’s tough rhetoric, India’s commitment to BRICS and its growing economic ties with other member nations may push Delhi further away from the US. Although India is likely to continue doing business in dollars for the foreseeable future, it might increasingly support BRICS’ broader goal of reducing dependency on the US currency. While India has rejected the idea of adopting the de-dollarization strategy of BRICS, the growing shift toward local currencies among other member states might compel India to make a choice. As the geopolitical landscape evolves, India will be forced to navigate a delicate balancing act between the economic and strategic leverage of the US-led bloc and the rising influence of the BRICS bloc.
India’s firm commitments in BRICS, and Modi-Xi reproachment show that India does not feel threatened from China. At the same time, it questions India’s commitment to US as a regional power balancer against China. Yet, it is uncertain how would Washington manage its relations with India in the future. In the context of the containment policy for China in the region, US has no other option but to rely on India. Delhi is the only viable option through which Washington could fire a shot, considering the mutual understanding of both countries on China. On the other hand, India-China détente stands as a watershed which might convince the US to reconsider India as a strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, Trump’s hardline stance on BRICS, combined with the broader geopolitical changes, may push India further into the arms of the BRICS bloc, even if it tries to maintain its relationship with Washington. India’s foreign policy, based on strategic autonomy, will face significant tests as it navigates these pressures in the years ahead.
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