Decades after the fall of the Cold War, the world appeared to enter a unipolar phase with the United States as the dominant superpower. The idea was that American military power, economic supremacy, and international influence would define the era. However, in the present day, we are beginning to hear discussions about a future characterised by multi-polarity, with power divided among several key actors. One of the main arenas where this shift is becoming apparent is in the emerging rivalry between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This raises the question: is this competition merely a reassertion of the Cold War era, Cold War II or some variation of it, or is the new global landscape a more complex game of rewriting the rules of international power within a genuinely multipolar world?
The comparison to the Cold War is, on the surface, quite appealing. The conflicts between the U.S. and China are intense competitions across economic, technological, military, and ideological realms. Their relationship is not one of pure cooperation. The U.S. has clearly labelled China as a strategic rival, implementing export restrictions, increasing criticism of Chinese capital, and forging alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, China speaks of its resistance to U.S. unilateralism and advocates for what it describes as a multipolar world order. However, the language and circumstances of this conflict are not similar to the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the previous century.
The nature of interdependence is a key difference. The Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union consisted of two vastly different economic blocs, both hostile and lacking full ties. In contrast, the U.S. and China are very closely linked. China is embedded in global supply chains, maintains significant trade with the U.S., holds U.S. treasury securities, and participates in international institutions guided by the liberal international order. The extent of this economic integration means that the competition isn’t just between blocs, ideologies or zero cooperation — it is much messier. This is better described as intra-core competition: two major powers at the centre of the global economy are vying against each other, despite being surrounded by other distinct zones.
Such interdependence makes a hypothesis of merely reverting to bipolarity (i.e., only U.S. vs. China) more difficult. According to some scholars, the world remains bipolar, with China and the U.S. as the dominant poles. Others argue that we already live in a multipolar world where emerging giants such as India, Russia, Brazil, and regional blocs are shifting the balance. The reality is that U.S.-China competition remains central, but it is also comprehensive; other stakeholders and power centres exist and are significant.
When the competition occurs in a multipolar world, the tactics and strategies would differ from those during the Cold War days. In the Cold War, the conflict was primarily driven by ideological confrontation (communism versus capitalism), with proxy wars being very common, and the two superpowers maintaining rigid blocs. Ideology remains relevant today (liberal democracy versus authoritarian capital) and conventional warfare is still possible (Taiwan, South China Sea), but has been increasingly replaced by cyber-, technological, trade-, and normative warfare – hybrid battlegrounds that were less prominent during the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
Multiplicity also suggests there will be more space for powers operating in the region to manoeuvre. Nations are less rigidly aligned either as clients of one of the superpowers. For example, the Republic of India has been economically engaged with both China and the U.S. and seeks strategic independence rather than total alignment. Beijing and Washington are competing for influence across many countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The U.S.-China rivalry cannot dominate the entire system in such a context. Additionally, China tends to promote non-alignment, especially among other countries and the potential multipolar world, which reduces Western leadership.
One more dimension: the distribution of power across different areas. During the Cold War, ideology and military-industrial strength were primary sources of power. Today’s great-power competition is broader and more complex, encompassing and surpassing economic strength (GDP, trade, investment), technological dominance (AI, quantum computing, 5G), financial networks (reserved currency, infrastructure finance), and soft power (development assistance). Because of its expanded scope and interconnectedness, this rivalry is not simply a replay of the Cold War but instead a new form of contest driven by current realities.
That said, the Cold War analogy helps us understand the seriousness of U.S.-China rivalry, the danger of mistakes, and the risk of proxy conflict escalation. Ideas like zero-sum competition, spheres of influence, alliances, and escalation risks (e.g., Taiwan, South China Sea, technology war) echo Cold War thinking. However, referring to the so-called Cold War can overly simplify the current situation. Today’s competition isn’t purely ideological or geographically separated as it was during the U.S.-Soviet era; instead, it’s marked by significant overlaps, economic interdependence, and multiple centres of power.
