The West’s triumph in the post-Cold War gave rise to the thought that the human race had reached the pinnacle of its socio-political evolution. Drawing on a reading of Hegel filtered through Kojève, Fukuyama asserted that liberal democracy, wedded to market capitalism, had prevailed over the rest, not merely militarily but normatively. In this geopolitical and intellectual environment, liberal internationalism was accepted as the organising principle of the new world order. Decades later, that confidence has thinned with liberal internationalism yielding ground to what may be described as realist internationalism.
The evolution of International Relations (IR) is a tale of intellectual rivalry between realism and liberalism. Liberalism emanated from the ideas of Immanuel Kant and later institutional theorists such as Robert Keohane. Offering a more optimistic reading of world politics, it argues that multilateral institutions, economic interdependence, societal interactions and democratic governance can mitigate conflict. For liberals, rules and regimes shape state behaviour more cooperatively. Conversely, realism views the international system as anarchic and power as its sole currency. Associated thinkers such as Morgenthau and Waltz, it assumes states as the primary actors, with survival through self-help as their core objective. For realists, cooperation is temporary and contingent upon self-interests.
Until the end of the Cold War, neo-strands of realism and liberalism dominated the discourse on IR. The theoretical horizon of IR began to expand as alternative perspectives gradually emerged. Nevertheless, despite the tough academic challenge posed by social constructivism, feminism, postmodernism, and critical theory in the 80s and 90s, only the neo-theories could bridge the gap between theory and state practice. Policymakers rarely cited theory explicitly, but their choices reflected either of the neo logics.
The end of the Cold War profoundly unsettled the realists who had predicted continuity in bipolarity. On the contrary, liberal internationalism became both description and prescription. Liberal claims about the transformative power of ideas, institutions, and economic integration appeared to be validated, leading to the belief that liberal internationalism is the world’s only future. The belief that a rules-based order could ensure peace was further strengthened by the consolidation of the World Trade Organisation, the expansion of the European Union, and Democratic transitions in Eastern Europe.
Over the next three post-Cold War decades, liberal internationalism sowed the seeds of its own erosion. Globalisation failed to deliver on the promise of prosperity for all. Wealth distribution became alarmingly skewed despite the expansion of aggregate wealth. Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya exposed the limits of military-driven democratisation. The anti-Islam bias during the War Against Terrorism and the West’s complicity in the Gaza genocide further stained the liberal fabric. China’s economic miracle offered an alternative pathway to development and prosperity, mocking the liberal promise. The rise of right-wing extremism, spearheaded by Donald Trump, gave the final dent. The scepticism toward alliances, multilateralism, free trade and democracy revealed the fragility of liberal internationalism.
In this context, realist internationalism, advocated by Emma Ashford, recentres foreign policy around power politics and national interests. Grounded in the realist tradition, it views the promotion of democracy as unnecessary. Contrary to classical realism, it argues for sustained international engagement, but with tighter prioritisation. While accepting the persistence of great power competition, the concept treats institutions as mere instruments of power. It maintains that the US may not revert to isolationist policies but should seek to minimise its military engagements in the Middle East and Ukraine as these regions do not directly affect its security. Most strikingly, it encourages the US to accept the 19th-century colonial concept of the sphere of influence (SOI) of other great powers. In short, the concept rejects liberals’ triumphant style of politics and strikes a balance between hawkish and isolationist policies by urging prudence.
The US policy under President Trump reflects this shift. By asserting claims over Greenland and urging Europe to make compromises in Ukraine, the SOI is being rekindled. Sanctions and export controls are deployed as tools of economic statecraft, while strategic competition with China frames economic and technological policy. The arrest of Venezuela’s President and the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader show the disregard for international law. Calls for burden sharing in multilateral alliances indicate that alliances are no longer considered indispensable.
The transition from liberal to realist internationalism does not signify the end of cooperation. It marks its recalibration of the state’s policies and academic enquiry of IR amid renewed rivalry and domestic constraints. Realist internationalism provides a reality check: international politics has returned to interest calculation, but without abandoning interdependence. The liberal internationalist enthusiasm has given way to sobriety. The end of history has yielded to the persistence of power.
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