Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Washington from February 13 to 14 to meet the newly elected President, Donald Trump, at the White House. The visit featured an extensive meeting between the two leaders, culminating in a joint press conference The two leaders announced the launch of the U.S.-India COMPACT Agreement, which seeks to catalyze opportunities for military partnership, accelerated commerce, and technology. The COMPACT agreement replaces the ten-year framework for the India-U.S. Defence Relationship, which was signed in 2015. The leaders’ joint statement emphasized key areas of cooperation including: defence, trade, technology, energy security, and multilateral engagements, while also announcing a flurry of new initiatives. Additionally, it highlighted the importance of pursuing fair trade practices and the repatriation of illegal immigrants. With regard to defence, major emphasis was placed on New Delhi increasing its weapons purchases from Washington. Setting the broader tone of bilateral interactions under the Trump administration, the meeting produced a statement of intent rather than concrete deliverables. A deeper analysis of the meeting also indicates that in the coming days, the U.S.-India strategic partnership shall be incumbent upon India making reciprocal trade policies, while the transfer of critical technologies to New Delhi could be off the table.
Even prior to coming into power, Trump was very explicit of his expectations from India. Now in office, Trump has evidently redefined Washington’s approach to U.S.-India ties by emphasizing key U.S. concerns, mainly India’s protectionist trade policies and illegal Indian immigrants. This has marked a departure from Washington’s earlier approach that accepted strategic trade-offs for Indo-Pacific convergence. It has also pressured New Delhi into giving into Washington’s demands (since New Delhi has offered tariff relaxations and has signalled intent to increase imports from the U.S). With Trump’s approach toward New Delhi apparently working, Washington’s conventional wisdom that a meaningful cooperation with New Delhi requires an accommodative stance has also been challenged.
During the meeting, the need to expand defence sales to New Delhi appeared as Washington’s primary area of interest. At the forefront of the list was the agreement on New Delhi’s acquisition and co-production of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and Stryker Infantry Combat Vehicles this year. In addition to this, New Delhi would also procure six Long-range P-8I Maritime Patrol aircrafts which will expectedly augment New Delhi’s Intelligence gathering, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities across the western Indian Ocean region.
Trump also announced that Washington would review its policy on releasing fifth-generation fighters and under-sea systems to India. This is expected to result in the Indian air force being equipped with the F-35 Lightning II joint strike aircraft. Moreover, Trump also offered Modi to purchase Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighter jets. The F-35 is a fifth-generation fighter jet, recognized for its advanced stealth, speed, and combat capabilities. However, according to Indian officials, the U.S. offer remains in the proposal stage.
New Delhi has rather been calculated toward acquiring the F-35 fighter jets. This primarily stems from the fact that India’s long standing defence supplier Russia has also proposed New Delhi to locally produce Russian-origin Su-57 stealth fighter jets in India. Unlike Washington’s offer, Moscow’s proposal includes the use of domestically sourced components and a complete transfer of technology. In case of the two countries reaching an agreement, Russia has indicated its willingness to begin production as early as this year. However, it is pertinent to note that Russia’s defence production and its supply chains have considerably slowed down since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Moreover, while the Su-57 presents an indigenous manufacturing opportunity, it remains less advanced and lacks the extensive combat testing as compared to the F-35s. Nevertheless, New Delhi could be expected to prioritize Washington’s offer; trading off localized production and transfer of technology for technological superiority and financial strain that comes with buying American fighter jets. This could mainly result from the contingency that the Indian Airforce faces a shortage of squadrons, whereas the domestic industries have consistently failed to produce the Tejas fighter jets.
In addition to this, while particularly mentioning the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), Trump also indicated that Washington would review domestic arms transfer regulations in order to streamline defence trade. Since the onset of the U.S-India defence partnership, substantive ITAR reforms benefiting India have not materialized as yet. It is not to say that Washington does not make adjustments to ITARs for easing defence trade procedures. In 2021, the U.S. made amendments to the ITAR, thereby granting exemptions to the UK and Australia; placing them on par with Canada within the U.S. defence industrial base. However, these adjustments were contingent on the imposition of reciprocal export policies by the two states. More recently, in August 2024, Washington also made reforms to ITAR to facilitate Australia’s acquisition of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines under AUKUS.
However, vis-a-vis India, Washington has categorically remained hesitant in making amends to the ITAR to facilitate technology transfers to New Delhi. Washington’s reluctance stems from both security concerns and trade-related imperatives. First, the export-related infrastructures of India and the U.S. differ significantly. Second, the Indian military has extensively relied on Russian military platforms and systems, most notably the S-400 missile defence system — which raises the concerns that the operational security of the F-35’s radars and early warning systems could be compromised.
Hence, while the U.S. has adjusted ITAR for close military allies such as Canada, the UK, and Australia, similar concessions for India remain unlikely unless New Delhi responds with reciprocal trade policies. This is also evident from the fact that during the meeting, both countries have also indicated to begin negotiations to reach agreement on reciprocal defence procurement arrangements. Therefore, for India, it could be expected that ITAR reforms will not be driven solely by strategic considerations but will also depend on Washington’s confidence in New Delhi’s ability to protect U.S. technology and enact reciprocal trade measures. In this scenario, bi-lateral defence partnership could be particularly devoid of transfers and co-productions of critical technologies.
Furthermore, while highlighting the increased integration of U.S weapon platforms into the Indian defence inventory, the two leaders also affirmed to further strengthen interoperability and defence industrial cooperation. India’s extensive reliance on U.S-based systems – as envisioned under the strategic partnership – could stifle domestic innovation, it will also deepen New Delhi’s reliance on American weapons and technology, potentially exposing it to U.S. political or economic pressures. New Delhi has already had a taste of U.S. arm-twisting in the form of delayed deliveries of General Electric-manufactured F-404 IN20 engines, which were intended to power India’s Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas Mk1As. Hence, while the integration of U.S.-origin defence items and the promise of expanded co-production might seem to enhance military interoperability, there exist concerns over strategic independence and associated risks that come with entrenching dependency.
Lastly, Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) is another key initiative that has been launched during the meeting. Reportedly, the ASIA will particularly seek to enhance U.S-India cooperation in Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA). While details about the initiatives are not known as yet, it could be estimated that it would allow Washington to acquire critical data regarding underwater activity of the Indian Ocean, particularly pertaining to Chinese activities. Additionally, UDA is also vital for surveillance of sea lanes of communication and other maritime assets against underwater threats (including submarines). Going forward, while the U.S.-India collaboration over UDA could offer a degree of technical assistance to New Delhi, however, in the longer run, it could raise concerns over sensitive UDA data and sovereign control over surveillance systems.
While Trump’s meeting with Modi brings a good deal of clarity regarding how he envisions bilateral ties with New Delhi, this could come with fine print and attached conditions. As New Delhi deepens its defence and strategic ties, the trajectory of this partnership appears to be contingent India’s willingness to reciprocate on trade, Washington’s reservations over technology transfers, and the long-term risks of dependency on American military systems. While New Delhi stands to benefit from advanced weaponry and interoperability with U.S. forces, it also faces critical trade-offs in terms of strategic autonomy and domestic defence innovation.
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