The aggressive pattern following the Pahalgam crisis which altered South Asia’s strategic deterrence pattern continues to push New Delhi to resort to its conventional tactic of blaming Islamabad for orchestrating it. Back in 2019, a similar episode was seen i.e., the Pulwama-Balakot crisis and South Asia, since then, understood a dangerous manifestation of these repeatedly aggressive political patterns. After the politically ignited military operation of Modi took centre stage in its domestic politics, BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) faced spears from all directions. From questions on intelligence failure to motives behind the operation, and gains from the crisis to a lack of international support, Modi has faced the opposition’s domestic pressure in a manner consistent with the divisively aggressive rhetoric that BJP has been engineering since 2019.
New Delhi’s political failure can be best understood in the post-crisis scenario as, during the confrontation, the political opposition, the general public, and political analysts did not withstand the military and diplomatic response of the state, to say the least. After the crisis ended by U.S. mediation, Pakistan took pride in its military operation with its political parties and masses endorsing it. However, in Delhi’s case, various concerns are still being raised by its public regarding the credibility of the operation, questioning the ‘claimed’ gains of Modi. Meanwhile, BJP, for a long time has maintained its stance that it does not entertain internationalization of its internal or regional matters. This surge in international attention directed towards Kashmir continues to disturb Modi’s political strategies: a matter of internationalization and internalization of the disputed nuclear flashpoint. This diplomatic struggle also proved the Simla Accord of 1972 to be bootless, which had held the principle of mutual resolution of conflicts between two nuclear rivals.
Speculations were raised that if Modi had an upper hand in the operation, as iterated by the media and the Indian forces, then why did it accept a ceasefire, also the one mediated by a foreign power? New Delhi also appeared to be on a strategic backfoot when it met Islamabad’s fiery response that it had been undermining for decades, and the Indian forces did face significant strategic losses in conducting Operation Sindoor. The collateral damage was at first categorically denied by both India’s state officials and armed forces. However, the international media reported significant losses caused to India by Pakistan’s military which corroborated Islamabad’s claims, though the figures of the losses differed. A global setback for India after Pakistan was elected as a vice-chair for the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee has further created strategic anxieties for Modi, as the diplomatic muscle of Pakistan continues to reinforce its posture in the region. This has also led Modi to revisit the aperture he had created to dissipate any emerging support for Pakistan as he recently did in Colombia’s case. Nonetheless, igniting battles on multiple frontiers is never a calculated gambit to manoeuvre political leverage and diplomatic strategies on such complex discourses.
As the plethora of disinformation still propagates not only from the social media platforms in India but also from their mainstream news channels and journalists, the propaganda chainsaw has chopped off the country’s diplomatic narrative structure. Their national media still continues to diabolically boost nationalistic spirit and evoke both sensitive and warmongering emotions. Their media’s reporting tactics during the crisis had two elements in general: a theatrical display of hyper-nationalism and a lack of perceptive substance. This mix of amplified and televised mechanics of media warfare with a glorified perception of the operation’s achieved goals proved to be nationally embarrassing for India’s strategic spectrum. As international platforms have also confirmed the war losses related to Indian jets, it appears that New Delhi has yet again failed to calibrate Islamabad’s response. The Indian Air Marshal, when asked about the Indian assets lost in the operation, vaguely admitted the losses stating “they are a part of combat” and refrained from giving actual figures. These losses highlight the strategic failure of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and its capabilities in a combat scenario to outmanoeuvre adversaries despite acquiring modern weapon systems. Apart from losing its diplomatically potent outline of regional dominance, these losses also caused India to lose billions of dollars. A recent controversy over the Rafale deal has also resurfaced, stating that huge corruption has been done while making the deal, leading to an overestimation of the equipment’s potential rather than sophisticating combat forces.
In a recent interview in Singapore, the Indian chief has begrudgingly admitted to having experienced losses in the combat and repeatedly diverted the question towards highlighting India’s ‘calibrated’ response. His admission of failure has led to severe backlash and gave opposition parties a margin to further call out the government for misleading the nation. Not only that, Modi’s sindoor campaign has sparked extreme dissent among Indian women for using religious symbolism and culturally sensitive emotions for political gains. The political optic of distributing sindoor among Indian women is being mocked by the opposition leaders, labelling it a “One Nation, One Husband” scheme of ignorance.
The emergence of drones as a strategically provocative tactic to induce fear and panic has contributed to a regional shift in retaliation patterns that maintained ground in South Asia’s decades-long face-off with traditional crisis-handling techniques. With a traditional display of triad forces, this innovative approach of New Delhi to use sophisticated weapons has granted a new sub-conventional normalization of using kamikaze drones for surveillance and fearmongering. The strategic pedestal of South Asia might not escalate beyond sub-conventional levels, but an increased realization of updating to sophisticated war mechanics continues to loom over. With that being said, the strategic chessboard readapts in a manner consistent with the warfighting manoeuvres and weapons modification in post-crisis management in South Asia. With both sides being cognizant of escalatory outcomes of impulsive war moves, shifting towards psychological operations of fearmongering works proficiently to rotate both war optics and retaliation patterns. Strategic stability in South Asia’s deterrence curvature seems to revolve around cyber warfare and the ‘dawn on drones’ to mitigate large-scale standoffs and potential upsetting of nuclear thresholds.
In conclusion, India did suffer heavily in this limited crisis as Pakistan’s response was befitting, humiliating, and unanticipated. Nonetheless, a new normal of “drone warfare” has been adeptly set in the region by India’s provocative war tactics. Also, the stability-instability paradox, despite the drone war mechanics taking the stage, will continue to lessen the probability of a nuclear escalation in the region as both countries are cognizant of the outcome of advancing on the escalation ladder. The regional fallout of nuclear escalation will not only be confined to these two nuclear rivals but will instead build out on the larger canvas of South Asia’s security apparatus. Narrative propaganda and drones have aptly opened a gateway for sub-conventional face-offs, proxy wars, and narrative escalation to direct the region’s political posture and deterrence practices. The traditional war optics between both countries have started to fade away as new war fronts, practices, and weapon upgradation continue to redirect the posture of the two hostile neighbours.
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