Is the U.S.-China rivalry replacing the Cold War? Not quite. The cold War formed a distinct era: two powerful nations, clear ideological conflict, fewer connections, global involvement through client states, inflexible alliances, and the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Today’s competition is more subtle. It is evolving into something adapted to the 21st century – Cold War 0 with many variations or a multipolar rivalry centred around a duopoly. We do not live in a unipolar world, but we are not entirely in traditional multipolarity with numerous small powers either; we occupy an intermediate stage.
Unpacking the reasons why this move towards multi-polarity is important, why not? To start with, it changes the way coalitions and blocs are formed. Smaller states became more likely to survive or gain influence at the expense of the dominant powers when the world was unipolar or bipolar. In a multipolar world, they can diversify alliances, hedge their bets, or even carve out their niches. This enhances the agency of medium and small powers. Countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Nigeria exemplify those that are both cooperating with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and engaging with U.S. strategic frameworks. They do not commit to specific camps. This dynamism curbs the ability of either the U.S. or China to dominate the system entirely.
Second, economic competition and decoupling emerge as strategic tools. During the Cold War, economic integration between the blocs was minimal; today, it has become a key leverage point. Both the U.S. and China are reshoring and diversifying supply chains away from China, while China is further embedding itself in global value chains and infrastructure financing. Technological rivalry, such as in AI and semiconductors is a defining aspect of the current competition: control over these fields grants a geopolitical advantage. These trends highlight that such rivalry is not solely military or ideological but also strongly economic and technological.
Third, the existence of several serious and regional powers implies that no single actor can influence the outcome as easily. For example, Russia, which is strategically less powerful than the USSR, is a revisionist state and collaborates with China in certain areas, creating triadic patterns that limit the independence of the U.S. New global players such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Turkey also have their own agendas and sometimes work with both the U.S. and China. The rise of regional organisations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or others) indicates an order that is not dominated by a single power.
However, the move back to multipolarity is not a complete achievement. There are those who would claim that power is not fully distributed: the U.S. maintains unmatched military strength globally, China continues to depend on U.S. technologies and international finance, and most states remain bound by the U.S. alliance. Therefore, as multipolarity begins to emerge, it is not yet equal. The shift can be unstable as powers compete for dominance, alliances shift, and norms are challenged. The transition itself is inherently dangerous.
With all this said, the question that inevitably arises is: is the U.S.-China rivalry recreating or redefining the Cold War? The latter is suggested by the evidence. It is updating it—reforming old traditions of great-power competition to a world marked by greater integration, intricate interdependence, and a multiplicity of participants. The competition seems similar in its systemic significance, but it is organised differently: it is no longer a rigid bloc system, but rather a landscape of more mixed economies, merged fields (technology, commerce, cyber sphere), and increased authority for non-superpower states. It will not extend as far as the binary structure of the past, but the underlying goals remain similar.
This is important to analysts and policymakers because the tools, risks, and opportunities differ. Cold war playbooks (i.e., clear blocks, containment, low interdependence, etc.) will not be effective. This demands new approaches that recognise the overlap, interdependence, and fluidity of the current system. For smaller states such as Pakistan, India, or those in Southeast Asia or Africa, this can mean increased strategic space as well as greater uncertainty. It involves using a variety of axes and hedging strategies simultaneously, rather than simply choosing a side.
Finally, we are witnessing a paradigm shift in the world order. The unipolar moment has passed, and we now live in a multipolar world—or at least a world with multipolar tendencies. The U.S.-China rivalry is central to this change, but it is not acting alone or in a Cold War manner. Instead, it represents a reinvention of international competition, reflecting the complexities of the 21st century: a connected global economy, technological competition, multiple centres of power, and a global economy where smaller states have more options. The most important thing policymakers and scholars need to recognise is that this is not a repeat of the Cold War; rather, the game is changing, and they must adapt accordingly.
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