On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” (SMDA), which states that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both. The Joint Statement could have been viewed as a formalization of the already existing defense arrangement between the two countries but it’s flawed interpretation by a Saudi official and more importantly Pakistan’s Defense Minister, that his “nation’s nuclear program will be made available to Saudi Arabia if needed,” has attracted significant attention amongst the international community, and more importantly in the neighbouring India.
This is not the first time that the defense minister Khawaja Asif has made irresponsible remarks about Pakistan’s nuclear program. In 2016, in response to a fake news story about a supposed threat from Israel’s defense minister, he tweeted, “Israel forgets Pakistan is a Nuclear state too.” Israel later had to clarify that no official had made such a threat, and the person mentioned in the fake news was not their defense minister.
Khawaja Asif’s recent statement is the second time that the defense minister may have put Pakistan in an awkward position regarding nuclear matters. Pakistan has not made any such commitment, nor does it have the capacity to offer a nuclear umbrella to any other country, including Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is modest and focused specifically on India; it has no other ambitions. Pakistan maintains a policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD), which means that it will not engage in an arms race and will build only the minimum number of nuclear weapons sufficient to deter its principal adversary, India. According to the recent international estimates, which Pakistan never endorses, it has a smaller number of nuclear weapons than India, which makes it extremely difficult to offer nuclear guarantees to other countries.
Beyond maintaining a minimum required number of weapons, Pakistan has also been cautious in declaring the ranges of its missiles. This is intended to signal to the outside world that its nuclear capability remains India-focused and should not be viewed as a threat by any state beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is guided and approved by the National Command Authority (NCA), which is an institutionalized body for discussing all nuclear matters. The NCA’s decisions are implemented through the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which acts as its secretariat. Neither the defense minister nor any other member of the NCA has the authority or legitimacy to offer their own interpretation of Pakistan’s nuclear policy.
Besides the nuclear issue, which has drawn significant international focus, the Pak-Saudi Joint Statement has several other interesting facets that need analysis to understand its political, economic, and military implications.
Will the new agreement transform the South Asia and Middle Eastern regional security complexes into a new entity, or will the agreement remain largely symbolic, with both sides using it to achieve limited political objectives?
The SMDA envisions an enhanced role for Pakistan in the regional security architecture, but it is unclear how this would materialize. The US remains the principal security guarantor for several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, and its major ally, Israel. If Israel is not the major security concern for the Saudis, given the US presence in the region, then what other potential threats would require Pakistan’s assistance? Or, is this new arrangement an attempt to lure Pakistan away from Chinese influence and back into the US-led regional security framework?
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a longstanding defense collaboration, which the recent SMDA has formalized. In the past, Pakistan helped Saudi Arabia defend the Kingdom from external threats and continues to maintain a sizeable military presence for training and limited security purposes.
The new agreement does not make Pakistan a ‘net security provider’ or a contender to lead a collective security arrangement, which some have wrongly labelled as the birth of a ‘Muslim NATO’. The term ‘net security provider’ was first used by US Secretary of State Robert Gates in 2009 when he promoted India’s regional power credentials in the Indo-Pacific to counter China. Pakistan has remained skeptical of this role for its neighbour, India, and should not seek one for itself in the Middle East.
Since the US remains a principal security guarantor for most Arab countries and a major arms supplier for the Saudis, it is reasonable to believe that the US will not allow any arrangement that could undermine its own position, and more importantly, that of its major ally, Israel. So, if the SMDA is not intended to counter the Israeli threat, who else could be the intended target of this new arrangement?
Iran is a regional rival to Saudi Arabia due to its political and ideological differences. It could be one of the intended targets that both the US and Saudi Arabia want to address by building a coalition of regional countries. Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions have been a major source of friction with Saudi Arabia and are strongly opposed by the US. This could be an added reason to bring Pakistan into the regional security matrix. Still, it would be unwise to expect that Pakistan could provide forces or nuclear capability against Iran, with which it shares a border and maintains reasonably good relations.
Another issue that undermines Saudi influence in the region is the Yemen-based Houthis, whom the Kingdom may hope to address through this new arrangement. Pakistan has extensive experience in counterinsurgency and battle-hardened troops, so it might be asked to help deal with the Houthi threat. However, the US experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s own counterinsurgency efforts show that these wars are difficult and can lead to significant losses. Pakistan may not be able to sustain such losses, especially when the conflict is not its own. Even with the US and Israeli support, Saudi Arabia has not been successful against the Houthis, so it is hard to see how Pakistan could deliver a different outcome.
The Pak-Saudi SMDA is expected to enhance Pakistan’s influence in the region, which some commentators suggest China might exploit to make inroads in the Middle East. This, however, seems unlikely, as the US would continue to remain a major partner for most influential Arab countries.
In May 2025, the US and Saudi Arabia agreed to an investment deal worth $600 billion, which includes $142 billion in US weapons sales. Qatar, another influential strategic partner and host of the forward headquarters of the US Central Command, recently signed an agreement with the potential to generate an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion, including economic deals totaling more than $243.5 billion. Similarly, the US has secured a commercial deal worth $200 billion with the UAE. Together, these investment agreements of over $2 trillion in the Gulf region make the US the most influential economic and security partner for most regional countries, making it difficult for China to replace the US in the near future.
There is a greater concern that Pakistan’s enhanced role in the region could potentially draw it back into the US-led military security architecture and away from the Chinese-led economic security framework. Therefore, while building new economic and security partnerships, Pakistan must remain cognizant of its own limitations and interests. Saudi Arabia remains an important strategic partner, and Pakistan must strengthen this relationship based on mutually beneficial interests, rather than by offering security guarantees for short-term dividends, which would be difficult to manage and could put Pakistan in an unenviable position in the long run.
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