The civilian and military nuclear program of India has captured the attention of the world since it became a nuclear power out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Issues of nuclear security in India especially the incidents of nuclear material thefts have raised concerns regarding the safety of Indian nuclear infrastructures and program. Some of the critiques have given indications that India may be involved in strategies or even dangerous nuclear experiments on an international front this is commonly known as a nuclear gambit. Cases of nuclear material being stolen in India are of great concern, as they show the weakness in the nuclear security setup of India. Such lapses may even have disastrous outcomes like the development of radiological dispersal device by the non-state entities which is likely to threaten both India and the global community. These threats are compounded by the absence of any autonomous nuclear regulation organization and the poor security standards at nuclear power stations, as observed by the international zone monitors such as Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) that ranks India very low in terms of nuclear security implementation.
It has been found that there is a worrying tendency of nuclear material theft in India, some of which have been on a large scale in the last few decades. To give some examples, in a criminal gang sneaked out was several kilograms of semi-processed uranium. In 1998 theft of 100 kg of uranium used in mining complex Jadugoda, was caught trying to sell it to Australian federal politician. In 2001, two men were caught in possessions of more than 200 grams of uranium. Similarly, in 2003, 225 grams of milled uranium was seized from a jihad group who were planning to wrap them around explosives. In 2008, Low-grade uranium was smuggled to Nepal, with the help of the son of one of the employee in the Atomic Minerals Division. In the year 2009 a Nuclear reactor employee used security lapse to poison workmates with radioactive isotope. Back in 2013, Leftist guerillas acquired uranium ore, which was loaded on explosives to make bombs, and was apprehended by the police. The depleted uranium that was apprehended in Thane in 2016 is estimated to be smuggled out of one of the Gulf countries. In 2021, 7.1 kg (15 lb) of natural uranium was confiscated off two men in Maharashtra, worth about 2.9 million. And in 2024, 50 grams of stolen radioactive material that was valued at 100 million were confiscated and three people were taken into custody. The theft is still continued in India. Unlike in Pakistan where there is not even a single theft or irresponsible state behavior was recorded or reported by the national or the international community, this proves that Pakistan is determined in its nuclear safety even despite the world terming it as a terrorist sponsor but at least Pakistan is more secure than the state whose nuclear is freely and easily accessible to terrorist groups and separatist elements like, India.
Excluding the theft or losses of non-nuclear weapons, SASSI documents 18 events in India between 1994 and 2021 of thefts and loss of more than 200 kg of nuclear material, including uranium. Such cases show a repeat of an activity, and some materials are believed to have been smuggled to the neighboring countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh. The numerous occurrences of such incidents are indicators of the vulnerability of the Indian nuclear security system. The Indian Home Ministry released a report in 2013 showing that Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) responsible to protect the nuclear installations was reportedly understaffed and ill equipped, and were not enough trained.
The standards and protocols of nuclear security in India was identified as weaker than in Pakistan and Russia by the U.S. intelligence (insider threat issues, security of transport, and control of materials). Under the Department of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is not fully autonomous and hence its effectiveness is affected as compared to the international standards, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires stringent domestic regulation of nuclear materials.
Such weaknesses have raised the possibility of these stolen nuclear materials, being used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD), also known as a dirty bomb, which can have a serious impact on people assuming that a group of terrorists obtains them. Although not directly applicable to the nuclear weapons, some of the materials confiscated like natural uranium, are suspected of posing a serious threat because they can be found in the black market. The global nuclear gambit of India suggests that this engagement of strategic or risky behavior on an international front would compromise the nuclear safety and export of nuclear technology in irresponsible hands.
In order to resolve the issue of the domestic security, India ought to focus on reinforcing its nuclear regulatory framework, making the AERB independent and improving the physical protection of the nuclear plants. Best practices and joint security reviews may also be supported through international cooperation to enhance the struggle of India against nuclear theft. Although the international community has not made much noise about the failures in India in regard nuclear security, more monitoring and assistance is likely to reduce the challenges faced. To sum up, although India has major problems with protecting its nuclear material, it does not seem to be engaged in an unsafe or criminal nuclear policy on the world level. India can enhance its role of being a responsible nuclear power by solving its own security problems and by helping in the global non-proliferation endeavor.
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