In recent years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Afghan government of supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). It has claimed that these two groups are collaborating with each other and operating from Afghan territory. The potential cooperation may aim to promote their separatist movements. Despite TTP’s focus being on Islamist movements and BLA’s on secularity, there are hints of collaboration between them as display through their various media activities. For example, Baloch separatists and their affiliated channels share news on social media whenever the TTP carries out an attack. On the other hand, accounts that are supposedly connected to TTP increase reports of Baloch separatist activities whenever they launch an attack in in the province. The TTP has also increasingly expressed an interest in Balochistan, using Umar Media to urge the Baloch people to oppose alleged state repression. Furthermore, the TTP produced a nine-minute long video exposing the triple murders in Barkhan district in February 2023, allegedly planned by former provincial minister, Sardar Abdul Rehman Khetran, and condemned the killings. In April and May 2022, the group also released videos in Balochi, urging the Baloch to support its war against the state. They may cooperate tactically in certain regions of Balochistan and the wider tribal areas, where both TTP and BLA can temporarily unite against Pakistan’s security forces. This is the main reason in which they can collaborate given that Balochistan borders Afghanistan, with many adjoining Pashtun areas. It is possible that the Taliban might facilitate the cross-border movement of Baloch armed groups. In Baloch-dominated regions of the province, the TTP might receive logistical assistance (weapons) from them or their supporters. Although BLA and TTP are ideologically distinct militant groups, they historically supported each other whenever they had common objectives. These objectives include trading and exchanging weapons or providing logistical aid. However, such interactions among militants do not constitute high-level collaboration.
It is challenging to determine whether the BLA would trust or form an alliance with the TTP given its prior negotiations, its insistence on Sharia law, and its opposition to Balochistan’s independence. Baloch nationalists have also long been concerned about the possible Islamization of the region, which they believe could jeopardise their secular ideals and separatist rebellion. The another reason for their potential non-alliance is BLA’s skepticism towards TTP due to the group acting as a proxy of the state in the past (peace talks with the Pakistani government as early as May 2022). The BLA also fears that the TTP could reunite with the state at any time, which might then be used against the Baloch people. While claims of a potential alliance have been refuted, Pakistan has accused the BLA of receiving assistance from foreign countries, particularly India. The government of Pakistan has accused India of supporting BLA (when Kalbhushan Yadav was caught) as part of its broader regional strategy, but no concrete evidence has been presented. Additionally, the BLA itself has denied such ties. This can also be a potential non-alliance reason, as the TTP, as a jihadist organisation, would avoid ties with India. Any collaboration between the BLA and TTP would probably be tactical, brief, and aimed at countering their shared enemy (the Pakistani government and military). Since the BLA, according to the existing evidence, is engaging less with international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, as compared to working with other local insurgency groups based in Balochistan, like The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Republican Army, JAYSH-UL-ADAL, and other separatist Balochistan-based militias, with a singular ambition of achieving Balochistan’s independence from Pakistan, the BLA is expected to disassociate itself from these actors. The government of Pakistan continues to monitor these entities with great care, and any evidence of coordination with foreign terrorist groups would likely lead to further military operations and sanctions.
While there are suspicions about foreign backing, the BLA’s focus remains on the internal political struggle in Balochistan, and it is unlikely to have formal ties with international jihadist or terrorist organisations. The group’s main support base is within the Baloch diaspora and some Baloch communities in the region.
Groups like Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and other extremist organisations share a similar stance to the TTP, focusing on Islamist extremism and violence. These groups are primarily involved in sectarian violence, targeting Shia Muslims and carrying out large-scale attacks against civilians and Pakistan’s security forces. The BLA, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and the TTP are connected and allegedly acting on behalf of foreign hostile agencies exploiting Balochistan’s indigenous issues. The three of them can only collaborate against Pakistan’s security forces because BLA, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and LeJ have different political and ideological backgrounds and for them to find a common ground for long is nearly impossible. The BLA is unlikely to directly collaborate with them because these groups have religiously driven goals, and there is little common ground between them and the BLA’s separatist agenda.
There is a possibility of cooperation of BLA with other terrorist groups. But the BLA is the only nationalist terrorist group in Pakistan while other groups are mainly jihadists and they cannot facilitate them in the way they want it.
In conclusion, while the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) may occasionally engage in tactical cooperation with other militant groups, particularly those targeting the Pakistani state, its core nationalist and secular agenda remains distinct from the religiously motivated objectives of groups such as the TTP, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS. Although both the BLA and groups like the TTP share a common adversary in the Pakistani government and military, their ideological differences and contrasting long-term goals make sustained collaboration improbable. Moreover, the BLA’s reliance on local and regional support, coupled with its cautious approach to external alliances, indicates that while short-term collaborations might occur, they will likely remain opportunistic and limited. As the BLA continues its struggle for autonomy, the group’s interactions with other insurgent groups will likely be driven by tactical considerations rather than ideological alignment. Ultimately, other broader jihadist agendas in the region are unlikely to overshadow the BLA’s fight for Baloch independence as a distinct political and nationalistic movement.
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