In South Asia, there are few cases when the world community does not forget about alerts of the Nipah virus, represented by the World Health Organization. Whenever the news about outbreaks is made, it almost always seems to be small, localized, and comfortingly contained. There is a certain feeling of closure in that word as though the issue has been solved but not just pushed back. But beneath this placid phraseology, there is a much more disturbing fact. Nipah does not come back as there is something mysterious or random about it. It reoccurs due to the fact that the circumstances under which it is introduced are hard to change.
Few pathogens are as lethal. In a lot of outbreaks, almost half of the victims die and, in some cases, the rate of death is even greater. Nipah is one of the known zoonotic diseases that is savage. What is interesting though is not just its killing power, but how familiar it has become. WHO investigations have repeatedly shown the same routes of infection, close contact in the household, being exposed in the hospital, eating contaminated food including the sap of date palms (raw) and contact with infected animals. The same trends have reoccurred in Bangladesh and in intermittent outbreaks in India, the latest cases of which occurred in 2026. It is not the rapidity of the spread of the virus, but rather their capacity to take advantage of the same open vulnerabilities, that make them persistent.
Scientifically, there is not much grey. There is a natural reservoir that has been well established. Ways of transmission are well recorded. In WHO assessments, the incubation period, clinical course and long-term neurological damage are outlined. Even the most favourable conditions that are conducive to the transmission, such as living quarters packed with people and overstretched healthcare centres, are common knowledge. The failure of knowledge is not what is consistent, but dedication. After an outbreak has subsided and headlines have gone away, there is no longer sustained political and institutional attention on them.
The consequence of this knowledge and action disparity is more than just on the health of the population. Nipah is an example of how naturally occurring diseases can cause the creation of risks that are similar to those commonly linked to threats caused by biological security challenges. Fear, economic upheaval, and apprehension in local health systems may be the result even without any ill intent of a well-intentioned weak surveillance, delayed diagnosis, limited laboratory services, and poor health systems. It is a systemic (not an accidental) effect.
Here we can see the applicability of the Biological Weapons Convention silently. The BWC is often referred to with deliberate biological warfare, but it has the wider option of minimizing harm caused by biological agents that may be in any form. Epidemic preparedness is in line with such principles as transparency, cooperation with other countries, and the responsible use of biological science. Nipah reveals the unnatural separation of global health and arms control by demonstrating that biological risk is a non-bureaucratic phenomenon.
Among the most disturbing results of the previous outbreaks is the implication of the role of healthcare facilities themselves. WHO statistics show that hospitals may also serve as disease vectors instead of disease prevention centres where the infection prevention is of low standards. Lack of ventilation, lack of protective equipment and overworked personnel are some of the conditions that result in human-to-human transmission being increased. They are not medicine failures; they are planning and investment failures. The effects of looking infection control as a non-essential task rather than an essential tool spread way beyond the individual patients.
Another vulnerability that is quite common in laboratories is laboratories safety. Diagnosing Nipah infection needs high-containment labs and personnel which are unevenly distributed in the affected areas. Samples are often required to be moved over extended distances which adds to risk and time. Enhancing the biosafety and biosecurity of the laboratory should therefore be perceived as not only a need to the health of the population, but also a confidence building strategy that builds international trust. The aim is right in line with the essence of the BWC.
The way ahead is obvious, though it may be strenuous. The elimination of Nipah in the future will take more efforts than managing Nipah outbreaks once they occur. Monitoring of the human-animal interface should become more robust. Hospital infection control cannot be considered a secondary issue, but instead a vital part of the national security. The studies on immunization and medicines should be supported on a long-term basis, rather than on crisis funding. Above all, global health and security communities should take the task of interacting with each other, with more seriousness as it is acknowledged that biological threats do not often communicate to the world whether they are natural or deliberate.
Nipah is not the next pandemic likely to cause the world pandemic. But it must not be made one to warrant action. It is already a kind of stress test, demonstrating the susceptibility of current systems to the high-impact biological events. It will be a matter of whether the world is willing to consider biosecurity, public health, and international cooperation as a unified and interdependent issue instead of as individual and technical issues whether future outbreaks remain targeted resources or grow into something much more disruptive.
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